

Logical Positivism

An American History

Sander Verhaegh

Logical Positivism
An American History

Sander Verhaegh

Table of Contents

Preface

List of Abbreviations

List of Tables and Figures

Ch. 1. Introduction

Part I. Context

Ch. 2. Selective Pressures

Ch. 3. External Relations

Ch. 4. Frames of Reference

Appendix I Scientific Philosophy 1900–1930

Part II. Individuals

Ch. 5. First Encounters

Ch. 6. Science, Syntax, Socialism

Ch. 7. Exiled Empiricists

Appendix II Logical Positivism 1930–1960

Part III. Institutions

Ch. 8. Danger to the Discipline

Ch. 9. Supply and Demand

Ch. 10. Golden Age/Gilded Cage

Appendix III Analytic Philosophy 1940–1970

Part IV. Narratives

Ch. 11 *Kulturkampf*

Ch. 12 Post-Positivism

Ch. 13. New Narratives

Appendix IV Philosophy of Science 1920–1980

Ch. 14. Conclusion

Bibliography

Index

Preface

Logical positivism took shape in Europe but it took hold in the United States. It emerged from discussions between philosophers and scientists in Vienna and Berlin; but it transformed philosophy after its best-known representatives fled fascism and sought refuge in North America. The logical positivists fundamentally changed how American scholars approached the study of science and they contributed to the rise of a new, ‘analytic’ conception of philosophy that still dominates the field today. Allies hailed its clarity and methodological rigor, welcoming it as the philosophy to end all philosophies. Critics dismissed it as sterile and reductive and tried to keep it out of American philosophy departments. Outside university walls, logical positivism got caught up in a culture war that greatly affected public debate in the 1950s and 1960s. Religious leaders and countercultural essayists warned their readers about the dangers of a philosophy that entails that moral questions are strictly speaking meaningless. Others embraced it as a breath of fresh air, celebrating logical positivism as a model of modern, scientific thinking in an age when science and technology helped the United States become a world power.

How could a small group of academic migrants—Rudolf Carnap, Herbert Feigl, Carl Gustav Hempel, Hans Reichenbach and others—leave such a deep imprint on American thought? And how did logical positivism itself change in the wake of their migration? This book presents an American history of logical positivism, arguing that the key to these questions lies in a better understanding of the intellectual and cultural climate that proved so susceptible to the émigrés’ ideas. Drawing on a wealth of archival material—personal and professional correspondence, notebooks, diaries, course catalogues, institutional records, interviews, and articles in contemporary newspapers and magazines—this book reconstructs logical positivism’s American development and legacy.

In offering an ‘American history’, this book does not just shift the perspective from Europe to the United States, tracing the migrants’ activities in their new home country. It presents an American history in a more substantive sense. Logical positivism is often portrayed as an invasive species that contributed to the demise of a distinctively American intellectual culture. Roy Wood Sellars once described it as “a new kind of colonialism” led by “Viennese scientists” who knew little about American philosophy (1969, vi, 28). Richard Rorty wrote about a “take over” by European migrants who “showed up thanks to Hitler and various other historical contingencies” (1982, 214; 1995, 70). This book presents an alternative perspective, arguing that logical positivism was predominantly a product of transatlantic exchange. In the 1910s and 1920s, I argue, a diverse coalition of American new realists, operationists, logicians, scientific pragmatists, and philosophers of physics had already laid the groundwork, such that connections between these groups and their European colleagues gave rise to an international community of ‘scientific philosophers’. After the war, logical positivism became more than a

school of philosophy when American intellectuals, journalists, and religious leaders repurposed its ideas for broad cultural discussions about the relation between science and religion; as well as the connection between science, technology, and politics. To understand logical positivism's impact, this book argues, one should not only study the activities of the émigrés but also consider the intellectual, institutional, and cultural climate that facilitated logical positivism's rise and fall.

This book is divided into four parts. Part I traces the development of American philosophy in the decades before the intellectual migration, showing how local discussions about logic and the theory of relativity created fertile ground for a new conception of philosophy (Chapters 2–4). Part II reconstructs the (first) encounters between European and American philosophers and scientists in the 1920s and 1930s, showing how these exchanges helped shape the contours of what we nowadays know as logical positivism (Chapters 5–7). Part III analyzes how central features of the positivists' conception of philosophy became ingrained into academic practice when U.S. universities had to expand and rejuvenate in the years after the war (Chapter 8–10). And Part IV analyzes the cultural narratives that came to define logical positivism's legacy and place in the history of American philosophy—stories that still inform our understanding of the movement today (Chapters 11–13). Each part is concluded with a quantitative analysis of the philosophical literature in the corresponding period, supplementing this book's studies of specific philosophers and institutions with a broader-scale overview of the discipline's development in the long twentieth century (Appendices I–IV). All material that was used to generate the tables and figures in these appendices are available in an online supplement at <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.17376602>.

Some chapters of this book draw on earlier work. Chapter 4 is based on “The Reception of Relativity in American Philosophy”, published in *Philosophy of Science* (2024b), and uses material from “Psychological Operationisms at Harvard: Skinner, Boring, and Stevens”, published in *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* (2021). Chapter 5 combines material from “The American Reception of Logical Positivism: First Encounters (1929–1932)”, published in *HOPOS: Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science* (2020a) and “Logical Positivism: The History of a ‘Caricature’”, published in *Isis: A Journal of the History of Science Society* (2024c). Chapter 6 includes material from “Nagel's Philosophical Development”, published in *Ernest Nagel: Philosophy of Science and the Fight for Clarity* (2022a) and “Columbia Naturalism and the Analytic Turn: Eclipse or Synthesis?”, published in *American Philosophy and the Intellectual Migration* (2025c). Chapter 7 is a rewritten and condensed version of the two-part paper “Coming to America: Carnap, Reichenbach, and the Great Intellectual Migration”, published in *Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy* (2020bc), and includes material from “Carnap and Reichenbach”, forthcoming in *Rudolf Carnap Handbuch* (forthcoming-a). Chapters 8 and 9 are based on the two-part paper “The Analytic Turn in American Philosophy: An Institutional Perspective”, in *HOPOS: Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science* (2025de). Chapter 10 is based on “Golden Age/Gilded Cage: Logical Empiricism as Analytic Philosophy”, forthcoming in *Philosophy of Science: Past, Present and Future* (forthcoming-c). Sections 2.2–2.5 and Chapter 3 build on “External Relations: Russell, New Realism, and the Harvard School of Logic”, forthcoming in *Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy* (forthcoming-b), “Susanne K. Langer and the Harvard School of

Analysis”, published in *The Bloomsbury Handbook of Susanne K. Langer* (Bloomsbury 2024a), and “Naturalism”, published in the *Routledge Handbook of the History of Philosophy of Science* (Routledge, 2026). Finally, some parts of Appendices I and II are based on “Bibliometrics Beyond Citations: Introducing Mention Extraction and Analysis”, published in *Scientometrics* (Petrovich, Verhaegh, Bös et al. 2024), and “The American Reception of Logical Empiricism: A Mention-Based Bibliometric Analysis”, published in *The Legacy of the Vienna Circle* (Verhaegh, Petrovich, and Bös 2025). Finally, the first section of Appendix IV is based on the introduction to *Philosophy of Science: Past, Present and Future* (Love and Verhaegh, forthcoming). I thank all these journals and publishers for granting permission to reprint this material. Translations of German and French sources—published work and archival documents—are mine unless indicated otherwise.

Yet this book is more than a collection of papers. Some chapters and appendices (1, 11–14, A.III) are completely new. Others mostly consist of new material (2, 6, A.I, A.II, and A.IV) or have been extensively rewritten (3–5, 7–10) to fill the gaps and avoid repetition. I am greatly indebted to Adam Tamas Tuboly, Cheryl Misak, George Reisch, Matthias Neuber, Stefaan Blancke, Thomas Uebel, and an anonymous reviewer for Oxford University Press, who all read the penultimate draft of this book and saved me from many errors. In addition, I would like to thank Alan Love, Bas van Fraassen, Benjamin Marschall, Christian Damböck, David Atkinson, David Hollinger, Friedrich Stadler, Georg Schiemer, Jan Vrhovski, Joel Katzav, Jonathan Strassfeld, Juliet Floyd, Lisa Kampen, Lona Gaikis, Marta Sznajder, Robert Stalnaker, Sangam McDuff, Sebastien Gandon, members of the MCPS² reading group—Bennett McNulty, Dejan Makovec, Jennifer Whyte, Kelli Barr, Moussa Mohammadian, and Noah Friedman-Biglin—and audiences in Amsterdam, Antwerp, Boston, Budapest, Campinas, Chicago, Düsseldorf, Frankfurt, Geneva, Ghent, Glasgow, Groningen, Hamilton, Jena, Maastricht, Minneapolis, Montpellier, New Brunswick, Paris, Phoenix, Pittsburgh, Rome, Tilburg, Turin, Utrecht, Vancouver, and Vienna for comments on individual chapters and the papers on which they are based.

This project began in 2018, when I first visited the *Wiener Kreis Archiv* in Haarlem to study the correspondence between Feigl and Moritz Schlick. Since then, I have had the opportunity to examine dozens of archival collections, thanks to funding from the Dutch Research Council (grants VI.Veni.275.20.064 and VI.Vidi.201.115), the Pittsburgh Center for Philosophy of Science, the Bertrand Russell Research Center at McMaster University, and since 2022, the European Research Council (grant 2021-STG, 101039904). I am much indebted to archivists, curators, and collection specialists at UC Berkeley, University of Chicago, Columbia University, Cornell University, Stadt und Universitätsbibliothek Frankfurt am Main, Harvard University, Institute for Advanced Study, University of Iowa, McMaster University, University of Michigan, University of Minnesota, Noord-Hollands Archief, University of Pennsylvania, University of Pittsburgh, Princeton University, Rockefeller Archives Center, Stanford University, and Yale University, in particular Jon Klosinski and Jason Rampelt (Archives of Scientific Philosophy), Kenneth Blackwell and Andrew Bone (Bertrand Russell Research Center), and Erin George and Erin McBrien (University of Minnesota Archives) for helping me find and get access to the material I needed to write this book. In addition, I would like to thank everyone who helped me feel welcome at the University of Pittsburgh and at McMaster University during my research stays in 2020 and 2022, in particular Carolyn Oblak,

Edouard Machery, Tom Ricketts, and the visiting fellows at the Pittsburgh Center for Philosophy of Science; and Alex Klein, Donovan Wishon, Jessica Bouchard, Johannes Steizinger, Mark Johnstone, Rabia Awan, Sandra Lapointe, and the students of the course on logical positivism I taught at McMaster. I am also indebted to the people who helped me develop this book project into a viable grant proposal, including Corijn van Mazijk, Felipe Romero, Jeanne Peijnenburg, Lotte Jaspers, Marielle Brouwer, Marta Sznajder, and my wonderful colleagues at Tilburg University, in particular Eleanora Sciubba, Gijs Paaimans, Inge van de Ven, Katarina Mihaljevic, and Matteo Colombo.

Most importantly, I would like to thank the amazing ‘Exiled Empiricists’ project team: Claudia Cristalli, Eugenio Petrovich, Fons Dewulf, Ties van Gemert, and since 2023, Gregor Bös and Nina IJdens, as well as the project’s visiting fellows Alex Klein and Christian Feldbacher-Escamilla. This book would not have been possible without their philosophical and methodological input, our fruitful project meetings, their constructive feedback on multiple drafts of most of its chapters, and their contributions to the conception and development of *edhiphy*, the database used to map the development of American philosophy in the appendices of this book. Parts of Appendices I and II were co-authored with Eugenio Petrovich and Gregor Bös; Christian Feldbacher-Escamilla reviewed the translations of the German source material cited in Chapter 7; and Fons Dewulf kindly shared the transcripts of his oral history interviews with, among others, Bas van Fraassen, Clark Glymour, and Helen Longino for the Exiled Empiricists Oral History Project. Finally, I thank the people at Oxford University Press, in particular Hannah Doyle, Lucie Randall, and Meredith Taylor, for their support and their patience with this project.

When Carnap first visited the United States in 1923, he immediately recognized it as a country of great scientific opportunities. In a letter to Heinrich Scholz, he predicted that it would “have a more promising, intellectually fruitful future than people in our country usually think”.¹ His prediction turned out to be correct, albeit for deeply tragic reasons he could not have foreseen in the mid-1920s. Just one decade later, Reichenbach could already hail ‘*Amerika*’ as the country that was going to “continue German science” now that it had been “driven out of its home”.² Today, the United States finds itself at a turning point. Authoritarian politicians and profit-driven technology companies have proliferated the spread of misinformation, turning the country from a forward-looking into a backward-looking nation. Academic freedom is under severe threat and core scientific values are treated with suspicion by the administration and a large share of the population. It is not surprising, therefore, that scientists are now considering a move in the opposite direction. In February 2025, the German Max Planck Society reported that it received an increasing number of applications from American scientists and the president of the European Research Council told European parliament that she hoped to present U.S. scientists with “a haven” after the second Trump administration threatened to cut billions in science funding.³ This book reconstructs the rise of

¹ Carnap to Heinrich Scholz, August 13, 1923, RCP, 102-72-09

² Reichenbach to Wolfgang Köhler, February 4, 1935, HRP, 013-48-25.

³ “Haben Sie vielleicht Interesse, nach Deutschland zu kommen?”, *Der Spiegel*, February 8, 2025; “Europe Could be a ‘Haven’ for US Researchers, says ERC President”, *Science Business*, February 27, 2025.

a philosophical movement that promoted a scientific world conception and actively combatted the irrationalities of its time and age. I hope it will encourage and inspire readers to do the same in the present.

Sander Verhaegh
Amsterdam
May 2026

Abbreviations

Archival Collections

ACP	Alonzo Church Papers, Firestone Library, Princeton University
BBP	Brand Blanshard Papers, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library
BFSP	B. F. Skinner Papers, Pusey Library, Harvard University Archives
BRP	Bertrand Russell Papers, Bertrand Russell Research Centre, McMaster University
CHP	Carl Gustav Hempel Papers, Archives of Scientific Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh
CILP	Clarence Irving Lewis Papers, Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries
CU	Columbia University, University Archives, Butler Library, Columbia University Libraries
DCWP	Donald Cary Williams Papers, Pusey Library, Harvard University Archives
ENP-ASP	Ernest Nagel Papers, Archives of Scientific Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh
ENP-CU	Ernest Nagel Papers, Butler Library, Columbia University Libraries
FJEW	Frederick James Eugene Woodbridge Papers, Butler Library, Columbia University Libraries
FWP	Forrest O. Wiggins Papers, University Archives, Elmer L. Andersen Library, University of Minnesota
GCP	George Perrigo Conger Papers, Upper Midwest Literary Archives, Elmer L. Andersen Library, University of Minnesota
HFP	Herbert Feigl Papers, University Archives, Elmer L. Andersen Library, University of Minnesota
HRP	Hans Reichenbach Papers, Archives of Scientific Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh
HU	Harvard University, University Archives, Pusey Library, Cambridge, Massachusetts
IASR	Institute for Advanced Study Records, Shelby White and Leon Levy Archives Center, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton.
JGP	James Gutmann Papers, Butler Library, Columbia University Libraries

JPC	Journal of Philosophy Correspondence, Butler Library, Columbia University Libraries
LJHP	Lawrence Joseph Henderson Papers, Pusey Library, Harvard University Archives
MHP	Max Horkheimer Papers, Stadt und Universitätsbibliothek, Frankfurt am Main
MRCP	Morris Raphael Cohen Papers, Hanna Holborn Gray Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library.
MSP	Moritz Schlick Papers, Wiener Kreis Archiv, Rijksarchief in Noord-Holland, Haarlem
ONP	Otto Neurath Papers, Wiener Kreis Archiv, Rijksarchief in Noord-Holland, Haarlem
PKP	Paul Oskar Kristeller Papers, Butler Library, Columbia University Libraries
PWBP	P. W. Bridgman Papers, Pusey Library, Harvard University Archives
PU	Princeton University, University Archives, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton, New Jersey
RAC	Rockefeller Archives Center, Sleepy Hollow, New York
RBPP	Ralph Barton Perry Papers, Harvard University Archives
RCP	Rudolf Carnap Papers, Archives of Scientific Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh
RJP	Richard C. Jeffrey Papers, Archives of Scientific Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh
SHP	Sidney Hook Papers, Hoover Institution Library and Archives, Stanford University
SLP	Susanne K. Langer Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University
SSSP	Stanley Smith Stevens Papers, Pusey Library, Harvard University Archives
UCB	University of California, Berkeley, University Archives, The Bancroft Library, Berkeley, California
UC	University of Chicago, University Archives, University of Chicago Library, Chicago, Illinois
UI	University of Iowa, University Archives, Special Collections and Archives, Iowa City
UMN	University of Minnesota, University Archives, Elmer L. Andersen Library, Minneapolis, Minnesota
USMP	Unity of Science Movement Papers, University of Chicago Library
VLP	Victor Lenzen Papers, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley
WSP	Wilfrid Sellars Papers, Archives of Scientific Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh
WCSP	Wesley C. Salmon Papers, Archives of Scientific Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh
WVQP	W. V. Quine Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University

YU Yale University, University Archives, Manuscripts and Archives, New Haven, Connecticut

Reference Works

CJD *The Correspondence of John Dewey, 1871–1952*. 3 vols. Ed. Larry A. Hickman. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University.

CPP *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*. Vols. 1–6. Eds. C. Hartshorne and P. Weiss. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press

CWJ *The Correspondence of William James*. Volumes 1–7. Eds. I. K. Skrupskelis and E. M. Berkeley. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia.

EWD *The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882–1898*. 5 vols. Ed. J. A. Boydston. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.

LWD *The Late Works of John Dewey, 1925–1953*. 17 vols. Ed. J. A. Boydston. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.

MWD *The Middle Works of John Dewey, 1899–1924*. 15 vols. Ed. J. A. Boydston. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press

WWJ *The Works of William James (1875–1988)*. Volumes I–XVIII. Eds. F. H. Burkhard, F. Bowers, and I. K. Skrupskelis. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.

Other Abbreviations

AAAS American Association for the Advancement of Science

AAC Association of American Colleges

ACE American College of Education

APA American Philosophical Association

ASP Archives of Scientific Philosophy

CCNY City College of New York

CSPR Conferences on Science, Philosophy, and Religion

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

HOPOS History of Philosophy of Science

HPS History and Philosophy of Science

IEUS The International Encyclopedia of Unified Science

IMSSS Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences

KGB Committee for State Security, Soviet Union

MCPS Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science

MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology

NBC National Broadcasting Company

NDEA National Defense Education Act

NEH National Endowment for the Humanities

NSDAP	National Socialist German Workers' Party
NSF	National Science Foundation
NYU	New York University
PLP	Progressive Labor Party
PM	<i>Principia Mathematica</i>
PSA	Philosophy of Science Association
SDS	Students for a Democratic Society
UC	University of California
UCLA	University of California, Los Angeles
UI	University of Iowa
UMN	University of Minnesota
UPenn	University of Pennsylvania
WPA	Western Philosophical Association

List of Figures

- AI.1 Co-mention network of contemporary philosophers in American philosophy journals, 1901–1915
- AI.2 Co-mention network of contemporary philosophers in American philosophy journals, 1916–1930
- AI.3 Co-mention network of contemporary philosophers in American philosophy journals, 1931–1945
- AII.1 Mention statistics of eleven philosophers connected to logical positivism, 1921–1979
- AII.2 Mention shares of eleven philosophers connected to logical positivism in American and British philosophy journals, 1921–1979
- AIII.1 Co-mention network of contemporary philosophers in American philosophy journals, 1941–1950
- AIII.2 Co-mention network of contemporary philosophers in American philosophy journals, 1951–1960
- AIII.3 Co-mention network of contemporary philosophers in American philosophy journals, 1961–1970
- AIV.1 Institutional and genealogical connections between logical positivists and philosophy of science leadership, 1959–1974

List of Tables

3.1	Harvard course offerings in logic 1910-1911 vs. 1925–1926
3.2	Harvard philosophy doctorates by field of interest, 1891–1930
AI.1	Most-mentioned contemporary philosophers in American philosophy journals, 1901–1930
AI.2	Philosophers with the fastest growing mention numbers in American philosophy journals, 1901–1930
AI.3	Number of articles containing the term ‘pragmatis*’ in six Anglophone philosophy journals, 1898–1907
AI.4	Overrepresented philosophers in <i>Journal of Philosophy</i> and <i>Philosophical Review</i> , 1901–1930
AII.1	Most-mentioned contemporary philosophers in American philosophy journals, 1931–1960
AII.2	Philosophers with the fastest growing and declining mention numbers in American philosophy journals, 1921–1930 to 1931–1940
AII.3	Most and least characteristic terms of articles mentioning Carnap, Reichenbach, Schlick, Feigl, or none of these four in American philosophy journals, 1931–1940
AII.4	Mention proportions of philosophers in generalist vs. philosophy of science journals, 1904–1960
AIII.1	Most-mentioned contemporary philosophers in American philosophy journals, 1941–1970
AIII.2	Most-mentioned and most overrepresented philosophers; most and least characteristic terms in <i>Journal of Philosophy</i> , <i>Philosophical Review</i> , and <i>Philosophical Studies</i> , 1951–1979
AIII.3	Historical figures represented among the most-mentioned philosophers in American philosophy journals, 1941–1979
AIV.1	Thirty classic logical positivist papers in <i>Philosophy of Science</i>
AIV.2	Most-mentioned contemporary philosophers and scientists in <i>Philosophy of Science</i> , 1934–1974
AIV.3	Most common title terms in <i>Philosophy of Science</i> , 1934–1974
AIV.4	Most and least characteristic terms occurring in <i>Philosophy of Science</i> , 1934–1974

1. Introduction

On September 11, 1931, a hefty ocean liner arrived in the harbor of New York City. The ship, measuring over nine hundred feet in length, had just passed Liberty Island and its approximately two thousand passengers were eager to disembark. The luxurious RMS *Berengaria* offered its first-class travelers plenty of entertainment—a ballroom, a Ritz-Carlton restaurant, and a two-story Roman bath. But they all had been aboard for six days and were looking forward to return home after a summer in Europe. Sir Richard Squires, Prime Minister of Newfoundland, was on his way back after a summit in London. Eleanor Cummings, wife of the Chicago railway magnate, had spent a few months in France. And the crew of the *Amberjack II*, a small race yacht, was returning to the United States after finishing second place in the Newport-Plymouth Trans-Atlantic Race.¹

Yet not all passengers were North Americans who had visited the ‘old continent’. A small group of European travelers was particularly relieved to set foot on U.S. soil. They had crossed the Atlantic to escape the political climate in Europe and were hoping to start a new life in the United States. One of them was Herbert Feigl, a tall and distinguished-looking philosopher of science who had decided to emigrate because there were virtually no positions for Jewish academics in the German-speaking world.² The twenty-eight-year-old philosopher had published a monograph in the philosophy of physics, a book that had prompted Albert Einstein to write him a recommendation letter, but it had been impossible to find a job. Austria was led by a chancellor who supported a cap on Jewish scholars and the University of Vienna rector had tried to reform the student regulation on ‘German-Aryan’ principles (Fenz 1978; Stadler 1979; Sigmund 2017). Feigl had briefly worked at the *Volkshochschule Wien*, an institute for adult education, but there was little chance of acquiring a permanent post.

It was not the first time that Feigl had to move countries because of his background. About ten years earlier, when he had just graduated high school, Feigl and his cousin Arthur Beer had tried to enroll at the University of Munich, located in what then was one of Europe’s capitals of anti-Semitism. The two cousins had grown up in Liberec (*Reichenberg*), a small textile city in Bohemia, nowadays part of the Czech Republic, and had stumbled upon an article on relativity theory in an Austrian journal. They had been fascinated by the story and had decided to study physics, mathematics, and philosophy in Munich, home to Arnold

¹ Layton (2011, ch. 8); “List of United States Citizens”, SS *Berengaria*, September 11, 1931, Liberty Ellis Island Foundation; “Premier, Back from London, Says Government Experts Aid in Balancing Budget”, *The New York Times*, September 12, 1931; “Some Newlyweds and Their Present Places of Residence”, *Chicago Daily Tribune*, July 15, 1931.

² “List or Manifest of Alien Passengers for the United States Immigration Officer”, SS *Berengaria*, September 11, 1931, Liberty Ellis Island Foundation; Feyrerabend (1995, 116).

Sommerfeld, Einstein's successor as chair of the German Physical Society. Pretty soon, they had been entangled in the Kafkaesque procedures preventing Jewish students from entering the lecture halls. The enrollment office demanded a permit of residence but the local authorities would only grant the permit if they were admitted by the university. Feigl and his cousin successfully contested the decision but soon after they received their documents, Munich passed new even stricter regulations forcing the cousins to move to Vienna to continue their studies (Feigl 1974, 5).

In the early 1920s, Feigl was able to continue his education by moving to a neighboring country. By 1931 he had to cross an entire ocean to resume his career. Feigl and his wife had boarded the *Berengaria* in Cherbourg, France, and were on their way to the Midwest, where he would soon start a job as a lecturer at the State University of Iowa. He was well aware that American academia was not known for its hospitality to Jewish scientists either. But he had been determined to travel to “any dirty place” if it would allow him to pursue his academic interests, even if it was the “South or the Middle West”.³ After the Harvard philosopher Clarence Irving Lewis had helped him acquire the job, convincing the Dean of Iowa's College of Liberal Arts that there was “nothing disturbing” about hiring a Jew (Feigl 1969b, 74), the young philosopher had received a contract, married his long-time fiancée Maria Kasper, and bought two single-fare tickets for the ocean steamer, ready to leave Europe behind.

1.1. Vienna Circle

Before his emigration, Feigl had been a member of the Vienna Circle, a group of philosophers and scientists led by Moritz Schlick, best known for his work in the philosophy of the natural sciences (Schlick 1917). The German philosopher-physicist held the prestigious chair of *Naturphilosophie* at the University of Vienna and had come to know Feigl in 1923, when he had served as a judge in an essay prize competition. Feigl, still nineteen years old at the time, had read some of Schlick's work on the philosophy of relativity theory and had submitted an article on the significance of Einstein's ideas.⁴ Impressed by the paper, Schlick had taken him on as a student after his conflict with the bigoted authorities in Munich; and it was Feigl who, together with his friend Friedrich Waismann, proposed to start a philosophical circle to discuss “issues in the logical and epistemological foundations” of science and mathematics (Feigl 1974, 7). Other prominent members of the group included the mathematician Hans Hahn, the physicist Philipp Frank, the sociologist Otto Neurath, and a few years later, Rudolf Carnap and Kurt Gödel.⁵ Starting in 1924, the Circle regularly met in the library of the Mathematical

³ Feigl to Moritz Schlick, April 5, 1931, MSP, 99/Fei-19.

⁴ Schlick to Robert Millikan, February 15, 1930, MSP, 109/Mill-2. Clipping from *Neue Freie Presse*, June 24, 1923, HFP, 01-04-01.

⁵ The Circle's 1929 manifesto (see Section 1.2) lists fourteen members, including Gustav Bergmann, Viktor Kraft, Karl Menger, Marcel Natkin, Olga Hahn-Neurath, and Theodor Radakovic (Hahn et al. 1929). Uebel (2024) lists several regular participants who are not mentioned in the manifesto (e.g. Bela von Juhos, Josef Schächter, and Edgar Zilsel) or who joined the Circle in later years (e.g. Rose Rand and Käthe Steinhardt).

Institute on the Boltzmanngasse, a short street in Vienna's ninth district. Little did they know that what started as a small Thursday evening discussion group would turn into a global movement that helped set the agenda for generations of American philosophers.

The Vienna Circle met in a period of great social and political turmoil. As the capital of the Austro-Hungarian empire, Vienna had been one of Europe's cultural center for decades. At the turn of the century, Sigmund Freud, Gustav Klimt, Robert Musil, Gustav Mahler, and Johann Strauss had all been living in the city. But so had Adolf Hitler, Leon Trotsky, and Franz Ferdinand. When the Austro-Hungarian soldiers returned from the trenches of the Great War, the European map had been radically redrawn. The dual monarchy had been dissolved and given birth to five new states, including a weakened Austrian rump state clamped between Mussolini's Italy and the politically unstable Weimar republic. Economic crises were abundant: trade blockades, food shortages, and a hyperinflation of ten thousand percent crippled the Viennese economy. What had once been the bristling heart of Europe, had become a poor, overcrowded city in a politically insignificant country.

Between 1924 and 1933, the heydays of the Circle, Vienna was governed by social democrats who responded to the crisis by implementing a range of social projects: public libraries, sports facilities, and institutes for adult education. The 'Red Vienna' housing program in particular was a guiding example for socialists around the world. In a short span of time, the administration built 'workers' palaces' for more than two hundred thousand people (Gruber 1991). Some members of the Circle played a role in these and other programs: Neurath was secretary of the social housing guild and the Austrian Association for Settlement and Allotment, Hahn was a member of the Vienna School Committee and headed the Association of Socialist University Teachers. Though not every member of the Circle identified as a socialist or social democrat, they all supported Vienna's attempts to elevate and educate the masses. The group organized well-attended public lectures and many members, including Feigl, regularly taught at the *Volkshochschulen* (Stadler 1981; Uebel 2004; Romizi 2012).

Despite the leftists' electoral successes, the political tension was palpable. Vienna was a progressive island in an ocean of conservatism. The Russian revolution had sparked the fear of communism and the Austrofascist movement was rapidly growing in popularity. The new Austrian republic was led by reactionary Catholics, with the anti-Semitic Greater German People's Party as a junior partner in most coalitions. Though the Treaty of Versailles prohibited a united German empire, many Austrians favored *Anschluss*, especially when Hitler, now located in Munich, became the leader of the NSDAP. Even at the University of Vienna conservatives were in the majority, often blocking appointments of liberal, socialist, and Jewish candidates. The Ministry of Education intervened in selection procedures and had a strong preference for Christian conservative academics. When the anti-liberal and anti-Marxist German Student Union published an overview of 'tendentious professors' in 1925, Schlick and Neurath were on the list. Hahn was included on a blacklist of Jewish teachers by the anti-Semitic *Deutsch-Österreichische Tageszeitung*.⁶

⁶ "Rasse und Wissenschaft auf unserer Universität", *Deutsch-Österreichische Tageszeitung*, April 23, 1924. See Stadler (1979, 69).

1.2. Scientific World Conception

It is no coincidence that Vienna Circle members mixed progressive politics with scholarly discussions about science and mathematics. In the 1920s, Europe's socio-political schisms were deeply intertwined with debates about the nature and limits of science. In the course of a century, the continent had become highly industrialized and scientific breakthroughs had put traditional worldviews on the defensive. Darwin's theory of evolution, technological innovations, revolutionary developments in physics, and the swift spread of naturalist perspectives on man, mind, and morality put pressure on traditional ways of thinking. Many German and Austrian intellectuals were skeptical about what they deemed to be the imperialist character of the natural sciences, arguing that society's rapid transformation had contributed to the demise of moral and spiritual values. They were backed by religious authorities. In 1907, Pope Pius X had published an encyclical letter describing science as a threat to "more serious and elevated disciplines" (1908, cited in Romizi 2012, 226).

This antiscientific mentality was reinforced by the First World War. Many German intellectuals enthusiastically embraced the geopolitical conflict and justified it by appealing to Germany's superior culture, contrasting it with the materialist cultures of the British and the French (Ringer 1969; Kusch 1995). When life in the trenches proved less heroic than expected, intellectuals used the soldiers' harrowing experiences to bolster their skepticism about technological 'progress'. Science had given the world mustard gas, tanks, and strategic bombers instead of cultural and social elevation. And when the Central Powers lost the war, scholars massively embraced anti-scientific worldviews, equating technological innovation with cultural decline. This atmosphere of crisis and cultural pessimism was perhaps best expressed by Oswald Spengler, a nationalist philosopher who acquired a cult following among German-speaking students. In *Untergang des Abendlandes* (1918), a book that sold more than one hundred thousand copies in the 1920s, Spengler argued that Western civilization and its scientific principles were deteriorating and would inevitably result in self-destruction.

The Vienna Circle opposed these intellectual and philosophical currents. Instead of arguing that the Enlightenment project had disenchanted the world, they doubled down on scientific thinking. They responded by embracing the virtues of what they called 'the scientific world conception': empirical evidence, logical analysis, and conceptual clarity. In their manifesto *Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung: Der Wiener Kreis*, the group expressed its aversion to "metaphysical and theologising thought", with which they meant the anti-scientific modes of thinking that were in vogue among Christian apologetics, nationalist politicians, and neo-romantic intellectuals alike (Hahn et al. 1929, 301). Neurath embraced the value of empirical research in an essay titled *Anti-Spengler* (1921) and Schlick argued that there is simply "no other way of understanding the world but a scientific one" (1928, 132). What supernatural speculation, anti-Semitic talk of racial essences, and nationalist theories about the German *Volksgeist* had in common, was their appeal to unscientific, unempirical, or even meaningless concepts. The Vienna Circle did not try to develop 'deep' or 'transcendental' theories but emphasized the virtue of scientific rigor: "Neatness and clarity are striven for, and dark distances and unfathomable depths rejected. In science there are no 'depths'; there is surface everywhere" (Hahn et al. 1929, 306).

The Circle's 'scientific world conception' was not only an answer to the political climate. It was also a response to intellectual developments, in particular the recent revolutions in physics and mathematics and the concurrent crisis in philosophy. Up until the mid-nineteenth century, philosophy had been widely viewed as the queen of the sciences. Physics, psychology, and sociology had all been branches of philosophy, or were at the very least viewed as disciplines that required a philosophical foundation. When the Vienna Circle first met in 1924, however, most of these subjects had become self-standing disciplines. Though many psychologists and sociologists were still employed in philosophy departments, they had replaced philosophical speculation with empirical methods. In response, philosophers worried what was left for them to do and tried to carve out a new role for what had once been regarded as a foundational discipline. Some believed it is the philosopher's task to integrate moral, religious, and empirical truths into a comprehensive philosophical system. Others aimed to limit the scope of the empirical method by drawing a strict distinction between the *Natur-* and *Geisteswissenschaften*, arguing that philosophers, historians, and other students of human culture ought to employ different methods and concepts. Still others rejected the focus on science altogether, portraying philosophy as an attempt to grasp the essence of pure intuition, undistorted by artificial scientific constructs.

The Vienna Circle had a different response. In line with its aversion to metaphysical and theologizing thought in the public arena, the group saw it as its goal to "unmask" traditional philosophical questions as "pseudo-problems" (Hahn et al. 1929, 306). Rather than attempting to build grand philosophical systems or to ponder the unadulterated fullness of human experience, the Circle sought to integrate or dissolve philosophy into the sciences. The scientific revolutions had caused much conceptual and methodological confusion and Feigl and his colleagues believed they had the tools to elucidate the situation. Schlick's first major book—*Raum und Zeit in den gegenwärtigen Physik* (1917)—had been hailed by Einstein as a "masterly" exposition of his theory of relativity and had led him to recommend his colleague for the prestigious chair of *Naturphilosophie* in Vienna. Feigl himself was interested in the probabilistic nature of scientific theories and believed that philosophy can help scientists clarify their meaning. In his contribution to the first issue of *Erkenntnis*, one of the movement's main outlets in the 1930s, Feigl wrote:

When physics works with statistical laws and thereby even achieves very great success in the mastery of empirical facts, it is the undeniable task of epistemology (the logical analysis of knowledge) to clarify the meaning of these laws and their position in the general system of our knowledge about nature. (1930, 113)

The Vienna Circle, in sum, aimed to incorporate philosophy *into* the scientific world conception. It sought to develop what was commonly called a 'scientific philosophy'.

Naturally, the Circle was not the first group to develop a scientific approach to philosophy. They were explicitly building on nineteenth-century movements that, in the wake of Darwin's revolution, had argued for a comprehensive scientific perspective on reality. The main difference, as we shall see, is that the Viennese were operating in an altered academic landscape. Revolutionary developments in logic, mathematics, physics and psychology had invoked new questions and had generated novel logical tools that could help philosophers in

their analyses of scientific methods and concepts. In addition to sharing a scientific world conception, prominent Circle members like Schlick, Feigl, and Carnap were mostly united by their attempts to employ the tools of modern logic in their analyses. For the first time in history, the group believed, science-minded philosophers had the instruments to remove the “metaphysical and theological debris” accumulated in centuries of philosophical speculation (Hahn et al. 1929, 317).

Nor was the Vienna Circle the only group to urge clarity and precision in the 1920s. Stimulated by the advances in logic, science and mathematics, groups of ‘scientific philosophers’ had started to pop up all over the continent. In Germany, a small circle of philosophers and scientists frequently got together in what was known as the ‘Berlin Group’ (Milkov and Peckhaus 2013), led by Hans Reichenbach, a German philosopher who like Schlick had acquired his fame through his philosophical analyses of relativity theory (Gimbel and Walz 2006). In Poland, a group of scholars nowadays known as the Lvov-Warsaw school (Wolenski 1989) worked in a scientific spirit, too, embracing the motto that “the method of true philosophy is nothing other than that of natural science” (Feferman and Feferman 2004, 31). All these groups were generally well-respected by physicists, mathematicians, and social scientists, who regularly attended their conferences. Collectively, however, they were swimming against the current. Their activities had little impact in a climate in which scientific thinking was accused of “bearing guilt for the world crisis” (Von Laue 1915, cited in Forman 1971, 11). Pretty soon they were forced to flee Central Europe.

1.3. Intellectual Migration

The RMS *Berengaria*, the ship that brought the Feigl to New York, was a German built vessel that had once operated as the prime steamer of the Hamburg America Line. Kaiser Wilhelm II had christened the ship—then still called the SS *Imperator*—in 1912, about a month after the similar-sized RMS *Titanic* hit an iceberg near Newfoundland. After it completed its maiden voyage, the *New York Times* ran a thousand-word cover story, describing the ship as “a magnificent specimen of the marine engineering skill of the twentieth century”.⁷ Six years and a devastating war later the liner belonged to the United States. American forces had acquired the vessel following the armistice of 1918 and used it to repatriate thousands of troops from Europe (Layton 2011, ch. 8). Once the pride of the German fleet, the RMS *Berengaria* became the flagship of the Cunard line. Under this new guise, it played a crucial role in transporting thousands of German-speaking academics to the United States in the years before the next global conflict. The ship that had once been a symbol of Germany’s scientific and technological sophistication, was now exporting its scientists and intellectuals to the United States.

Feigl was far from the only philosopher to cross the Atlantic. In the years before the War, more than one hundred philosophers sought refuge in the United States.⁸ Several members of the Vienna Circle, the Berlin group, and the Lvov-Warsaw school followed Feigl’s footsteps.

⁷ “Imperator, Biggest of Liners, in Port”, *The New York Times*, June 19, 1913.

⁸ Verhaegh (2025b) lists 178 displaced European philosophers, broadly conceived, who moved to the United States between 1931 and 1945.

The first of them was Carnap, who had become the Circle's best-known philosopher following the publication of his book *Der Logische Aufbau der Welt* (1928a). Though Carnap was not of Jewish descent, he had grown increasingly concerned about the rapid spread of fascist ideology among his colleagues and students (Carnap 1963, 34). He managed to get a post at the University of Chicago and used the position to get more scientific philosophers to the United States. Carl Gustav Hempel and Olaf Helmer, both former students of Reichenbach, became Carnap's research assistants in 1937. Reichenbach himself left Berlin after becoming one of the many victims of an anti-Semitic law banning 'non-Aryans' from government positions. Unlike Carnap, Reichenbach was unable to find a job in North America and moved to the University of Istanbul instead. Only in 1938 was he offered a professorship at the University of California, Los Angeles, allowing him and his family to start a new life across the Atlantic. Other affiliated academics seeking refuge in the United States were Gödel, who joined Einstein and J. Robert Oppenheimer at the Princeton Institute for Advanced Study; Frank, who became a lecturer at Harvard; and Gustav Bergmann, a young Viennese philosopher who became Feigl's colleague at Iowa.⁹ All of them eventually became American citizens, again following Feigl, who was the first of the group to acquire the U.S. nationality.¹⁰ Although the United States had strict immigration quotas designed to preserve America's "racial status quo"—a policy that disproportionately affected Jewish immigrants—academics could obtain a visa if they had a job offer from a U.S. institution.¹¹

The last scientific philosopher to arrive before the war was Alfred Tarski, one of the prime logicians of the Lvov-Warsaw school. Born Alfred Teitelbaum, he had already tried to escape his Jewish ancestry when he had adopted the Polish-sounding name 'Tarski' to conceal his background—a common practice in a country where it was impossible for Jews to have an academic career (Fefermann and Fefermann 2004, 36–39). The logician had taken an ocean liner in August 1939 because he planned to attend a conference of the now mostly U.S.-based community of scientific philosophers. Unaware that he had booked a ticket for one of the last ships to leave the country, Tarski boarded the vessel without his wife and two children, planning to return to Warsaw after the conference. Shortly after his arrival, Poland was invaded and sealed off from the world. Tarski was offered a professorship at UC Berkeley but spent most of the war trying to arrange a way out for his family. It was not until 1946 that he was reunited with his wife and two children. The rest of his family, "about thirty people counting only close relatives", were murdered by the Nazis.¹²

⁹ Still others ended up in the United Kingdom. Neurath had sought refuge in The Hague but crossed the Channel in a refugee boat after the German invasion of The Netherlands; Rand and Olga Taussky-Todd spent some years in the United Kingdom but eventually emigrated to the United States. Waismann emigrated in 1938 and had quite a successful career at the University of Oxford.

¹⁰ "Herbert Feigl", U.S. Naturalization Record Indexes, December 20, 1937.

¹¹ House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization. *Restriction of Immigration*. 68th Congress, Rep. No. 350, pt. 1, 16.

¹² Tarski to Heinrich Scholz, October 21, 1946, cited in Feferman and Feferman (2004, 169).

Some of Tarski's colleagues would not survive the war either. Janina Hosiasson-Lindenbaum, a logician from Warsaw best known for her work on probability, was scheduled to speak at the same Harvard conference but was unable to travel to the United States. After the invasion, she sought refuge in Vilnius, the capital of present-day Lithuania, until the city was seized by the Nazis. She was arrested, interrogated at the Gestapo headquarters and eventually 'released' on March 29, 1942, likely the day she was executed along with twenty-eight other inmates (Sznajder 2024, 1350). Schlick had already been murdered by a deranged student in 1936, marking the end of the Vienna Circle in the capital of the now fascist state of Austria. In response to the murder, newspapers printed letters arguing that Schlick himself was to blame for the assassination. The leader of the Circle had corrupted the student with his "scientific world conception". The bullet that killed Schlick was "not guided by the logic of some lunatic looking for a victim" but rather by the logic of the Circle's scientific philosophy, which had deprived the student of his "meaning of life".¹³

1.4. Logical Positivism

The Feigl experienced something of a culture shock when they moved into their cottage house in Iowa City, a small town with a population of about fifteen thousand, half of them students at the local university. The freshly married couple had been living in cosmopolitan Vienna and it took them quite some time to adapt to the social customs of an American college town. In a letter, Feigl described his surprise about the endless dinner invitations, the clubs for faculty wives, and the norm not to talk about personal matters during soirées and get-togethers. The two repeatedly got lost in the city's street grid system and had to get used to the traffic. Even after a few months, Feigl was still astonished by the peculiar Americans who refused to walk anywhere and who appeared to believe that "rushing around in one's car constitutes a natural form of recreation". Still, the two liked their new home. The Corn State capital was a "quiet and friendly" place surrounded by "pretty fields" and they were genuinely happy that they had been so warmly adopted by the community.¹⁴

The University of Iowa employed only three philosophers besides Feigl: Herbert Martin, an educationalist who worked on the moral development of children; Bonno Tapper, a German immigrant who had moved to the United States before the First World War; and James Manry, a Presbyterian philosopher who had spent much of his career as a missionary in India.¹⁵ Feigl enjoyed the collegial atmosphere, the luxury of a private office, and the absence of "intrigue and spitefulness" that had characterized the mood at the University of Vienna.¹⁶ Still, he had a difficult first year. The Feigls had emigrated in the midst of the Great Depression and were living in constant fear that they would lose their only source of income. In 1931, almost

¹³ "Austriacus" (1936), cited in Edmonds (2020, 177).

¹⁴ Feigl, "Letter on Iowa", unknown addressee, November 23, 1931, HFP, 01-01-10; Feigl to Schlick, November 16, 1931, MSP, 99/Fei-20.

¹⁵ UI, Faculty and Staff Vertical Files. Folders: "Manry, James Campbell", "Martin, Herbert W.", and "Tapper, Bonno".

¹⁶ Feigl, "Letter on Iowa", unknown addressee, November 23, 1931, HFP, 01-01-10.

a quarter of the U.S. population was unemployed and the effects of the crisis gradually started to hit American universities. In Iowa, businesses were rapidly going bankrupt and salaries were cut in all state schools.¹⁷ Only when Manry emigrated to India to continue his missionary work were they assured of a stable source of income.¹⁸

Feigl was on a mission as well. Looking back on his first years in the United States, he described himself as an “ardent propagandist”, pushing what he had come to see as “a new form of enlightenment” (1963, 38; 1969a, 22). Already at Harvard, where he had spent a few months to study with physicist P. W. Bridgman in the year before his emigration, he had convinced some American colleagues of the fruits of the scientific world conception.¹⁹ He convinced Lewis, the philosopher who had helped him get the Iowa job, that the Vienna Circle was “the most promising of present movements” in Europe; and he regularly convened with a group of talented Harvard logicians, including Susanne Langer and W. V. Quine, to discuss the latest advances in logic and philosophy of science in Europe. Now that his job was secure, he continued his campaign from Iowa, becoming the “leading PR man” of the Vienna Circle in the United States (Feyerabend 1995, 116). He promoted the Viennese approach in American philosophy journals, in his teaching, and at local and national conferences. The feedback he received only reinforced his impression that many American philosophers were sympathetic to the Circle’s views. In fact, he discovered that a small but important network of philosophers and scientists had been working on similar issues in the United States, some of whom had been developing ideas that were “barely distinguishable” from the scientific world conception.²⁰ While he felt that U.S. universities were still inferior to the ones in Europe, he concluded that “American philosophy ... is healthier and more hopeful than philosophy in Germany” as the new generation was particularly interested in these developments.²¹ U.S. students, Feigl wrote, were “not as metaphysically inclined” as German adolescents and were eager to learn more about the topics he introduced to the Iowa curriculum: ‘philosophy of science’ and ‘modern logic’.²²

Feigl even invented a new label—“logical positivism”—to promote the Viennese perspective on science and philosophy. Together with his friend Albert Blumberg, an American philosopher who had studied under Schlick in the late 1920s, he published an English-language manifesto in *Journal of Philosophy*, one of the most important periodicals for academic philosophers in the United States. The paper, titled “Logical Positivism: A New Movement in European Philosophy”, introduced the scientific world conception to an American audience, advertising its novel ideas about science and philosophy. The term ‘logical positivism’ was

¹⁷ “Pay Cuts in 3 State Schools”, *The Sioux City Journal*, February 17, 1932; Feigl to Schlick, February 21, 1932, MSP, 99/Fei-21.

¹⁸ “James. C. Manry Resigns Post at Iowa University”, *Quad-City Times*, July 31, 1932; Feigl to Schlick, November 7, 1932, MSP, 99/Fei-25.

¹⁹ Bridgman to Feigl, March 2, 1930, PWBP, 4234.8, Box 2; “Rockefeller Fellowship Record Card, Herbert Feigl”, RAC, Record Group 10.2, Series 9, Box 8.

²⁰ Feigl to Schlick, December 6, 1930, MSP, 99/Fei-17

²¹ Feigl to Schlick, September 14, 1933, MSP, 99/Fei-27.

²² Feigl, “Letter on Iowa”, unknown addressee, November 23, 1931, HFP, 01-01-10; Feigl to Schlick, September 14, 1933, MSP, 99/Fei-27.

new and Feigl's and Blumberg's decision to present the Viennese world conception as a philosophical 'ism' was to have profound consequences. Whereas the Circle had portrayed its approach as a "basic attitude" rather than as a fixed philosophical system with "theses of its own" (Hahn et al. 1929, 305–306), the American paper presented it as a distinct 'ism'. To this day, "logical positivism" is still widely associated with some of the views and arguments outlined in Blumberg and Feigl's 1931 "propaganda piece".²³ Logical positivism, on this view, is a strictly empiricist philosophy centered around a verificationist criterion of meaning—the principle that statements are meaningful if and only if they are empirically verifiable. Whereas traditional philosophers seek to develop grand, speculative theories about life, morality, art, religion, and the ultimate nature of the universe, logical positivism maintains that any such theory is meaningless because it cannot be verified. The job of a philosopher, Blumberg and Feigl claimed, is not to tell us what the world is like, since only empirical, scientific statements are verifiable. Nor is it the job of a philosopher to tell us how we ought to live, since the verification criterion implies that moral imperatives cannot be tested: "experience reveals what is, never what ought to be" (Blumberg and Feigl 1931, 293). The "purpose of philosophy" is to *clarify*. Its positive task is to analyze the language of science by using the tools of logic to show, for example, that scientific hypotheses, even those about unobservable particles, are justified because they are ultimately nothing but complex logical constructions of more straightforward statements about what can be directly observed. Its negative task is to expose all statements that do not satisfy the criterion and to dismiss them as "meaningless" (Blumberg and Feigl 1931, 293–296). Though Feigl later came to regret his "fanfare article" and corresponding reputation as a "philosophical prohibitionist" (1963, 38), the paper strongly influenced the Circle's reception in North America.

1.5. Impact

Despite or perhaps because of Feigl's uncompromising attitude, the Iowan community absorbed much of his agenda. When the philosopher left the department for the University of Minnesota in 1940, the so-called Iowa School had been transformed into a flourishing hub of scientific philosophy. The department had hired Bergmann, the aforementioned Vienna Circle philosopher. It had hired Wilfrid Sellars, a talented student who would become one of America's most influential 'analytic' philosophers. And the local psychology department had hired Kurt Lewin, a psychologist and former member of the Berlin Group who, like Reichenbach, had been a victim of the mass terminations at the University of Berlin, and who quickly started to attract talented students from all over the country.²⁴ In addition, the psychology department hired Kenneth Spence, a Yale graduate and behaviorist psychologist who came to play an important role in cementing an "alliance between logical positivism and

²³ Feigl to Schlick, April 5, 1931, MSP, 99/Fei-19.

²⁴ Leon Festinger and Roger Barker are two of Lewin's best-known students. Bergmann, too, first worked for Lewin before he transferred to the philosophy department. UI, Faculty Files, Bergmann, Gustav. See Chapter 10 for a more detailed reconstruction.

behaviorism” through his frequent collaborations with Bergmann.²⁵ Not surprisingly, these interdisciplinary projects were stimulated by Feigl, who had approached the head of the psychology department to start a seminar on the philosophical analysis of psychological science (Feigl 1969b, 88). What had been a friendly but somewhat dull philosophy department before his arrival, had turned into a vibrant and interdisciplinary community by the late 1930s.

The success of the Iowa school was not an isolated development. Logical positivism had a tremendous impact on the American intellectual climate, in particular in the world of philosophy. Shortly after the publication of the Blumberg-Feigl paper, the Vienna Circle became a topic of heated controversy in U.S. philosophy journals.²⁶ The American Philosophical Association (APA) hosted a “round-table conference” on logical positivism and Lewis noticed that the Viennese perspective “easily” took “first place in the interest and discussions of [his] students”.²⁷ Reichenbach, still based in Berlin at the time, was confronted with an influx of U.S. professors and students who told him that there was much American interest in his “exact approach to philosophy”.²⁸ By 1934, just three years after the publication of Blumberg and Feigl’s paper, the movement had become so widely known that it was acceptable to complain about a publication if it did *not* discuss the views of the new movement. An American reviewer of a book on the implications of modern science protested that it did not reference “the very important positivistic movement ... [of] Schlick, Carnap, Philipp Frank, etc.” (Lenzen 1932b, 585), while a piece about a textbook on contemporary philosophy complained that he missed “a chapter on the ‘logistic’ programme of the Viennese Circle” (Jessop 1934, 504).

At first, logical positivism was mostly a *succès de scandale* (Feigl 1969b, 71). Blumberg and Feigl’s blunt and somewhat naive verificationist views were relatively easy to dismantle and many philosophers worried that the positivists’ ideas about meaning were so strict that they were throwing out the baby with the bath water (e.g. Gamertsfelder 1933; Morris 1934; Weiss 1934). Gradually, however, many American philosophers started to see that the views of the scientific philosophers were more sophisticated than some of the early publications had made them out to be. As a result, the Europeans slowly started to become serious players in the U.S. philosophical conversation, such that, by the 1950s, one in three academic philosophy publications mentioned at least one of the displaced philosophers (see Appendix II). While ‘logical positivism’ remained a pejorative term in some circles, many of the expatriates acquired prestigious posts and helped found new and influential venues for what eventually became known as ‘analytic philosophy’. Bergmann, Feigl, Hempel, and Reichenbach all served terms as president of the APA and several of them were included on the editorial boards of new journals such as *Philosophy of Science* (first issue in 1934) and *Journal of Symbolic Logic* (1936). Feigl himself proved to be a particularly effective institution

²⁵ Laird Addis (1987), cited in Farber (1991, 20). See Bergmann and Spence (1941; 1944) and Smith (1986, 208–209).

²⁶ See, e.g., Ginsburg (1932), Gamertsfelder (1933), Hess (1933), Dewey (1934), Lewis (1934), Nagel (1934a), Morris (1934), and Weiss (1934).

²⁷ Larrabee (1933); Feigl to Schlick, September 14, 1933, MSP, 99/Fei-27; Lewis to Schlick, December 14, 1934, MSP, 107/Lewis-1.

²⁸ Reichenbach to Berliner, April 20, 1932, HRP 014-56-10.

builder. He co-founded the influential Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science, the journal *Philosophical Studies*, and he published two influential textbooks—*Readings in Philosophical Analysis* (Feigl and Sellars 1949) and *Readings in Philosophy of Science* (Feigl and Brodbeck 1953)—that helped win over the next generation in classrooms all over the country.²⁹

Outside philosophy, logical positivism became quite popular among natural and social scientists. P. W. Bridgman, Feigl's former mentor at Harvard, independently developed a strictly empiricist approach to the meaning of scientific concepts that attracted much attention among physicists (Lindsay 1937, 456). Stanley Smith Stevens ignited a similar discussion in the social and behavioral sciences, in particular psychology. Echoing Feigl's idea that logical positivism is "the philosophy to end all philosophies" (1969a, 22), Stevens sought to employ Bridgman's theory of meaning to start a "revolution" that would "put an end to the possibility of revolutions" in psychology (Stevens 1935a, 323). By 1934, Feigl could send Neurath a list of more than sixty American philosophers and scientists to be invited to an international conference of what was increasingly becoming a global movement, incorporating scholars from almost all prestigious universities in the United States, including Berkeley, Brown, Chicago, Columbia, Cornell, Harvard, Johns Hopkins, Michigan, MIT, NYU, Princeton, UCLA, and Yale.³⁰ This conference was the first congress of the Unity of Science movement—an international organization and, after Neurath's death, American institute that sought to stimulate interdisciplinary collaboration between philosophers and scientists interested in the logic, methodology and language of science. Feigl, who would briefly become president of the institute in the 1960s, was influenced by the movement and modeled his aforementioned center for philosophy of science after its central mission, writing that it was founded to stimulate "interdepartmental collaboration" and "to remove barriers between the various fields of science".³¹

Gradually, logical positivism even came to influence debates outside academia. After the war, its ideas were so popular that 'logical positivism' became something of a household name in educated circles. Reichenbach's *The Rise of Scientific Philosophy* (1951) became a bestseller after it was selected book of the month by *The Book Find Club*; and popular magazines and local newspapers regularly referenced the positivists in their articles, even if they were unrelated to philosophy. A cultural critic for the *San Francisco Examiner* could compliment the author of a book on leisure and recreation for his "logical positivist's insistence on the clear division between fact and opinion", while an article on how to "ask questions that get results" in *Nation's Business* could inform its readers that "a great many business questions involve predictions of the future" and reference "Dr. Rudolf Carnap's" view that "we can never be certain about future events" but "form our expectations of them in accordance with past

²⁹ As such, logical positivism's American reception history is quite unique. Logical positivism also caused a sensation in the United Kingdom, mainly due to A. J. Ayer's *Language, Truth, and Logic* (1936), but it mostly remained a scapegoat in the 1950s and 1960s, when logical positivism flourished in the United States. See Tuboly (2020) and Verhaegh (2025f).

³⁰ Feigl to Neurath, December 11, 1934, ONP, Folder 233.

³¹ "Brief Outline of the Project for a Minnesota Center for the Philosophy of Science", ca. 1952, UMN, College of Liberal Arts Records, Box 14.

experience”.³² As may be expected, the attention was not all constructive. Logical positivism was frequently attacked by religious leaders, who condemned its verificationist criterion because it implies that “assertions about God are meaningless”.³³ An Episcopal priest criticized the positivists at a meeting in Austin, noting that the movement worshipped science instead of God Almighty, and a young Rabbi warned his readers about their view that morality is just a matter of “personal like or dislike” since only things that can be measured can be evaluated.³⁴ In the late 1960s, some of these ideas resurfaced in countercultural circles, when the protest generation condemned logical positivism as the ideology of the military-industrial complex. New left activists dismissed positivism as “the key philosophy which we are indoctrinated into in our ‘mod’ colleges and universities”, associating it with a narrow, materialist, bourgeois, reductionist, value-free, mechanistic, amoral, or technocratic perspective on society.³⁵

1.6. Puzzles

How could logical positivism have such an impact on the American intellectual climate? Why did U.S. academics take seriously a brash, twenty-eight-year-old philosopher telling them that much of what they had been doing was “strictly speaking, meaningless” (Blumberg and Feigl 1931, 282)? Why was it the stringent, verification-focused variant of scientific philosophy—rather than some of the alternative approaches that had been developed in Berlin, Prague and Vienna—that caught the attention of American philosophers? And how did the émigrés’ ‘scientific world conception’ eventually develop into the ‘analytic’ approach that still dominates academic philosophy today?

From a socio-historical perspective, logical positivism’s success is quite remarkable for at least three reasons. For one thing, Feigl and his colleagues emigrated to the United States in the 1930s, when academic universities were plagued by the effects of the Great Depression. Feigl was barely able to acquire a position before the job market collapsed. But most of his compatriots arrived between 1935 and 1940, when cuts and shrinking private endowments had exhausted the budgets of American universities (Geiger 2015, ch. 11). While the ports of New York welcomed hundreds of displaced scholars, there were not even enough jobs for America’s best and brightest. In a 1938 letter, the Columbia philosopher Ernest Nagel wrote that it felt as if “half of Europe” was “passing through New York”, expressing his “despair” about all these “splendid men, splendidly equipped intellectually” who were entering the United States “without any prospects”.³⁶ It is surprising, therefore, that many scientific philosophers were able to obtain positions at prominent U.S. institutions such as Berkeley (Tarski), Chicago (Carnap), Harvard (Frank), Iowa (Feigl and Bergmann), Minnesota (Feigl), UCLA

³² “Donald Stanley’s Book Corner”, *The San Francisco Examiner*, December 21, 1964; “Ask Questions that get Results”, *Nation’s Business*, July 1959.

³³ “Why Are Men Indifferent to Religion?”, *Lake Shore Visitor*, August 20, 1965.

³⁴ “Conference Told Science Elevated to Priesthood”, *Austin American Statesman*, December 12, 1953; “Sermon of the Week”, Sanford Seltzer, *The Miami News*, July 31, 1965.

³⁵ “Hippies Reflect Modern Version of Buddhism”, *Portland Press Herald*, October 25, 1967.

³⁶ Nagel to Charles Morris, October 20, 1938, USMP, Box 2, Folder 5.

(Reichenbach and Carnap), and Yale (Hempel). All the more so because most of them (or their spouses) had a Jewish background (i.e. Bergmann, Feigl, Frank, Hempel, Reichenbach, Tarski), which was a significant hurdle in this period. When Carnap, in 1936, inquired whether the Princeton philosophers were interested to hire Reichenbach, he was told that there was “no non-Aryan in the whole department”, that its chair “would never dare proposing the appointment of a non-Aryan”, and that the fact that Reichenbach was “only half-Aryan” ruled out “any possibility at Princeton”.³⁷

Logical positivism’s impact is even more remarkable when one takes into account the intellectual context. Though there was a small but important network of scientific philosophers in the United States (see Section 1.4), many American philosophers—in particular those at elite institutions—emphasized that philosophy should be part of the humanities, not a scientific field of study. Few U.S. professors had been trained in formal logic and most of them believed it is the philosophers’ job to develop a comprehensive perspective on art, morality, religion, politics, science, and society. As such, many of them opposed the (in their eyes) positivists’ excessive focus on logic and natural science. Irwin Edman, chair of Columbia University’s department of philosophy, viewed the Vienna Circle as a “cult” that would “reduce philosophy to a series of definitions, postulates, [and] logical relations” (1934, 477). And University of Chicago professor Mortimer Adler called positivism “a corruption of modern culture”, noting that democracy “has much more to fear” from the “positivism of its professors ... than from the nihilism of Hitler” (1941, 128). Even Americans who had contributed to the development of formal logic were skeptical. The Harvard logician Henry Sheffer believed the logical positivists were “gravely damag[ing]” philosophy and said he “had rather not been born” if his work “had done anything to stimulate this development” (Sheffer, cited in Berlin 1978, xii). C. I. Lewis, who had initially described the Vienna Circle as “the most promising of present movements” in Europe (section 1.4) eventually soured on it, calling the positivists’ perspective on moral questions “one of the strangest aberrations ever to visit the mind of man” (1946, 366, 399).

To be sure, there were strong philosophical and ideological similarities between the positivists and the American pragmatist movement, such as John Dewey’s naturalist school. Both the Vienna Circle and pragmatic naturalists had developed empirically minded philosophies and mixed progressive politics with reflections about the nature and scope of science. Still many American philosophers, we will see, viewed logical positivism and pragmatism as *competing* traditions. They focused on the most technical aspects of the movement and mostly ignored the more naturalistic variants—such as the views of Neurath and Frank—that had also been developed in Central Europe. While some members of the Vienna Circle and their young American followers felt that pragmatism and logical positivism were like-minded traditions (e.g. Morris 1935a; Carnap 1936, 427), established pragmatists tended to view the immigrants, in particular their views on values and morality, as a serious threat to philosophy. Logical positivism, Nagel wrote in a letter to Neurath, had made “a decided impression” upon the “younger men in the profession” but the “old-timers ... distrust it, dislike it, and pretend that it has nothing very important to say”.³⁸

³⁷ Carnap to Reichenbach, June 12, 1936, HRP, 013-41-1. See also Karabel (2005).

³⁸ Nagel to Neurath, January 2, 1936, ONP, Item 275.

Finally, the impact of the positivists is remarkable because they were far from the only movement to be displaced to the United States. In the years before the Second World War, philosophers from a wide range of schools and traditions sought refuge across the Atlantic. Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer moved their Frankfurt School to Columbia University; exiled phenomenologists such as Aron Gurwitsch and Alfred Schutz were actively promoting their views at the New School of Social Research; and there was a lively group of what Richard Wolin (2001) has called ‘Heidegger’s children’ (e.g. Hannah Arendt, Karl Löwith, and Herbert Marcuse) who had left Europe for North America. Many of these philosophers were quite successful in acquiring an American following in Catholic schools, in literature departments, or in the social sciences; and Arendt and Marcuse would become voices of the New Left in the 1960s. Yet Feigl and his colleagues had by far the biggest impact on *academic* philosophy, raising the question of why this movement was so successful in this particular field of study. Whereas logical positivism had been something of a fringe school in the German philosophical world, where the intellectual climate was dominated by phenomenology and *Lebensphilosophie*, the roles were remarkably reversed in the United States. Arendt perhaps best expressed her surprise about this turn of events in a conversation with William Barrett, noting that she could “not understand why ... Americans have taken to these second-rate European positivists”: “In Europe people like Carnap and Hempel were jokes ... Here you take them seriously” (Arendt ca. 1945, cited in Barrett 1982, 104).

1.7. Aims

This book reconstructs the American history of logical positivism. Building on a variety of archival material—professional and personal correspondence, travel diaries, institutional records, and contemporary newspaper articles—it investigates how the exiled empiricists and their American allies reshaped the U.S. intellectual climate—and how the U.S. intellectual climate shaped them. More specifically, this book traces the evolution of American scientific philosophy from its diverse manifestations at the turn of the twentieth century, to the period when ‘logical positivism’ dominated the philosophical conversation, up until the 1970s and 1980s, when the movement had given birth to a ‘post-positivist’ counterrevolution and various features of its approach had dissolved into the analytic mainstream.

The American development of logical positivism is a somewhat neglected topic in the history of philosophy.³⁹ One could fill a small library with books on the movement’s European history but there are surprisingly few book-length studies about its development in the country where it had its biggest impact.⁴⁰ The main reason for this dearth of publications, I suspect, is

³⁹ Interestingly, the American careers of other German philosophical traditions such as phenomenology and critical theory have been studied in much more detail. See, e.g. Jay (1986), Wolin (2009), Wheatland (2009), Woessner (2011), Burnham (2012), King (2015), Beck and Coomann (2018), Ferri (2019), and Strassfeld (2022).

⁴⁰ One notable exception is George Reisch’s *How the Cold War Transformed Philosophy of Science* (2005), which reconstructs logical positivism’s American development through the lens of the McCarthyist period. The present book owes much to Reisch’s groundbreaking work,

that logical positivism is deeply unpopular today. Many present-day philosophers associate logical positivism with a rather crude, verificationist theory of meaning and even historians who have a subtler perspective and contributed to the recent wave of “historically oriented reappraisals” tend to view American variants of logical positivism as “an almost total perversion” of the Vienna Circle’s original world conception. They argue that the subtleties of the European program were lost in translation and accuse the more “down-to-earth and pragmatically minded” Americans of turning a refined scientific philosophy into a “naïve empiricism” (Friedman 1999, 1–5).⁴¹ Historians of *American* philosophy typically concur that logical positivism was a retrogressive force but tend to blame the other party, condemning the immigrants for eclipsing the rich intellectual culture of the progressive era with an overly technical approach.⁴² Historians, in sum, usually present logical positivism’s American history as a history of decline, dismissing it as an undesirable development because it overturned more promising approaches to philosophy, whether this be the traditions that emerged during the “Golden Age of American Philosophy” (Frankel 1960) or the diverse palette of scientific philosophies that had been developed in Berlin, Lvov, Prague, Vienna, and Warsaw.

The American history of logical positivism, in consequence, has only been written in negative form. This is unfortunate because it means that this story has rarely been told from the perspective of those who developed it into one of the most influential movements of twentieth-century philosophy. Logical positivism is consistently cast as the antagonist in its own story and its history is usually told from the perspective of either one of two communities—the European immigrants *or* their American colleagues—thereby ignoring that the American variants of logical positivism emerged out of a *meeting* between the two. Logical positivism scholars tend to focus on the émigré philosophers and argue that their revolutionary message was misunderstood, whereas historians of U.S. philosophy typically focus on early-twentieth-century American movements and argue that the migration contributed to the demise of their unique philosophical culture. Yet logical positivism, I will argue, is neither a European export nor an American misinterpretation. It is the product of cross-cultural exchange. It would never have taken root if U.S. philosophy had not already developed in a similar direction—if there had not been an important network of scientific philosophers in the United States. And it would not have come to be associated with an analytic, strictly verificationist approach to

but will argue that much of logical positivism’s development can be traced back to encounters between U.S. and European scientific philosophers in the 1920s and 1930s. I argue that the red scare played an important role but that it was one of several external variables that shaped the course of American philosophy (of science) after the exiled empiricists settled in the United States. See in particular Chapters 8–11. The papers collected in Alan Richardson and Gary Hardcastle’s *Logical Empiricism in North America* are another good source for work on this topic. More generally, the present work is indebted to Richardson’s suggestion that ‘scientific philosophy’ is a key concept for understanding early twentieth-century science and philosophy. See Richardson (1997; 2023).

⁴¹ See also Carus (2007, 6–7), Uebel (2019, 20), and Richardson (2023, ch. 1).

⁴² See, e.g., Thayer (1968, 559) and Sellars (1969, 28). Talisse (2007, 133; 2013, 425) and Misak (2025, 31) call this the ‘eclipse view’. See Jewett (2011) for a history of this narrative.

philosophy if the displaced Europeans had not emphasized this project in their American writings.

This book tells an alternative, more integrated story that puts logical positivism itself center stage. Instead of portraying American philosophers as the passive recipients of an invasive, foreign philosophical culture, or the exiled empiricists as the victims of a flawed reception history, I argue that logical positivism has roots in both academic communities and developed in the complex interplay between them. I will show how American philosophy, in the years before war, became a melting pot of homegrown and foreign movements and I reconstruct how the philosophers who aimed to advance a scientific philosophy had to navigate both their internal differences and the strong opposition from factions who saw a different role for philosophy. Logical positivism, I argue, played two important roles in this process: it functioned as an exemplar for aspiring scientific philosophers and as a scapegoat for their opponents, thereby emerging as a relatively stable category within American intellectual life, even when philosophers of the new generation started to identify as ‘analytic’ philosophers from the 1950s onwards.

In developing a positive, more integrated history of logical positivism in the United States, I do not seek to rehabilitate it. Nor do I wish to argue that the positivists’ ideas and arguments were superior to the ones they replaced. This study seeks to develop an historical analysis of how logical positivism came to dominate academic philosophy in a specific intellectual and cultural context, not a philosophical analysis of whether this was or was not a desirable development. This is not because I believe that such an analysis would be pointless or because I do not have philosophical preferences of my own, but rather because this book aims to answer a different set of questions. This study seeks to reconstruct what happened when a small coterie of European scientific philosophers emigrated to the United States and encountered a highly developed but internally divided community of American philosophers, not what could or should have been.

1.8. Methods

In order to do justice to logical positivism’s diverse cultural and intellectual roots, this book employs a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. Chapters 2–13 present twelve historical studies of specific episodes in the development of logical positivism, most of them based on an analysis of a particular collection of archival material. Combined, these studies present a kaleidoscopic overview of the rise and eventual fall of logical positivism, shedding new light on a range of major and minor philosophers, departments, research institutes, journals, and public debates that played an important role in its American development. Importantly, most of these chapters focus on the interplay between different groups of exiled and American philosophers, revealing how various intellectual and institutional developments emerged out of encounters between these philosophical cultures.

Qualitative studies allow historians to analyze specific developments in great detail but are necessarily limited in scope, raising questions about selection and representation. Though I set out to study a diverse set of historical figures and institutions—including both major and minor philosophers; both elite colleges and public universities—any selection will necessarily

foreground some developments over others. In order to keep track of the broader story, Chapters 2–14 are interspersed with four quantitative, digital humanities studies (Appendices I–IV) that develop a broader, more integrated perspective on the development of American philosophy. Each of these appendices presents bibliometric maps and statistics that trace and analyze the evolution of the discipline at the community level. I examine broad shifts in debates in academic philosophy journals, investigate historical trends in dissertation topics and university curricula, present tables of the most-discussed philosophers in different periods and journals, and identify networks of philosophers through co-mention analyses.

In creating these maps, I will mostly rely on *edhiphy*, a database specifically designed for bibliometric research on the development of twentieth-century philosophy (Petrovich, Verhaegh, Bös et al. 2024; Verhaegh, Petrovich, and Bös 2025). Whereas quantitative studies often employ citation data to quantitatively map the development of academic communities, *edhiphy* uses *mention* data to reconstruct what and who philosophers were talking about in a period when academics rarely cited work of colleagues or predecessors in standardized form. *Edhiphy* contains, among others, a catalogue of more than one million mention links extracted from almost twenty-three thousand full-text articles published between 1890 and 1979 and can be used to estimate the relative impact of various philosophers in different periods of time, to map logical positivism’s evolving place in the American philosophical landscape, and to dissect its reception by focusing on the role of various journals and universities.⁴³

In combining qualitative and quantitative analyses, I hope to demonstrate that a mixed-method approach can enrich the study of the history of science and philosophy. Qualitative studies allow historians to develop fine-grained analyses but necessarily highlight specific philosophers and developments. Quantitative tools allow historians to analyze enormous sets of data but tend to abstract away from historical detail. In integrating the two approaches, I hope to show that it is possible to combine scope with historical detail. Quantitative studies can help historians answer broader questions and estimate the relative impact of particular ideas and movements, while qualitative case studies can help them get a better sense of how these large-scale developments actually affected intellectual life. Much as modern dual lens cameras allow one to take both close-up and wide-angle pictures, a mixed-method approach allows historians to develop different perspectives on the same development—to integrate detailed reconstructions with big-picture overviews.

1.9. Overview

This book is divided into four parts, each focused on a different period and a different unit of historiographical analysis: contexts, individuals, institutions, and narratives. Logical positivism, I argue, could only become as successful as it was because it emerged in a particular intellectual and socio-political *context* (Part I, Chapters 2–4), because various *individuals*—the exiled empiricists and their American colleagues—helped logical positivism become a particular type of philosophy (Part II, Chapters 5–7), because its approach became ingrained into the *institutional* fabric of American academic philosophy (Part III, Chapters 8–10), and

⁴³ A more detailed introduction to *edhiphy* and mention analysis is presented in Appendix I.

because logical positivism became part of a broader *story* about intellectual life in the postwar era (Part IV, Chapters 11–13).

Part I focuses on context, exploring several developments that paved the way for the logical positivists in the decades before the intellectual migration. I discuss changes in the American system of higher education, the professionalization of philosophy, the cultural effects of the First World War I, and argue that these developments gave rise to a variety of American scientific philosophies, each predominantly inspired by a specific development in the natural and formal sciences: the theory of evolution (Chapter 2), the birth of mathematical logic (Chapter 3), and the theories of special and general relativity (Chapter 4). Combined, I argue, these scientific revolutions gave rise to a small and internally divided but gradually growing community of philosophically-minded scientists and scientifically-minded philosophers that would come to play a crucial role in the reception of European scientific philosophy. Several members of this community visited their continental colleagues in the late 1920s and early 1930s, thereby creating an international network that would help the new movement spread its ideas and, a few years later, help the European émigrés acquire positions at prominent U.S. institutions.

Part II turns to the activities of individual actors. Whereas the first three chapters argue that the conditions were ideal for *something like* logical positivism to take root, Chapters 5–7 focus on the ideas and activities of individual philosophers to explain how logical positivism could become what it became. Chapter 5 traces Feigl’s and Schlick’s first encounters with U.S. philosophers at Harvard and Berkeley and reconstructs how developments in both American and European philosophy led them to (very successfully) promote logical positivism as a particular type of position in the early 1930s. Chapter 6 examines the first Euro-American encounters from an American perspective, reconstructing Hook’s and Nagel’s years in Europe in the late 1920s and early 1930s. I argue that Hook’s and Nagel’s pragmatist backgrounds made them ideal candidates to steer the discussion about logical positivism into a different direction—for example, one focused on the aforementioned perspectives of Neurath and Frank—and discuss some reasons why this alternative reception history failed to materialize. Chapter 7, finally, argues that Carnap and Reichenbach did not correct (and in some cases reinforced) the standard conception in their attempts to find a position in American philosophy. I reconstruct their meetings with American philosophers in Europe and show how both used their growing international network to boost their profile and improve their chances on the U.S. academic job market, thereby making effective use of the intense debate about logical positivism in the Anglophone world.

Part III, then, turns to *institutions*, showing how logical positivism gradually became something more than the “latest fashion in scientific philosophizing” (Randall 1939, 80). I reconstruct how the immigrant philosophers and their American allies managed to overcome the deep-seated skepticism about logical positivism at several elite universities and argue that they were helped by a variety of demographic and economic developments such as the spectacular growth of American higher education in the 1950s and 1960s. Chapters 8 and 9 present a detailed reconstruction of the development of three departments of philosophy—Princeton, Yale, and Columbia—and argue that the postwar transformation of U.S. philosophy was first and foremost a generational transition. I show that logical positivism was predominantly popular among students and young philosophy instructors and argue that this

generation helped solidify some of the movement's fundamental commitments into philosophical practice when American institutions of higher learning were forced to expand and rejuvenate in the years after the war. Chapter 10 reconstructs Feigl's attempts to create institutional space for logical positivism through the foundation of centers (the MCPS) and journals (*Philosophical Studies*) and the publication of several textbooks (Feigl and Sellars 1949; Feigl and Brodbeck 1953). I argue that Feigl continuously vacillated between two institutional models—one which positioned logical positivism as a school within analytic philosophy and one which emphasized its cross-disciplinary ambitions—and I show why the first model eventually prevailed.

Part IV, finally, turns to *narratives*, showing how logical positivism came to play an important role in the story about American intellectual life in the postwar era. Chapter 11 focuses on the 1940s and 1950s and examines its reception in cultural discussions about science, values, and American democracy. I show that logical positivism was frequently singled out by (1) conservative and religious leaders who viewed it as a threat to democracy and (2) progressives who treated it as a model of modern scientific thinking. I argue that these discussions gave logical positivism cultural momentum in a period when the United States pumped hundreds of millions of dollars into scientific research to alleviate Cold War anxieties and I reconstruct how this public attention reinforced existing narratives about the positivists' philosophical program. Chapter 12 turns to the 1960s and 1970s and reconstructs how narratives about logical positivism became intertwined with countercultural opposition to the military-industrial complex and the concurrent post-positivist turn in the philosophy of science. Chapter 13, finally, reconstructs how third-generation logical positivists (in particular Wesley Salmon) and historians of philosophy of science tried to develop new narratives about logical positivism's place in U.S. philosophy when the post-positivist revolt was in full swing and philosophers concluded that the movement was “dead, or as dead as a philosophical movement ever becomes” (Passmore 1967, 56).

In focusing on the contributions of individual philosophers, institutions, and broader intellectual and socio-political developments, this book argues that the development of logical positivism was both highly contingent and strongly shaped by the environment in which it emerged. Logical positivism, I will argue, is at once the improbable outcome of a series of chance developments and a philosophy that could easily flourish because it emerged in an overall hospitable climate. Its development would likely have taken a different course if particular individuals had made different choices but it also became so successful because the conditions were just right. At various points in its development, I will argue, logical positivism grew in popularity because it perfectly squared with existing philosophical, scientific, institutional, socio-cultural, geopolitical, and demographic trends. In some cases, this was pure coincidence. In other instances, logical positivism *became* a perfect fit because philosophers like Feigl had an impressive talent for navigating these intellectual and institutional developments.

A note on terminology

Logical positivism has meant many different things to many different people since the label was first introduced by Blumberg and Feigl. It is commonly associated with the strictly

verificationist philosophy outlined in Section 1.4. But it is also used as an umbrella term for the full spectrum of views and perspectives developed by the émigrés and their American allies. The narrow verificationist conception had the biggest impact on U.S. intellectual life but was defended by only a select number of philosophers for a brief period of time. The umbrella term does more justice to the diversity of views defended by the philosophers and scientists commonly identified as logical positivists but is rather difficult to pin down theoretically since there is “probably no important position that all [of them] shared” (Creath 2022a). This book vacillates between the two notions as it seeks to tell the story of an idea *and* a community. It reconstructs how a particular conception of logical positivism emerged out of the interplay between European and American scientific philosophers in the 1920s and 1930s; and it details how this community responded when this idea took on a life of its own.

Some logical positivists and historians, including Feigl, have introduced labels such as ‘logical empiricism’ and ‘scientific empiricism’ to distinguish between the early, strictly verificationist position and the wealth of alternatives developed in the decades thereafter. One problem with these labels, however, is that their meanings were contested in the period covered in this book. While Feigl, at one point, introduced the label ‘logical empiricism’ to differentiate between the “narrow” positivist position of the early 1930s and the more “liberal” logical empiricist perspectives developed in later periods (1950b, 291; 1956, 14), Reichenbach and his students used the same label to distinguish between the views originating in the Vienna Circle (‘logical positivism’) and positions developed within the Berlin Group (‘logical empiricism’).⁴⁴ This book will explicitly address the politics of naming in Chapters 5, 7, and 13, as this is an important issue in the history of the movement. In these chapters, I will occasionally use the label ‘logical empiricism’ to describe the philosophical identities of the people involved. In the remainder of the book, I will stick to ‘logical positivism’—even if the discussed philosophers preferred an alternative label—since this label played such a crucial role in the American history of the movement.

⁴⁴ ‘Logical empiricism’ has also become the standard label for historians of philosophy of science. Whereas the first generation of historians of the movement used ‘logical positivism’ (e.g. Hanfling 1981; Rescher 1985; Smith 1986; Friedman 1999), standard usage changed in the late-twentieth century (e.g. Reisch 1991; Sarkar 1996; Giere and Richardson 1996).

Bibliography

- Abir-Am, P. G. (1999). Introduction: Commemorative Practices in Science: Historical Perspectives on the Politics of Collective Memory. *Osiris* 14, 1–33.
- Achinstein, P. and Barker, S. (1969, eds.). *The Legacy of Logical Positivism*. Baltimore, MD.: Johns Hopkins Press.
- Adams, E. W. (1966). On the Nature and Purpose of Measurement. *Synthese*, 16, 125–169.
- Addis, L., Jesson, G., and Tegtmeier, E. (2007, eds.). *Ontology and Analysis: Essays and Recollection about Gustav Bergmann*. Berlin: De Gruyter.
- Adler, M. (1941). God and the Professors. In *Science, Philosophy and Religion: A Symposium* (pp. 120–138). New York: Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion.
- Adler, M. (1972). Preface. In M. Adler and C. van Doren (eds.). *How to Read a Book* (pp. 1–3). Revised edition. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Allen, C. (1998). As Bad as It Gets: Three Dark Tales from the Annals of Academic Receivership. *Lingua Franca*. <http://linguafranca.mirror.theinfo.org/9803/asbad.html>
- Almira, J. M. (2022). *Norbert Wiener: A Mathematician among Engineers*. Singapore: World Scientific.
- Anellis, I. H. (1995). Peirce Rustled, Russell Pierced: How Charles Peirce and Bertrand Russell Viewed Each Other's Work in Logic, and an Assessment of Russell's Accuracy and Rôle in the Historiography of Logic. *Modern Logic*, 5, 270–328.
- APA (1931). Fifth Annual Report of the Board of Officers. *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*, 5, 180–185.
- APA (1932). Eastern Division. *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*, 6, 209–213.
- APA (1933). Western Division. *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*, 7, 183–186.
- APA (1934). Western Division. *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*, 8, 160–164.
- APA (1935a). Western Division. *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*, 9, 170–172.
- APA (1935b). Eastern Division. *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*, 9, 173–177.
- APA (1938). Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association 1938: Twelfth Annual Report of the Board of Officers. *Philosophical Review*, 48, 177–196.
- APA (1950). Pacific Division. *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*, 24, 67–71.

- APA (1972). Eastern Division. *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*, 46, 125–148.
- Apple, W. (1979). *Ideology and Curriculum*. New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Aspray, W. (1991). Oswald Veblen and the Origins of Mathematical Logic at Princeton. In T. Drucker (ed.), *Perspectives on the History of Mathematical Logic* (pp. 54–70). Basel: Birkhäuser.
- Atkin, J. M., and Black, P. (2003). *Inside Science Education Reform: A History of Curricular and Policy Change*. New York: Teachers College Columbia University.
- Atkinson, D., and Peijnenburg, J. (2016). *Fading Foundations: Probability and the Regress Problem*. Cham: Springer.
- Aune, B. (2009). Feigl and the Development of Analytic Philosophy at the University of Minnesota. *Review of Contemporary Philosophy*, 8, 9–23.
- Auxier, R. E. (2005). Creighton, James Edwin (1861–1923). In Shook (ed.), 549–555.
- Avenarius, R. (1877). Zur Einführung. *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie* 1, 1–14.
- Axtell, J. (2006). *The Making of Princeton University*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Ayer, A. J. (1936). *Language, Truth, and Logic*. London: Gollancz.
- Baldwin, T. (1990). *G. E. Moore*. London: Routledge.
- Barnes, B. (1972). Sociological Explanation and Natural Science: A Kuhnian Reappraisal. *European Journal of Sociology*, 13, 373–393.
- Barnes, B. (1974). *Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory*. London: Routledge.
- Barrett, R. (2005). Rudner, Richard Samuel (1821–1979). In Shook (ed.), 2098–2100.
- Barrett, W. (1982). *The Truants: Adventures among the Intellectuals*. South Shore, MA: Anchor Press.
- Bauer, M. W. (2009). The Evolution of Public Understanding of Science—Discourse and Comparative Evidence. *Science, Technology and Society*, 14, 221–240.
- Bawden, H. H. (1904). What Is Pragmatism? *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods* 1, 421–427.
- Bayertz, K. (2015). Materialism. In Forster and Gjesdal (eds.), 607–621.
- Beaney, M. (2007, ed.). *The Analytic Turn: Analysis in Early Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology*. New York: Routledge.
- Beaney, M. (2013). The Historiography of Analytic Philosophy. In Beaney (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy* (pp. 30–60). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Beaney, M. (2016). Susan Stebbing and the Early Reception of Logical Empiricism in Britain. In Damböck (ed.), 233–256.
- Beck, M., and Coomann, N. (2018, eds.). *Historische Erfahrung und begriffliche Transformation: Deutschsprachige Philosophie im Exil in den USA 1933–1945*. Vienna: Wit Verlag.
- Becker, C. L. (1932). *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Beiser, F. C. (2015a). *The Genesis of Neo-Kantianism, 1796–1880*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Beiser, F. C. (2015b). Neo-Kantianism. In Forster and Gjesdal (eds.), 282–298.
- Belnap, N. (1960). The Formalization of Entailment. Ph.D. Dissertation. Yale University.
- Belnap, N. (2014). Biographical Interview. In T. Müller (ed.), *Nuel Belnap on Indeterminism and Free Action* (pp. 377–409). Cham: Springer.
- Benjamin, A. C. (1927). Review of *The Logic of Modern Physics* by P. W. Bridgman. *Journal of Philosophy*, 24, 663–665.
- Benjamin, A. C. (1936). The Operational Definition of Suppositional Symbols. *Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique*. Paris: Hermann.
- Benjamin, A. C. (1937). *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science*. New York: Macmillan.
- Bergmann, G. and Spence, K. (1941). Operationism and Theory in Psychology. *Psychological Review*, 48, 1–14.
- Bergmann, G. and Spence, K. (1944). The Logic of Psychophysical Measurement. *Psychological Review*, 51, 1–24.
- Berkovski, S. (2019). Some Remarks on Mach’s Philosophical Doctrines. In Stadler (ed.), 123–34.
- Berlin, I. (1978). *Concepts and Categories*. London: Hogarth.
- Bixler, J. S. (1930). Professor Dewey Discusses Religion. *Journal of Philosophy*, 23, 213–233.
- Black, M. (1934). The Principle of Verifiability. *Analysis*, 2, 1–6.
- Black, M. (1976). Are There Any Philosophically Interesting Questions in Technology? *PSA: Proceedings of Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association*, 2, 185–193.
- Blanpied, W. A., and Holton, G. (1971). Outline of the Program at Harvard. *Newsletter of the Program on Public Conceptions of Science*, 1, 3–4.
- Blanshard, B. (1945a). The Climate of Opinion. In Blanshard et al. (eds.), 3–42.
- Blanshard, B. (1945b). The Opportunity of Philosophy. In Blanshard et al. (eds.), 87–117.
- Blanshard, B. (1949). The New Subjectivism in Ethics. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 9, 504–511.
- Blanshard, B. (1952). The New Philosophy of Analysis. *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 96, 227–230.
- Blanshard, B. (1961). The Changing Climate of Philosophy. *Liberal Education: The Bulletin of the Association of American Colleges*, 47, 229–254.
- Blanshard, B. (1962). Epilogue. In A. Pap, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science* (pp. 427–431). New York: Free Press of Glencoe.
- Blanshard, B., Ducasse, C. J., Hendel, C. W., Murphy, A. E., and Otto, M. C. (1945a, eds.). *Philosophy in American Education: Its Tasks and Opportunities*. New York: Harper & Brothers.
- Blanshard, B., Ducasse, C. J., Hendel, C. W., Murphy, A. E., and Otto, M. C. (1945b). From the Commission’s Mailbag. *Philosophical Review*, 54, 197–259.
- Blau, J. L. (1953). *Men and Movements in American Philosophy*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Bloor, D. (1973). Are Philosophers Averse to Science? In D. O. Edge and J. N. Wolfe (eds.), *Meaning and Control: Essays in Social Aspects of Science and Technology* (pp. 1–30). London: Tavistock.

- Bloor, D. (1976). *Knowledge and Social Imagery*. London: Routledge.
- Blumberg, A. (1935). The Nature of Philosophic Analysis. *Philosophy of Science*, 1, 1–8.
- Blumberg, A., and Feigl, H. (1931). Logical Positivism: A New Movement in European Philosophy. *Journal of Philosophy*, 28, 281–296.
- Boas, G. (1931). Mr. Lewis's Theory of Meaning. *Journal of Philosophy*, 28, 314–325.
- Bös, G. (forthcoming). Studying the History of 20th-Century Philosophy of Science through Interactive Mention Analysis. In Love and Verhaegh (eds.).
- Boring, E. G. (1931). The Psychologist's Circle. *Psychological Review*, 38, 177–182.
- Boring, E. G. (1933). *The Physical Dimensions of Consciousness*. New York: Century.
- Boring, E. G. (1950). *A History of Experimental Psychology*. Second edition. New York: Appleton-Century.
- Boring, E. G. (1962). Preface. In *The Physical Dimensions of Consciousness* (pp. v–xi). Dover edition. New York: Dover.
- Bosanquet, B. (1885). *Knowledge and Reality*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench.
- Bowler, P. J. (1983). *The Eclipse of Darwinism: Anti-Darwinian Evolution Theories in the Decades around 1900*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Bradley, F. H. (1883). *The Principles of Logic*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Bradley, F. H. (1904). On Truth and Practice. *Mind*, 13, 309–335.
- Brenner, A. (2002). The French Connection: Conventionalism and the Vienna Circle. In M. Heidelberger and F. Stadler (eds.), *History of Philosophy of Science: New Trends and Perspectives* (pp. 277–286). Dordrecht: Springer.
- Brentano, F. (1902). *The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong*. Transl. by C. Hague. Westminster: Archibald Constable.
- Bridger, S. (2015). *Scientists at War: The Ethics of Cold War Weapons Research*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Bridgman, P. W. (1909). The Measurement of High Hydrostatic Pressure. *Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, 44, 201–279.
- Bridgman, P. W. (1912). Water, in the Liquid and Five Solid Forms, under Pressure. *Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, 47, 441–558.
- Bridgman, P. W. (1922). *Dimensional Analysis*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Bridgman, P. W. (1927). *The Logic of Modern Physics*. New York: Macmillan.
- Bridgman, P. W. (1928). Review of *An Account of the Principles of Measurement and Calculation* by N. R. Campbell. *Physical Review*, 32, 999–1000.
- Bridgman, P. W. (1940). Science: Public or Private? *Philosophy of Science*, 7, 36–48.
- Bridgman, P. W. (1943). Recent Work in the Field of High Pressures. *American Scientists*, 31, 1–35.
- Bridgman, P. W. (1945). The Compression of 21 Halogen Compounds and 11 Other Simple Substances to 100,000 kg/cm². *Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, 76, 1–7.
- Bridgman, P. W. (1960). Introduction. In J. B. Stallo (1960). *The Concepts and Theories of Modern Physics* (pp. vii–xxix). Ed. by P. W. Bridgman. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Bright, L. K., Malinsky, D., and Thompson, M. (2016). Causally Interpreting Intersectionality Theory. *Philosophy of Science*, 83, 60–81.

- Brightman, E. S. (1947). Philosophy in the United States 1939–1945. *Philosophical Review*, 56, 390–405.
- Brockman, J. (1970). 37. New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston.
- Broday, B. (1970, ed.). *Readings in the Philosophy of Science*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Brown, M. J. (2012). John Dewey's Philosophy of Science. *HOPOS: Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science*, 2, 258–306.
- Brownstein, M. (1969). Jumping. In *Highway to the Sky* (p. 28). New York: Columbia University Press.
- Brush, S. G. (1999). Why was Relativity Accepted? *Physics in Perspective*, 1, 184–214.
- Büchner, L. (1855). *Kraft und Stoff. Empirisch-naturphilosophische Studien*. Frankfurt am Main: Meidinger.
- Buchwald, D. K. (2006). Foreword. In Illy (2006, ed.), ix–xiii.
- Bunge, M. (1976). The Philosophical Richness of Technology. *PSA: Proceedings of Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association*, 2, 153–172.
- Burch, R. W. (2010). Royce, Boolean Rings, and the T-Relation. *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society*, 46, 221–241.
- Burnham, J. (2012, ed.). *After Freud Left: A Century of Psychoanalysis in America*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Burns, J., Brenner, A., Kiser, K., Krot, M., Llewellyn, C., and Snyder, R. (2009). JSTOR: Data for Research. In M. Agosti, J. Borbinha, S. Kapidakis, C. Papatheodorou, and G. Tsakonas (eds.), *Research and Advanced Technology for Digital Libraries* (pp. 416–419). Berlin: Springer.
- Burt, E. A. (1924). *The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science*. New York: Harcourt, Brace.
- Bush, V. (1945). *Science: The Endless Frontier*. U.S. Government Printing Office.
- Busse, L. (1909). *Die Weltanschauungen der grossen Philosophen der Neuzeit*. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner.
- Cailliet, E. (1953). *The Christian Approach to Culture*. New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury.
- Caldwell, W. (1900). Pragmatism. *Mind*, 9, 433–456.
- Calkins, M. W. (1907). *The Persistent Problems of Philosophy*. London: Macmillan.
- Calkins, M. W. (1912). *The Persistent Problems of Philosophy*. Third edition. London: Macmillan.
- Calkins, M. W. (1930). Mary Whiton Calkins. In C. Murchison (ed.), *A History of Psychology in Autobiography*. Vol. 1 (pp. 31–62). Worcester, MA: Clark University Press.
- Calkins, M. W., Warren, H. C., Dunlap, K., Gardiner, N. and Ruckmick, C. A. (1922). Definitions and Limitations of Psychological Terms, II. *Psychological Bulletin*, 19, 230–233.
- Campbell, J. (2006). *A Thoughtful Profession: The Early Years of the American Philosophical Association*. Peru, IL: Open Court.
- Campbell, J. (2007). One Hundred Years of Pragmatism. *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society*, 43, 1–15.

- Campbell, N. R. (1928). *An Account of the Principles of Measurement and Calculation*. London: Longmans, Green.
- Cantor, J. H. (1991, ed.). *Psychology at Iowa: Centennial Essays*. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Capps, J. (2003). Pragmatism and the McCarthy Era. *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society*, 39, 61–76.
- Carmichael, R. (1912). *The Theory of Relativity*. New York: Wiley.
- Carmichael, R. (1920). *The Theory of Relativity*. Second edition. New York: Wiley.
- Carnap, R. (1922). *Der Raum: Ein Beitrag zur Wissenschaftslehre*. Kant-Studien Vol. 56. Berlin: Reuther & Reichard.
- Carnap, R. (1928a). *Der Logische Aufbau der Welt*. Berlin-Schlachtensee: Weltkreis-Verlag.
- Carnap, R. (1928b). *Scheinprobleme in der Philosophie: Das Fremdpsychische und der Realismusstreit*. Transl. by R. George. *Pseudo-Problems in Philosophy: The Heteropsychological and the Realism Controversy*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Carnap, R. (1930). Die alte und die neue Logik. Transl. by I. Levi. The Old and the New Logic. In A. J. Ayer (1959, ed.), *Logical Positivism* (pp. 133–146). Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
- Carnap, R. (1932). Über Protokollsätze. *Erkenntnis*, 3, 204–214.
- Carnap, R. (1934a). *Logische Syntax der Sprache*. Transl. by A. Smeaton. *The Logical Syntax of Language*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner.
- Carnap, R. (1934b). On the Character of Philosophic Problems. *Philosophy of Science*, 1, 5–19.
- Carnap, R. (1934c). Meaning, Assertion and Proposal. *Philosophy of Science*, 1, 359–360.
- Carnap, R. (1934d). *The Unity of Science*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner.
- Carnap, R. (1934e). *Die Aufgabe der Wissenschaftslogik*. Transl. by B. McGuinness. The Task of the Logic of Science. In McGuinness (1987, ed.), *Unified Science* (pp. 46–66). Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
- Carnap, R. (1935). *Philosophy and Logical Syntax*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner.
- Carnap, R. (1936). Testability and Meaning. *Philosophy of Science*, 3, 419–471.
- Carnap, R. (1937). Testability and Meaning—Continued. *Philosophy of Science*, 4, 1–40.
- Carnap, R. (1942). *Introduction to Semantics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Carnap, R. (1950). Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology. *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, 4, 20–40.
- Carnap, R. (1952). Meaning Postulates. *Philosophical Studies*, 3, 65–73.
- Carnap, R. (1955). Meaning and Synonymy in Natural Languages. *Philosophical Studies*, 6, 33–47.
- Carnap, R. (1963). Intellectual Autobiography. In Schilpp (1963, ed.), 3–84.
- Carnap, R. (2022). *Rudolf Carnap: Tagebücher 1920–1935*, ed. by C. Damböck. Hamburg: Meiner.
- Carnap, R. (ms.). *Rudolf Carnap: Tagebücher 1936–1970*, ed. by C. Damböck. Hamburg: Meiner.
- Carnap, R., Zilsel, E., Reichenbach, H., Dubislav, W., von Mises, L., Neurath, O., and Grelling, K. (1930). Diskussion über Wahrscheinlichkeit. *Erkenntnis*, 1, 260–285.

- Carr, H. W. (1920). *The General Principle of Relativity in Its Philosophical and Historical Aspect*. London: Macmillan.
- Carr, H. W., Nunn, T. P., and Wrinch, D. (1922). Discussion: The Idealistic Interpretation of Einstein's Theory. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 22, 123–138.
- Carr, H. W., Sampson, R., and Whitehead, A. N. (1923). Symposium: The Problem of Simultaneity. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes*, 3, 15–41.
- Cartter, A. M. (1966). *An Assessment of Quality in Graduate Education*. Washington, DC: American Council on Education.
- Carus, A. W. (2007). *Carnap and Twentieth-Century Thought: Explication as Enlightenment*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Carus, A. W., Friedman, M., Kienzler, W., Richardson, A., and Schlotter, S. (2019, eds.). *The Collected Works of Rudolf Carnap*. Vol. 1. Early Writings. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Carus, P. (1884). *Aus dem Exil*. Dresden: R. von Grumbkow.
- Cassirer, E. (1923). *Einstein's Theory of Relativity*. Chicago, IL: Open Court.
- Cat, J. (2024). Otto Neurath. In E. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2024/entries/neurath>.
- Cat, J., Chang, H., and Cartwright, N. (1991). Otto Neurath: Unification as the Way to Socialism. In J. Mittelstrass (ed.), *Einheit der Wissenschaften* (pp. 91–110). Berlin: De Gruyter.
- Cerf, W. (1954). The Eleventh International Congress of Philosophy. *Philosophical Review*, 64, 280–299.
- Chamberlin, T. C. (1909, ed.). *Fifty Years of Darwinism*. New York: Holt.
- Chapman, F. M., and Henle, P. (1933). *The Fundamentals of Logic*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.
- Childs, D. J. (1986). "Mr. Apollinax", Professor Channing-Cheetah, and T. S. Eliot. *Journal of Modern Literature*, 13, 172–177.
- Churchman, C. W. (1949). Editorial: Philosophy of Science and Liberalism. *Philosophy of Science*, 16, 1–2.
- Clendenning, J. (1970, ed.). *The Letters of Josiah Royce*. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
- Clowse, B. B. (1981). *Brainpower for the Cold War: The Sputnik Crisis and National Defense Education Act of 1958*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Cock, A. G. (1983). Chauvinism and Internationalism in Science: The International Research Council, 1919–1926. *Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London*, 37, 249–288.
- Coffa, J. A. (1973). Foundations of Inductive Explanation. Ph.D. dissertation. University of Pittsburgh.
- Coffa, J. A. (1974). Hempel's Ambiguity. *Synthese*, 28, 141–163.
- Coffa, J. A. (1977a). Probabilities: Reasonable or True? *Philosophy of Science*, 44, 186–198.
- Coffa, J. A. (1977b). Carnap's *Sprachanschauung* Circa 1932. *Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association*, 2, 205–241.
- Coffa, J. A. (1979a). The Humble Origins of Russell's Paradox. *Russell: Journal of Bertrand Russell Archives*, 33, 31–37.

- Coffa, J. A. (1979b). Elective Affinities: Weyl and Reichenbach. In Salmon (1979a, ed.), 267–304.
- Coffa, J. A. (1991). *The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cohen, M. R. (1910). The Conception of Philosophy in Recent Discussion. *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods* 7, 401–410.
- Cohen, M. R. (1911). The Present Situation in the Philosophy of Mathematics. *Journal of Philosophy*, 8, 533–546.
- Cohen, M. R. (1912). Review of *Principia Mathematica* by A. N. Whitehead and B. Russell. *Philosophical Review*, 21, 87–91.
- Cohen, M. R. (1913). The New Realism. *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, 10, 197–214.
- Cohen, M. R. (1918). The Subject Matter of Formal Logic. *Journal of Philosophy*, 15, 673–688.
- Cohen, M. R. (1921). Later Philosophy. In W. P. Trent (ed.), *The Cambridge History of American Literature. Later National Literature, Part II* (pp. 226–265). New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons.
- Cohen, M. R. (1931). *Reason and Nature*. New York: Harcourt, Brace.
- Cohen, M. R. (1940). Some Difficulties in Dewey’s Anthropocentric Naturalism. *Philosophical Review*, 49, 196–228.
- Cohen, M. R. and Nagel, E. (1934). *An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.
- Cohen, R. S., and Neurath, M. (1983, eds.). *Otto Neurath: Philosophical Papers 1913–1946*. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
- Collodel, M. (2015). Flippant Anarchism: Feyerabend and the Student Movement. Unpublished manuscript.
- Colodny, R. (1971, ed.). *The Nature and Function of Scientific Theories*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Conant, J. (2022). An Introduction to Hilary Putnam. In: J. Conant and S. Chakraborty (eds.), *Engaging Putnam* (pp. 1–46). Berlin: De Gruyter.
- Conant, J. B. (1946). The American Community of Scholars. *Atlantic Monthly*, June 1946, 88–90.
- Congdon, L. (2002). Imre Lakatos’s Political Rebirth. In G. Kampis, L. Kvasz, and M. Stöltzner (eds.), *Appraising Lakatos: Mathematics, Methodology and the Man* (pp. 339–349). Dordrecht: Kluwer.
- Conger, G. P. (1946). Method and Content in Philosophy. *Philosophical Review*, 55, 404–424.
- Cornforth, M. (1934). Is Analysis a Useful Method in Philosophy? *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes*, 13, 90–118.
- Costello, H. T. (1957). Logic in 1914 and Now. *Journal of Philosophy*, 54, 245–264.
- Cozzoli, D. (2024). Kuhn, Popper, the Military-Industrial Complex and the Techno-Scientific Revolution. In Shan (ed.), 269–290.
- Creath, R. (1975). Science, Syntax and Semantics: An Examination of the Philosophy of Language of Rudolf Carnap. Ph.D. dissertation. University of Pittsburgh.

- Creath, R. (1982). Was Carnap a Complete Verificationist in the Aufbau? *Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association*, 1, 384–393.
- Creath, R. (1984). Smart, Salmon and Scientific Realism. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 62, 404–409.
- Creath, R. (1990, ed.). *Dear Carnap, Dear Van*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Creath, R. (1994). Functionalist Theories of Meaning and the Defense of Analyticity. In Salmon and Wolters (eds.), 287–304.
- Creath, R. (2022a). Logical Empiricism. In E. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logical-empiricism/>.
- Creath, R. (2022b). Quine and Post-Positivism. In Uebel and Limbeck-Lilienau (2022, eds.), 345–350.
- Creighton, J. E. (1898). *An Introductory Logic*. New York: Macmillan.
- Creighton, J. E. (1902). The Purposes of a Philosophical Association. *Philosophical Review*, 11, 219–237.
- Creighton, J. E. (1904). Purpose as Logical Theory. *Philosophical Review*, 13, 284–297.
- Creighton, J. E. (1909). Darwin and Logic. *Psychological Review*, 16, 170–187.
- Crellin, J. (2006). *Einstein's Jury: The Race to Test Relativity*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Cunningham, G. W. (1925). In Memoriam: James Edwin Creighton. *International Journal of Ethics*, 35, 214–216.
- Cunningham, S. (1994). Herbert Spencer, Bertrand Russell, and the Shape of Early Analytic Philosophy. *Russell: Journal of the Bertrand Russell Archives*, 14, 7–29.
- Dahms, H. J. (1994). *Positivismusstreit: Die Auseinandersetzungen der Frankfurter Schule mit dem logischen Positivismus, dem amerikanischen Pragmatismus und dem kritischen Rationalismus*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
- Dahms, H. J. (2019). Logical Empiricism and Art: The Correspondence Otto Neurath/Meyer Schapiro. In J. Cat and A. T. Tuboly (eds.), *Neurath Reconsidered: New Sources and Perspectives* (pp. 471–488). Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science. Cham: Springer.
- Damböck, C. (2016, ed.). *Influences on the Aufbau*. Dordrecht: Springer.
- Damböck, C., Sandner, G., and Werner, M. (2022, eds.). *Logical Empiricism, Life Reform, and the German Youth Movement*. Cham: Springer.
- Damböck, C. (2025). Carnap's Scientific Humanism. *Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy*, 13, 1–31.
- Damböck, C., and Schiemer, G. (2026, eds.). *Rudolf Carnap Handbook*. Heidelberg: J. B. Metzler Verlag.
- Daniels, N. (1974). IQ, Heritability, and Human Nature. *PSA: Proceedings of Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association*, 1, 143–180.
- Daniels, G. H. (1994). *American Science in the Age of Jackson*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
- Danto, A. C. (1985). *Narration and Knowledge*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Darden, L. (1976). The Heritage from Logical Positivism: A Reassessment. *PSA: Proceedings of Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association*, 2, 242–258.

- Davidson, D. (1999). Intellectual Autobiography of Donald Davidson. In L. E. Hahn (ed.), *The Philosophy of Donald Davidson* (pp. 3–70). Chicago, IL: Open Court.
- Davis, R. C. (1958). *The Public Impact of Science in the Mass Media*. Survey Research Center Ann Arbor: University of Michigan.
- DeBoer, G. E. (2000). Scientific Literacy: Another Look at Its Historical and Contemporary Meanings and Its Relationship to Science Education Reform. *Journal of Research in Science Teaching*, 37, 582–601.
- De Laguna, T., and De Laguna, G. A. (1910). *Dogmatism and Evolution*. New York: Macmillan.
- De Tocqueville, A. (1835). *Democracy in America*. London: Saunders & Otley.
- de Waal, C. (2012). Preface. In E. P. Charles (ed.), *A New Look at New Realism: The Psychology and Philosophy of E. B. Holt* (pp. xiii–xxvii). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.
- de Waal, C. (2014, ed.). Introduction. In C. S. Peirce, *Illustrations of the Logic of Science* (pp. 1–42). Chicago, IL: Open Court.
- Della Valle, G. (1924). International Congress of Philosophy. *Journal of Philosophy*, 21, 390–392.
- Dengerink Chaplin, A. (2020). *The Philosophy of Susanne Langer: Embodied Meaning in Logic, Art and Feeling*. London: Bloomsbury.
- Dewey, J. (1882a). The Metaphysical Assumptions of Materialism. EWD, Vol. 1, 3–8.
- Dewey, J. (1882b). The Pantheism of Spinoza. EWD, Vol. 1, 9–18.
- Dewey, J. (1883). Knowledge and the Relativity of Feeling. EWD, Vol. 1, 19–33.
- Dewey, J. (1884). Kant and Philosophic Method. EWD, Vol. 1, 34–47.
- Dewey, J. (1890). Is Logic a Dualistic Science? EWD, Vol. 3, 75–82.
- Dewey, J. (1900). Some Stages of Logical Thought. MWD, Vol. 1, 151–174.
- Dewey, J. (1903, ed.). *Studies in Logical Theory*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Dewey, J. (1909). The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy. MWD, Vol. 4, 3–14.
- Dewey, J. (1916). *Essays in Experimental Logic*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Dewey, J. (1925). *Experience and Nature*. LWD, Vol. 1.
- Dewey, J. (1929). *The Quest for Certainty: A Study of the Relation between Knowledge and Action*. New York: Minton, Balch.
- Dewey, J. (1930). From Absolutism to Experimentalism. LWD, Vol. 5, 148–161.
- Dewey, J. (1934). Meaning, Assertion and Proposal. LWD, Vol. 9, 303–304.
- Dewey, J. (1938). *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*. LWD, Vol. 12.
- Dewey, J. (1939). *Theory of Valuation*. LWD, Vol. 13, 189–252.
- Dewey, J. (1942). William James as Empiricist. LWD, Vol. 15, 9–17.
- Dewey, J., and Bentley, A. F. (1948). *Knowing and the Known*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
- Dewey, J., and Dewey J. M. (1939). Biography of John Dewey. In Schilpp (1939, ed.), 1–46.
- Dewey, J., Hook, S., and Nagel, E. (1945). Are Naturalists Materialists? *Journal of Philosophy*, 42, 515–530.
- Dewey, J., and Kallen, H. (1941, eds.). *The Bertrand Russell Case*. New York: Viking.
- DeWolfe Howe, M. (1953). *Holmes-Laski Letters: The Correspondence of Mr. Justice Holmes and Harold J. Laski*. Vol. I: 1916–1925. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

- Dewulf, F. (2020). The Place of Historiography in the Network of Logical Empiricism. *Intellectual History Review*, 30, 321–345.
- Dewulf, F. (2021). The Institutional Stabilization of Philosophy of Science and Its Withdrawal from Social Concerns after the Second World War. *British Journal for the History of Philosophy*, 29, 935–953.
- Dewulf, F. (2025). The Failed Reception of Voluntarism in Logical Empiricism. In Verhaegh (2025a, ed.), 211–232.
- Dohrn, B., Ayers, B., Jones, J., and Sojourn, C. (1974). *Prairie Fire: The Politics of Revolutionary Anti-Imperialism*. San Francisco: Communications.
- Douglas, H. (2001). Inductive Risk and Values in Science. *Philosophy of Science*, 67, 559–579.
- Douglas, H. (2009). *Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Douglas, H., and Branch, T. Y. (2024). The Social Contract for Science and the Value-Free Ideal. *Synthese*, 203, 1–20.
- Durbin, P. T. (1976). Are There Interesting Philosophical Issues in Technology as Distinct from Science? An Overview of Philosophy of Technology. *PSA: Proceedings of Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association*, 2, 139–152.
- Duschl, R. A. (1985). Science Education and Philosophy of Science Twenty-Five Years of Mutually Exclusive Development. *School Science and Mathematics*, 85, 541–555.
- Dutilh Novaes, C. (2020). Carnapian Explication and Ameliorative Analysis: A Systematic Comparison. *Synthese*, 197, 1011–1034.
- Dzuback, M. (1991). *Robert M. Hutchins: Portrait of an Educator*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Edge, D. O., and MacLeod, R. M. (1971). Editorial. *Science Studies*, 1, 1–2.
- Elkana, Y. (1978). Two-Tier-Thinking: Philosophical Realism and Historical Relativism. *Social Studies of Science*, 8, 309–326.
- Engelen, J., Verhaegh, S., Pannu, G., and Collignon, L. (2023). A Bibliometric Analysis of the Cognitive Turn in Psychology. *Perspectives on Science*, 31, 324–359.
- England, J. M. (1983). *A Patron for Pure Science: The National Science Foundation's Formative Years, 1945–1957*. Washington: National Science Foundation.
- Earman, J. (1992). *Bayes or Bust? A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Eaton, R. M. (1931). *General Logic: An Introductory Survey*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.
- Eddington, A. (1920). *Space, Time and Gravitation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Eddington, A. (1923). *The Mathematical Theory of Relativity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Edel, A. (1961). *Science and the Structure of Ethics*. International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, 2(3). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Edgar, S. (2009). Logical Empiricism, Politics, and Professionalism. *Science and Education*, 18, 177–189.
- Edman, I. (1934). The First Quarter of 1934 in the U.S.A. *Aryan Path*, 5, 475–478.
- Edman, I. (1941). Lyric and Analytic Elements in Naturalistic Philosophy. *Journal of*

- Philosophy*, 38, 561–568.
- Edmonds, D. (2020). *The Murder of Professor Schlick: The Rise and Fall of the Vienna Circle*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Einstein, A. (1905). Zur Elektrodynamik bewegter Körper. *Annalen der Physik*, 17, 891–921. Transl. by W. Perrett and G. B. Jeffery as On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies. In A. Einstein (1923). *The Principle of Relativity* (pp. 35–65). London: Methuen.
- Einstein, A. (1917). *Über die spezielle und die allgemeine Relativitätstheorie*. Transl. by R. W. Lawson as *On the Special and General Theory of Relativity*. London: Methuen.
- Einstein, A. (1949). Remarks. In P. A. Schilpp (ed.), *Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist* (pp. 663–688). Library of Living Philosophers. Vol. VII. New York: Harper & Row.
- Eliot, T. S. (1917). *Prufrock and Other Observations*. London: Egoist Press.
- Farber, I. E. (1991). Bergmann’s “History and Systems of Psychology” with Penultimate Reflections on Behaviorism. In Cantor (ed.), 19–36.
- Farmakis, L. (2008). Did Tom Kuhn Actually Meet Tom Bayes? *Erkenntnis*, 68, 41–53.
- Feest, U. (2025). *Operationism in Psychology: An Epistemology of Exploration*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Feferman, A., and Feferman, S. (2004). *Tarski: Life and Logic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Feigl, H. (1929). *Theorie und Erfahrung in der Physik*. Karlsruhe: G. Braun. Ch. III (Sinn und Gültigkeit der physikalischen Theorien). Transl. by G. Braun. Meaning and Validity of Physical Theories. In Feigl (1981), 116–144.
- Feigl, H. (1930). Probability and Experience. In Feigl (1981), 107–115.
- Feigl, H. (1934a). The Logical Character of the Principle of Induction. In Feigl (1981), 153–163.
- Feigl, H. (1934b). Logical Analysis of the Psychophysical Problem: A Contribution of the New Positivism. *Philosophy of Science*, 1, 420–445.
- Feigl, H. (1945a). Operationism and Scientific Method. In Feigl (1981), 171–185.
- Feigl, H. (1945b). Rejoinder. In Feigl (1981), 185–191.
- Feigl, H. (1949). Naturalism and Humanism. In Feigl (1981), 366–377.
- Feigl, H. (1950a). Existential Hypotheses. In Feigl (1981), 192–223.
- Feigl, H. (1950b). The Mind-Body Problem in the Development of Logical Empiricism. In Feigl (1981), 286–301.
- Feigl, H. (1951). Confirmability and Confirmation. In Feigl (1981), 145–152.
- Feigl, H. (1952). Validation and Vindication: An Analysis of the Nature and Limits of Ethical Arguments. In Feigl (1981), 378–392.
- Feigl, H. (1956). Some Major Issues and Developments in the Philosophy of Science of Logical Empiricism. In Feigl and Scriven (1956, eds.), 3–37.
- Feigl, H. (1958). The “Mental” and the “Physical”. In Feigl et al. (eds.), 370–497.
- Feigl, H. (1963). The Power of Positivistic Thinking. In Feigl (1981), 38–56.
- Feigl, H. (1964). Philosophy of Science. In R. Chisholm, H. Feigl, W. Frankena, J. Passmore, and M. Thompson (eds.), *Philosophy*. The Council of the Humanities (pp. 465–540). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Feigl, H. (1966). Is Science Relevant to Theology? In Feigl (1981), 399–407.
- Feigl, H. (1969a). The Origin and Spirit of Logical Positivism. In Feigl (1981), 21–37.

- Feigl, H. (1969b). The *Wiener Kreis* in America. In Feigl (1981), 57–94.
- Feigl, H. (1971). Empiricism at Bay? In Feigl (1981), 269–285.
- Feigl, H. (1973). Positivism in the 20th Century (Logical Empiricism). In P. P. Wiener (ed.), *Dictionary of the History of Ideas*. Vol. 3 (pp. 545–551). New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.
- Feigl, H. (1974). No Pot of Message. In Feigl (1981), 1–20.
- Feigl, H. (1981). *Inquiries and Provocations: Selected Writings 1929–1974*. Dordrecht: Reidel.
- Feigl, H., and Brodbeck, M. (1953, eds.). *Readings in the Philosophy of Science*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
- Feigl, H., and Maxwell, G. (1962, eds.). *Scientific Explanation, Space, and Time*. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Vol. III. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Feigl, H., and Scriven, M. (1956, eds.). *The Foundations of Science and the Concepts of Psychology and Psychoanalysis*. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Vol. 1. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Feigl, H., Scriven, M., and Maxwell, G. (1958, eds.). *Concepts, Theories, and the Mind-Body Problem*. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Vol. II. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Feigl, H., and Sellars, W. (1949, eds.). *Readings Philosophical Analysis*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
- Feigl, H., Sellars, W., and Lehrer, K. (1972, eds.). *New Readings in Philosophical Analysis*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
- Feinberg, B., and Kasrils, R. (1973, eds.). *Bertrand Russell's America, 1896–1945*. London: George Allen & Unwin.
- Fenz, B. (1978). Zur Ideologie der “Volksbürgerschaft”. Die Studentenordnung der Universität Wien vom 8. April 1930 vor dem Verfassungsgerichtshof. *Zeitgeschichte*, 4, 125–145.
- Ferrari, M. (2021). Alois Riehl and Scientific Philosophy. In R. Meer and G. Motta (eds.), *Kant in Österreich: Alois Riehl und der Weg zum kritischen Realismus* (pp. 179–200). Berlin: De Gruyter.
- Ferri, M. (2019, ed.). *The Reception of Husserlian Phenomenology in North America*. Cham: Springer.
- Feuer, L. S. (1941). The Development of Logical Empiricism. *Science and Society*, 5, 222–233.
- Feuer, L. S. (1958). John Dewey's Reading at College. *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 19, 415–421.
- Feyerabend, P. (1962). Explanation, Reduction, and Empiricism. In Feigl and Maxwell (eds.), *Scientific Explanation, Space, and Time*, 28–97.
- Feyerabend, P. (1970). Consolations for the Specialist. In Lakatos and Musgrave (eds.), 197–230.
- Feyerabend, P. (1975). *Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge*. London: New Left Books.
- Feyerabend, P. (1995). *Killing Time*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

- Feyerabend, P., and Lakatos, I. (1999). The Lakatos-Feyerabend Correspondence (1968–1974). In M. Motterlini (1999, ed.), *For and Against Method* (pp. 119–374). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Fine, A., Forbers, M., and Wessels, L. (1990, eds.). *PSA 1990: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association*. East Lansing, MI: Philosophy of Science Association.
- Floyd, J. (2009). Recent Themes in the History of Early Analytic Philosophy. *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 47, 157–200.
- Floyd, J. (2021). Sheffer, Lewis, and the “Logocentric Predicament”. In Q. Kammer, J. Narboux, and H. Wagner (eds.), *C. I. Lewis: The A Priori and the Given* (pp. 27–103). New York: Routledge.
- Floyd, J. (2026). Susanne Langer. In E. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/langer/>.
- Fogelin, R. J. (1980). Blanshard’s Critique of the Analytic Movement. In P. A. Schilpp. *The Philosophy of Brand Blanshard*, The Library of Living Philosophy, Vol. XV (pp. 696–724). La Salle, IL: Open Court.
- Forman, P. (1971). Weimar Culture, Causality, and Quantum Theory, 1918–1927: Adaptation by German Physicists and Mathematicians to a Hostile Intellectual Environment. *Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences*, 3, 1–115.
- Forster, M. N., and Gjesdal, K. (2015, eds.). *The Oxford Handbook of German Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Fox, R. (2018). Einstein in Oxford. *Notes and Records: The Royal Society Journal of the History of Science*, 72, 293–318.
- Frank, P. (1930). Was bedeuten die gegenwärtigen physikalischen Theorien für die allgemeine Erkenntnislehre? *Erkenntnis*, 1, 126–157.
- Frank, P. (1947). *Einstein: His Life and Times*. New York: Albert A. Knopf.
- Frank, P. (1949). *Modern Science and Its Philosophy*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Frank, P. (1950). *Relativity: A Richer Truth*. London: Jonathan Cape.
- Frank, P. (1957). *Philosophy of Science: The Link between Science and Philosophy*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Frankel, C. (1960, ed.). *The Golden Age of American Philosophy*. New York: G. Braziller.
- Friedl, J. (2013). *Konsequenter Empirismus. Die Entwicklung von Moritz Schlicks Erkenntnistheorie im Wiener Kreis*. Vienna: Springer.
- Friedman, M. (1974). Explanation and Scientific Understanding. *Journal of Philosophy*, 71, 5–19.
- Friedman, M. (1987). Carnap’s *Aufbau* Reconsidered. *Noûs*, 21, 521–545.
- Friedman, M. (1994). Geometry, Convention, and the Relativized A Priori: Reichenbach, Schlick, and Carnap. In Salmon and Wolters (eds.), 21–34.
- Friedman, M. (1999). *Reconsidering Logical Positivism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Friedman, M. (2001). *The Dynamics of Reason*. Stanford, CA: Center for the Study of Language and Information.
- Friedman, M. (2003). Kuhn and Logical Empiricism. In T. Nickles (ed.), *Thomas Kuhn* (pp.

- 19–44). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Friedman, M., and Creath, R. (2007, eds.). *The Cambridge Companion to Carnap*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Frost-Arnold, G. (2017). The Rise of “Analytic Philosophy”: When and How Did People Begin Calling Themselves “Analytic Philosophers”? In S. Lapointe and C. Pincock (eds.), *Innovations in the History of Analytical Philosophy* (pp. 27–67). London: Palgrave.
- Galavotti, M. C. (2022). Wesley Salmon. In E. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wesley-salmon/>.
- Gališanka, A. (2019). *John Rawls: The Path to a Theory of Justice*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Galison, P. (1990). Aufbau/Bauhaus: Logical Positivism and Architectural Modernism. *Critical Inquiry*, 16, 709–752.
- Galison, P. (1998). The Americanization of Unity. *Daedalus*, 127, 45–71.
- Gallagher, J. J. (1971). A Broader Base for Science Teaching. *Science Education*, 55, 329–338.
- Gamertsfelder, W. S. (1933). Current Skepticism of Metaphysics. *The Monist*, 43, 105–118.
- Geiger, R. (1986). *To Advance Knowledge: The Growth of American Research Universities, 1900–1940*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Geiger, R. (2015). *The History of American Higher Education: Learning and Culture from the Founding to World War II*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Giere, R. N. (1976). A Dilemma for Philosophers of Science and Technology. *PSA: Proceedings of Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association*, 2, 194–201.
- Giere, R. N., and Richardson, A. (1996). *Origins of Logical Empiricism*. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Vol. XVI. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Gillispie, C. C. (1960). *The Edge of Objectivity: An Essay in the History of Scientific Ideas*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Gimbel, S., and Walz, A. (2006, eds.). *Defending Einstein: Hans Reichenbach’s Writings on Space, Time and Motion*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ginsberg, R. (1972). Philosophical Activity and War. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 33, 174–185.
- Ginsburg, E. B. (1932). On the Logical Positivism of the Viennese Circle. *Journal of Philosophy*, 29, 121–129.
- Gitlin, T. (1987). *The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage*. New York: Bantam Books.
- Gliboff, S. (2008). *H. G. Bronn, Ernst Haeckel, and the Origins of German Darwinism*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Glick, T. F. (1987, ed.). *The Comparative Reception of Relativity*. Dordrecht: Reidel.
- Glick, T. F. (1988). *Einstein in Spain: Relativity and the Recovery of Science*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Glymour, C., and Eberhardt, F. (2022). Hans Reichenbach. In E. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reichenbach/>
- Goldberg, S. (1984). *Understanding Relativity: Origin and Impact of a Scientific Revolution*. Boston, MA: Birkhäuser.

- Goldberg, S. (1988). What Instruments Measure and What People Believe: Reflections on Interpretations of the Michelson-Morley Experiment. *AIP Conference Proceedings*, 179, 78–95.
- Goldfarb, W. (1979). Logic in the Twenties: The Nature of the Quantifier. *Journal of Symbolic Logic*, 44, 351–368.
- Goldman, S. L. (1979). Present Strains in the Relations between Science, Technology and Society. *Science, Technology, and Human Values*, 4, 44–51.
- Good, J. A. (2006). *A Search for Unity in Diversity: The “Permanent Hegelian Deposit” in the Philosophy of John Dewey*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
- Goodstein, J. R. (1983). The Italian Mathematicians of Relativity. *Centaurus*, 26, 241–261.
- Gordin, W. (1926). The Philosophy of Relativity. *Journal of Philosophy*, 23, 517–524.
- Grau, K. T. (1999). Force and Nature: The Department of History and Philosophy of Science at Indiana University, 1960–1998. *Isis*, 90, 296–318.
- Gregory, F. (1979). *Scientific Materialism in Nineteenth Century Germany*. Dordrecht: Reidel.
- Griffin, N. (1991). *Russell’s Idealist Apprenticeship*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Griffin, N. (1992, ed.). *The Selected Letters of Bertrand Russell*. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
- Grossmann, R. (2007). Reminiscence of Gustave Bergmann (1987). In Addis et al. (eds.), 283–286.
- Gruber, H. (1991). *Red Vienna: Experiment in Working-Class Culture 1919–1934*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gruber, M. (2016, ed.). *Alfred Tarski and the “Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages”*. Cham: Springer.
- Gruen, W. (1939). What Is Logical Empiricism? *Partisan Review*, 6, 64–77.
- Grünbaum, A. (1954). The Clock Paradox in the Special Theory of Relativity. *Philosophy of Science*, 21, 249–253.
- Grünbaum, A. (1988). In Memoriam: J. Alberto Coffa. In Grünbaum and Salmon (eds.), xvii–xx.
- Grünbaum, A., and Salmon, W. (1988, eds.). *The Limitations of Deductivism*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Grundmann, S. (1965). Der Boykott der deutschen Wissenschaft nach dem ersten Weltkrieg. *Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Technischen Universität Dresden*, 14, 799–806.
- Grüttner, M., and Kinas, S. (2007). Die Vertreibung von Wissenschaftlern aus den deutschen Universitäten 1933–1945. *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 55, 123–186.
- Hacking, I. (1990). *The Taming of Chance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Haeckel, E. (1895). *Die Welträtsel*. Transl. by J. McCabe as *The Riddle of the Universe* (1901). New York: Harper.
- Hahn, H., Neurath, O., and Carnap, R. (1929). *Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung: Der Wiener Kreis*. Transl. by P. Foulkes and M. Neurath as *The Scientific Conception of the World: The Vienna Circle*. In R. S. Cohen and M. Neurath (1973, eds.), *Empiricism and Sociology* (pp. 299–318). Dordrecht: Reidel.
- Haldane, R. B. (1921). *The Reign of Relativity*. London: John Murray.
- Hall, G. S. (1879). Philosophy in the United States. *Mind*, 4, 89–105.

- Haller, R. (1982, eds.). *Schlick und Neurath: Ein Symposium*. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
- Haller, R. (2003). On Herbert Feigl. In Hardcastle and Richardson (eds.), 115–128.
- Hanfling, O. (1981). *Logical Positivism*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Hanson, N. R. (1958). *Patterns of Discovery: An Inquiry into the Conceptual Foundations of Science*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hardcastle, G. L. (2003). Debabelizing Science: The Harvard Science of Science Discussion Group, 1940–1941. In Hardcastle and Richardson (eds.), 170–196.
- Hardcastle, G. L., and Richardson, A. W. (2003, eds.). *Logical Empiricism in North America*. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Vol. XVIII. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Hare, P. H. (2005). Sheldon, Wilmon Henry (1875–1980). In Shook (ed.), 2205–2208.
- Harman, G. (1967). Quine on Meaning and Existence, II. Existential Commitment. *Review of Metaphysics*, 21, 343–367.
- Haslanger, S. (2000). Gender and Race: (What) Are They? (What) Do We Want Them to Be? *Noûs*, 34, 31–55.
- Haslanger, S. (2012). *Resisting Reality*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hazen, R. M. (1993). *The Diamond Makers*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Hébert, M. (1908). *Le Pragmatisme*. Paris : Emile Nourry.
- Hecht, H., and Hoffmann, D. (1982). Die Berufung Hans Reichenbachs an die Berliner Universität. *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie*, 30, 651–662.
- Hegselmann, R., and Siegart, G. (1991). Zur Geschichte der “Erkenntnis”, *Erkenntnis* 35, 461–471.
- Heidelberger, M. (2006). Kantianism and Realism: Alois Riehl (and Moritz Schlick). In M. Friedman and A. Nordmann (eds.), *The Kantian Legacy in Nineteenth-Century Science* (pp. 227–248). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Heitowit, E. D., Epstein, J., Steinberg, G. M. (1976). *Science, Technology, and Society: A Guide to the Field*. Ithaca, NY: Program on Science, Technology, and Society, Cornell University.
- Hempel, C. G. (1950). A Note on Semantic Realism. *Philosophy of Science*, 17, 169–173.
- Hempel, C. G. (1952). *Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science*. International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Hempel, C. G. (1954). A Logical Appraisal of Operationism. *Scientific Monthly*, 79, 215–220.
- Hempel, C. G. (1962). Deductive-Nomological vs. Statistical Explanation. In Feigl and Maxwell (eds.), 98–169.
- Hempel, C. G. (1965). Aspects of Scientific Explanation. In *Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays* (pp. 331–496). New York: Free Press.
- Hempel, C. G. (1993). Empiricism in the Vienna Circle and in the Berlin Society for Scientific Philosophy. Recollections and Reflections. In Stadler (1993, ed.), 1–9.
- Hempel, C. G., and Oppenheim, P. (1948). Studies in the Logic of Explanation. *Philosophy of Science*, 15, 135–175.
- Henderson, H. (1993). *Catalyst for Controversy: Paul Carus of Open Court*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.

- Henderson, L. J. (1935). *Pareto's General Sociology*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Henkin, L. (1996). The Discovery of My Completeness Proofs. *Bulletin of Symbolic Logic*, 2, 127–158.
- Herbert, C. (2001). *Victorian Relativity: Radical Thought and Scientific Discovery*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Hesburgh, T. M. (1961). Foreword. *Liberal Education: The Bulletin of the Association of American Colleges*, 47, 205–206.
- Hess, M. W. (1933). Mathematical Logic in Modern Positivism. *Journal of Philosophy*, 30, 242–245.
- Hesse, M. (1963). Review of *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* by T. Kuhn. *Isis*, 54, 286–287.
- Hilgard, E. R. (1991). Psychology at Iowa before McGeoch and Spence. In Cantor (ed.), 37–50.
- Hintikka, J. (1975, eds.). *Rudolf Carnap: Logical Empiricist*. Dordrecht: Springer.
- Hollands, E. H. (1908). Neo-Realism and Idealism. *Philosophical Review*, 17, 507–517.
- Hollinger, D. A. (1995). Science as a Weapon in *Kulturkämpfe* in the United States during and after World War II. *Isis*, 86, 440–454.
- Hollinger, D. (2011). The Unity of Knowledge and the Diversity of Knowers: Science as an Agent of Cultural Integration in the United States between the Two World Wars. *Pacific Historical Review*, 80, 211–230.
- Holt, E. B. (1914). *The Concept of Consciousness*. New York: Macmillan.
- Holt, E. B., Marvin, W. T., Montague, W. P., Perry, R. B., Pitkin, W. B., and Spaulding, E. G. (1910). The Program and First Platform of Six Realists. *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, 7, 393–401.
- Holt, E. B., Marvin, W. T., Montague, W. P., Perry, R. B., Pitkin, W. B., and Spaulding, E. G. (1912, eds.). *The New Realism*. New York: Macmillan.
- Holton, G. (1968). Mach, Einstein, and the Search for Reality. In G. Holton (1973, ed.), *Thematic Origins of Scientific Thought: Kepler to Einstein* (pp. 224–232). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Holton, G. (1974). On Being Caught between Dionysians and Apollonians. *Daedalus*, 103, 65–81.
- Holton, G. (1992). Ernst Mach and the Fortunes of Positivism in America. *Isis* 83, 27–60.
- Hook, S. (1922). A Philosophical Dialogue. *Open Court*, 36, 621–626.
- Hook, S. (1928). The Philosophy of Dialectical Materialism. II. *Journal of Philosophy*, 25, 141–155.
- Hook, S. (1930a). A Personal Impression of Contemporary German Philosophy. *Journal of Philosophy*, 27, 141–160.
- Hook, S. (1930b). Husserl's Phenomenological Idealism. *Journal of Philosophy*, 27, 365–380.
- Hook, S. (1931). Experimental Logic. *Mind*, 40, 424–438.
- Hook, S. (1935). Experimental Naturalism. In Hook and H. M. Kallen (eds.), *American Philosophy Today and Tomorrow* (pp. 205–225). New York: L. Furman.
- Hook, S. (1937). Dialectic and Nature. *Marxist Quarterly*, 1, 253–284.

- Hook, S. (1946). *Education for Modern Man*. New York: Dial Press.
- Hook, S. (1970). *Academic Freedom and Academic Anarchy*. New York: Cowles.
- Hook, S. (1978). Memories of Hans Reichenbach, 1928 and Later. In Reichenbach and Cohen (1978a, eds.), 32–35.
- Hook, S. (1980). The Institute for Social Research—Addendum. *Survey*, 25, 177–178.
- Hook, S. (1987). *Out of Step: An Unquiet Life in the 20th Century*. New York: Carroll & Graf.
- Horkheimer, M. (1934). Zum Rationalismustreit in der gegenwärtigen Philosophie. *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*, 3, 1–53.
- Horkheimer, M. (1937). The Latest Attack on Metaphysics. In *Critical Theory: Selected Essays* (pp. 132–187). New York: Continuum.
- Hospers, J. (1946). On Explanation. *Journal of Philosophy*, 43, 337–356.
- Hospers, J. (1953). *Introduction to Philosophical Analysis*. New York: Routledge.
- Houser, N. (1992). The Fortunes and Misfortunes of the Peirce Papers. In G. Deledalle (ed.), *Signs of Humanity* (pp. 1259–1268). Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Howard, D. (1993). Was Einstein Really a Realist? *Perspectives on Science*, 1, 204–251.
- Howard, D. (1994). Einstein, Kant, and the Origins of Logical Empiricism. In Salmon and Wolters (eds.), 45–106.
- Howard, D. (2003). Two Left Turns Make a Right: On the Curious Political Career of North American Philosophy of Science at Midcentury. In Hardcastle and Richardson (eds.), 25–93.
- Hoyningen-Huene, P. (1987). Context of Discovery and Context of Justification. *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A*, 18, 501–515.
- Hu, D. (2007). The Reception of Relativity in China. *Isis*, 98, 539–557.
- Hughes, R. (1925). A Study of the Graduate Schools of America. *Association of American Colleges Bulletin*, 11, 235–243.
- Hunter, D. (1991). *Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America*. New York: Basic Books.
- Hylton, P. (1990). *Russell, Idealism, and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Iaria, A., Schwarz, C., and Waldinger, F. (2018). Frontier Knowledge and Scientific Production: Evidence from the Collapse of International Science. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 133, 927–991.
- Illy, J. (2006, ed.). *Albert Meets America: How Journals Treated Genius during Einstein's 1921 Travels*. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Irzik, G. (2011). Hans Reichenbach in Istanbul. *Synthese*, 181, 157–180.
- Isaac, J. (2005). W. V. Quine and the Origins of Analytic Philosophy in the United States. *Modern Intellectual History*, 2, 205–234.
- Isaac, J. (2012). *Working Knowledge: Making the Human Sciences from Parsons to Kuhn*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Isaac, J. (2013). Donald Davidson and the Analytic Revolution in American Philosophy, 1940–1970. *Historical Journal*, 56, 757–779.
- Jacoby, G. (1909). *Der Pragmatismus: Neue Bahnen in der Wissenschaftslehre des Auslands*. Leipzig: Dürr.

- Jalloh, M. (2024). Metaphysics and Convention in Dimensional Analysis, 1914–1917. *HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of the Philosophy of Science*, 14, 275–322.
- James, H. (1930). *Charles W. Eliot: President of Harvard University, 1869–1909*. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
- James, W. (1881). Reflex Action and Theism. *WWJ*, Vol. 6, pp. 91–114.
- James, W. (1882). On Some Hegelisms. *WWJ*, Vol. 6, pp. 197–222.
- James, W. (1890). *The Principles of Psychology*. *WWJ*, Vol 8.
- James, W. (1898). Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results. *WWJ*, Vol 1, pp. 255–274.
- James, W. (1903). The Ph.D. Octopus. *WWJ*, Vol. 17, pp. 68–74.
- James, W. (1904a). The Chicago School. *WWJ*, Vol. 5, pp. 103–107.
- James, W. (1904b). Herbert Spencer. *WWJ*, Vol. 5, pp. 108–123.
- James, W. (1907). *Pragmatism*. *WWJ*, Vol 1.
- James, W. (1909). *A Pluralistic Universe*. *WWJ*, Vol. 4.
- Jay, M. (1986). *Permanent Exiles: Essays on the Intellectual Migration from Germany to America*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Jessop, T. (1934). Review of *Filosofi del novecento: Appendice a La Filosofia Contemporanea* by G. de Ruggiero. *Philosophy*, 9, 503–505.
- Jewett, A. (2011). Canonizing Dewey: Naturalism, Logical Empiricism, and the Idea of American Philosophy. *Modern Intellectual History*, 8, 91–125.
- Jewett, A. (2012). *Science, Democracy, and the American University: From the Civil War to the Cold War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Jewett, A. (2020). *Science under Fire: Challenges to Scientific Authority in Modern America*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Jones, L. V., Lindzey, G., and Coggeshall, P. E. (1982). *An Assessment of Research-Doctorate Programs in the United States: Humanities*. Washington, DC: National Academics Press.
- Kallen, H. M. (1911). Pragmatism and Its “Principles”. *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods* 8, 617–636.
- Kallen, H. M. (1916). Philosophic Formalism and Scientific Imagination. *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, 13, 597–607.
- Kamlah, A., and Reichenbach, M. (1977, eds.). *Hans Reichenbach: Gesammelte Werke*. Vol. 1. *Der Aufstieg der wissenschaftlichen Philosophie*. Berlin: Vieweg.
- Kaplan, A. (1991). Rudolf Carnap (1891–1970). In E. Shils (ed.), *Remembering the University of Chicago: Teachers, Scientists, and Scholars* (pp. 32–41). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Karabel, J. (2005). *The Chosen: The Hidden History of Admission and Exclusion at Harvard, Yale, and Princeton*. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
- Karnow, S. (1997). *Vietnam: A History*. Second revised edition. New York: Penguin.
- Katzav, J. (2018). Analytic Philosophy, 1925–1969: Emergence, Management and Nature. *British Journal for the History of Philosophy*, 26, 1197–1221.
- Katzav, J., and Vaesen, K. (2017). On the Emergence of American Analytic Philosophy. *British Journal for the History of Philosophy*, 25, 772–798.

- Katzav, J., and Vaesen, K. (2022). The Rise of Logical Empiricist Philosophy of Science and the Fate of Speculative Philosophy of Science. *HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of the Philosophy of Science* 12, 327–358.
- Kellner, D. (2026). *Adventures in Marxist Theory: Toward a Reconstruction of Marxism in the Contemporary Era*. New York: Routledge.
- Kellogg, V. L. (1910). Celebrating Darwin's Greatness and Darwinism's Weakness. *American Naturalist*, 44, 382–384.
- Keniston, H. B. (1959). *Graduate Study and Research in the Arts and Sciences at the University of Pennsylvania*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Kerkhof, K. (1940). Das Versailler Diktat und die Deutsche Wissenschaft: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Internationalen Organisationen. *Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik*, 7, 836–850.
- Kevles, D. (1979). *The Physicists: The History of a Scientific Community in Modern America*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Kevles, D., and Harding, C. (1975). The Physics, Mathematics and Chemistry Communities in America, 1870–1915: A Statistical Survey. *Working Papers*, 136, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Keyser, C. J. (1904). Concerning the Concept and Existence-Proofs of the Infinite. *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, 1, 29–36.
- Keyser, C. J. (1922). *Mathematical Philosophy*. New York: Dutton.
- Khelfaoui, M., Gingras, Y., Lemoine, M., and Pradeu, T. (2021). The Visibility of Philosophy of Science in the Sciences, 1980–2018. *Synthese*, 199, 6219–6249.
- Kindi, V. (2024). Kuhn and Philosophy. In Shan (ed.), 187–208.
- King, R. (2015). *Arendt and America*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Kitcher, P. (1989). Explanatory Unification and the Causal Structure of the World. In Kitcher and Salmon (eds.), 410–506.
- Kitcher, P., and Salmon, W. (1989, eds.). *Scientific Explanation*. Minnesota Studies in Philosophy of Science. Vol. XIII. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Klein, A. (2007). The Rise of Empiricism: William James, Thomas Hill Green, and the Struggle over Psychology. Ph.D. dissertation. Indiana University, Bloomington.
- Klein, A. (2020). The Politics of Logic. *Aeon*, February 3, 2020.
<https://aeon.co/essays/philosophy-at-war-nationalism-and-logical-analysis> (accessed May 2026).
- Klein, A. (2021). On the Philosophical and Scientific Relationship between Ernst Mach and William James. In J. Preston (ed.), *Interpreting Mach: Critical Essays* (pp. 103–122). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Klein, A. (2025a). *Consciousness Is Motor: William James on Mind and Action*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Klein, A. (2025b). Psychology and Philosophy: Bain and Robertson's Vision, James's Revision. In L. M. Verburgt (eds), *The Early Years of Mind: Making Contemporary Philosophy and Psychology* (pp. 45–76). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kleinpeter, H. (1901). J. B. Stallo als Erkenntniskritiker. *Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*, 25, 401–440.
- Knight, H. (1929). Philosophy in Germany. *Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 4, 387–393

- Knight, H. (1930). Philosophy in Germany. *Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 5, 105–112.
- Knorr-Cetina, K. (1981). *The Manufacture of Knowledge: An Essay on the Constructivist and Contextual Nature of Science*. Oxford: Pergamon.
- Koch, S. (1941a). The Logical Character of the Motivation Concept: I. *Psychological Review*, 48, 15–38.
- Koch, S. (1941b). The Logical Character of the Motivation Concept: II. *Psychological Review*, 48, 127–154.
- Koch, S. (1992). Psychology's Bridgman vs. Bridgman's Bridgman: An Essay in Reconstruction. *Theory and Psychology*, 2, 261–290.
- Koertge, N. (1980). Methodology, Ideology and Feminist Critiques of Science. *PSA: Proceedings of Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association*, 2, 346–359.
- Kołakowski, L. (1968). *The Alienation of Reason: A History of Positivist Thought*. Transl. by Norbert Guterman. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
- Kordig, C. R. (1971). The Comparability of Scientific Theories. *Philosophy of Science*, 38, 467–485.
- Kremer, M. (2023). Margaret MacDonald and Gilbert Ryle: A Philosophical Friendship. In S. M. Connell and F. Janssen-Lauret (eds.), *Lost Voices: Women in Philosophy 1870–1970* (pp. 288–311). London: Routledge.
- Kriehbaum, H. (1968). *Science and the Mass Media*. London: University of London Press Ltd.
- Kuhn, T. (1962). *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
- Kuhn, T. (1969). Postscript-1969. In T. Kuhn (1970, ed.), *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Second edition (pp. 174–210). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Kuhn, T. (1977). Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice. In *The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change* (pp. 320–339). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Kuklick, B. (1977). *The Rise of American Philosophy: Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1860–1930*. New Haven, CT: Princeton University Press.
- Kuklick, B. (2001). *A History of Philosophy in America, 1720–2000*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Kuklick, B. (2004). Philosophy at Yale in the Century after Darwin. *History of Philosophy Quarterly*, 21, 313–336.
- Kurz, P. (1966, ed.). *American Philosophy in the 20th Century*. New York: Macmillan.
- Kusch, M. (1995). *Psychologism: A Case Study in the Sociology of Philosophical Knowledge*. London: Routledge.
- Kyburg, H. (1965). Discussion: Salmon's Paper. *Philosophy of Science*, 32, 147–151.
- Lakatos, I. (1968). A Letter to the Director of the London School of Economics. In Lakatos (1978), 247–253.
- Lakatos, I. (1970a). Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. In Lakatos and Musgrave (1970, eds.), 91–196.
- Lakatos, I. (1970b). The Responsibility of Science. In Lakatos (1978), 256–258.

- Lakatos, I. (1978). *Mathematics, Science, and Epistemology*. Philosophical Papers. Vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lakatos, I., and Musgrave, A. (1970, eds.). *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*. Cambridge: At the University Press.
- Lamont, C. (1959, ed.). *Dialogue on John Dewey*. New York: Horizon Press.
- Langer, S. K. (1926). A Logical Analysis of Meaning. Ph.D. dissertation. Radcliffe College.
- Langer, S. K. (1930a). Review of *Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre* by H. Reichenbach. *Journal of Philosophy*, 27, 609–611.
- Langer, S. K. (1930b). *The Practice of Philosophy*. New York: Henry Holt.
- Langer, S. K. (1937). *An Introduction to Symbolic Logic*. New York: Allen & Unwin.
- Langer, S. K. (1964). Henry M. Sheffer 1883–1964. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 25, 305–307.
- Langford, C. H. (1937a). Review of *Der Typusbegriff im Lichte der neuen Logik* by C. G. Hempel and P. Oppenheim. *Journal of Symbolic Logic*, 1, 61.
- Langford, C. H. (1937b). Review of *Le Problème de la vérité* by C. G. Hempel. *Journal of Symbolic Logic*, 2, 170–171.
- Langford, C. H. (1938). Review of *Sur la méthode déductive* by A. Tarski. *Journal of Symbolic Logic*, 3, 56.
- Larrabee, H. A. (1933). Report of the Chicago Meeting of the American Philosophical Association. *Journal of Philosophy*, 30, 574–580.
- Latour, B., and Woolgar, S. (1979). *Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of Scientific Facts*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Laudan, L. (1977). *Progress and Its Problems: Towards a Theory of Scientific Growth*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Laudan, L. (1990). *Science and Relativism: Some Key Controversies in the Philosophy of Science*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Layton, J. K. (2011). *The Edwardian Superliners: A Trio of Trios*. Stroud: Amberley.
- Lazar, N. (1928). Bibliography of Published Writings of Professor Morris Raphael Cohen (1901–1927). In M. Grossman (ed.), *A Tribute to Professor Morris Raphael Cohen: Teacher and Philosopher* (pp. vii–xii). New York: Hassell Street.
- Leavitt, S. E. (1946). Princeton Conference and Humanities Tradition. *South Atlantic Bulletin*, 12, 3–5.
- Lee, M. (2009). Origins of the Epithet “Government by Public Relations”: Revisiting Bruce Catton’s War Lords of Washington, 1948. *Public Relations Review*, 35, 388–394.
- Lehman, H. (1972). Statistical Explanation. *Philosophy of Science*, 39, 500–506.
- Leighton, J. A. (1904). Pragmatism. *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods* 1, 148–156.
- Leighton, J. A. (1906). Psychology and the Logical Judgment with Reference to Realism. *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, 3, 12–16.
- Leighton, J. A. (1939). History as a Struggle for Social Values. *Philosophical Review*, 48, 118–154.
- Leitgeb, H. (2011). Logic in General Philosophy of Science: Old Things and New Things. *Synthese*, 179, 339–350.

- Leitgeb, H. and Carus, A. (2020). Rudolf Carnap. In E. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2022/entries/carnap>.
- Lenard, P. (1936). Vorwort zu *Deutsche Physik*. Transl. by K. Hentschel (1996). Foreword to “German Physics”. In K. Hentschel (ed.), *Physics and National Socialism* (pp. 100–109). Basel: Birkhäuser.
- Lenzen, V. F. (1923). The Philosophical Aspects of the Theory of Relativity. In: *Issues and Tendencies in Contemporary Philosophy*. Vol. IV (pp. 135–164). Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Lenzen, V. F. (1932). Review of *Philosophical Aspects of Modern Science* by C. E. M. Joad. *Journal of Philosophy*, 29, 583–585.
- Lenzen, V. F. (1932a). The Metaphysics of Space and Time. *Journal of Philosophy*, 29, 182–187.
- Lenzen, V. F. (1932b). Review of *Philosophical Aspects of Modern Science* by C. E. M. Joad. *Journal of Philosophy*, 29, 583–585.
- Lenzen, V. F. (1933a). Review of *A World of Epitomizations* by G. P. Conger. *Philosophical Review*, 42, 538–539.
- Lenzen, V. F. (1933b). Review of *Atom and Cosmos* by H. Reichenbach. *Journal of Philosophy*, 30, 390–391.
- Lenzen, V. F. (1938). *Procedures of Empirical Science*. International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Lenzen, V. F. (1965). Physics and Philosophy. An Interview Conducted by Edna Tartaul Daniel. Regional Cultural History Project. Berkeley: University of California.
- Lenzen, V. F. (1971). Bertrand Russell at Harvard, 1914. *Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies*, 3, 4–6.
- Leonard, H. S. (1931). Singular Terms. Ph.D. dissertation. Harvard University.
- Leslie, S. W. (1993). *The Cold War and American Science: The Military-Industrial-Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Leverette, Jr., W. E. (1965). E. L. Youmans' Crusade for Scientific Autonomy and Respectability. *American Quarterly*, 17, 12–32.
- Levine, B. (1989). *Sidney Hook: A Checklist of Writings*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
- Levine, J. (2009). From Moore to Peano to Watson: The Mathematical Roots of Russell's Naturalism and Behaviorism. *The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication*, 4, 1–126.
- Lewis, C. I. (1914). Review of *Principia Mathematica*. Vol. II by A. N. Whitehead and B. Russell. *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, 11, 497–502.
- Lewis, C. I. (1918). *A Survey of Symbolic Logic*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Lewis, C. I. (1924). Review of *Chance, Love, and Logic* by C. S. Peirce. *Journal of Philosophy*, 21, 71–74.
- Lewis, C. I. (1925). Review of *Scientific Thought* by C. D. Broad. *Philosophical Review*, 34, 406–411.
- Lewis, C. I. (1929). *Mind and the World Order*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.
- Lewis, C. I. (1930). Pragmatism and Current Thought. *Journal of Philosophy*, 27, 238–246.
- Lewis, C. I. (1934). Experience and Meaning. *Philosophical Review*, 43, 125–146.

- Lewis, C. I. (1941). Logical Positivism and Pragmatism. In J. D. Goheen and J. L. Mothershead Jr. (1970, eds.), *Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis* (pp. 92–112). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Lewis, C. I. (1946). *An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation*. La Salle, IL: Open Court.
- Lewis, C. I., and Langford, C. H. (1932). *Symbolic Logic*. New York: Century Co.
- Lewis, G. N., and Tolman, R. C. (1909). The Principle of Relativity, and Non-Newtonian Mechanics. *Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, 44, 711–724.
- Liebert, A. (1927). Contemporary German Philosophy. *Philosophical Review*, 36, 405–427.
- Liebert, A. (1928). Contemporary German Philosophy. *Philosophical Review*, 37, 557–573.
- Liebert, A. (1929). Contemporary German Philosophy. *Philosophical Review*, 38, 529–556.
- Limbeck-Lilienau, C. (2010). Rudolf Carnap und die Philosophie in Amerika. Logischer Empirismus, Pragmatismus, Realismus. In F. Stadler (ed.), *Vertreibung: Transformation und Rückkehr der Wissenschaftstheorie* (pp. 85–164). Vienna: Lit.
- Limbeck-Lilienau, C. (2022). The First Vienna Circle and the Erlangen Conference. In Uebel and Limbeck-Lilienau (2022, eds.), 99–108.
- Lindsay, R. B. (1937). A Critique of Operationalism in Physics. *Philosophy of Science*, 4, 456–470.
- Longino, H. E. (2002). *The Fate of Knowledge*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Love, A. (2021). From Vienna to Minneapolis: The Ideal of Intellectual Community. <https://cla.umn.edu/mcps/about/mission> (accessed May 2026).
- Love, A., and Verhaegh, S. (forthcoming, eds.). *Philosophy of Science: Past, Present and Future*. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Lovejoy, A. O. (1909). Pragmatism and Realism. *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, 6, 575–580.
- Lovejoy, A. O. (1914). Review of *The Concept of Consciousness* by E. B. Holt. *Philosophical Review*, 23, 664–677.
- Lovejoy, A. O. (1930). The Dialectical Argument against Absolute Simultaneity (I). *Journal of Philosophy*, 27, 617–632.
- Lowe, V. (1990). *Alfred North Whitehead*. Vol. 2: The Man and His Work, 1910–1947. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Lowen, R. S. (1997). *Creating the Cold War University*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Lucier, P. (2012). The Origins of Pure and Applied Science in Gilded Age America. *Isis*, 103, 527–536.
- Lund, M. (2010). Preface. In N. R. Hanson. *The Concept of the Positron: A Philosophical Analysis* (pp. xi–xiii). Paperback edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lund, M. (forthcoming). Norwood Russell Hanson: Philosophical Analysis and Interdisciplinarity. In Love and Verhaegh (eds.).
- Lurie, E. (1954). Louis Agassiz and the Races of Man. *Isis*, 45, 227–242.
- Lutz, S., and Tuboly, A. T. (2021). Introduction: From Philosophy of Nature to Philosophy of Physics. In S. Lutz and A. T. Tuboly (eds.), *Logical Empiricism and the Physical Sciences* (pp. 1–18). New York: Routledge.

- MacCorquodale, K., and Meehl, P. (1948). On a Distinction between Hypothetical Constructs and Intervening Variables. *Psychological Review*, 55, 95.
- Mach, E. (1895). *Popular Scientific Lectures*. Chicago, IL: Open Court.
- Mach, E. (1897). *The Analysis of Sensations*. Chicago, IL: Open Court.
- Mackenzie, J. S. (1906). The New Realism and the Old Idealism. *Mind*, 15, 308–328.
- Magie, W. F. (1912). The Primary Concepts of Physics. *Science*, 35, 281–293.
- Malaterre, C., Chartier, J., and Pulizzotto, D. (2019). What Is This Thing Called Philosophy of Science? A Computational Topic-Modeling Perspective, 1934–2015. *HOPOS: Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science*, 9, 215–249.
- Malisoff, W. M. (1934). Editorial: What Is Philosophy of Science? *Philosophy of Science*, 1, 1–4.
- Mander, W. J. (2011). *British Idealism: A History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Maraniss, D. (2003). *They Marched into Sunlight: War and Peace, Vietnam and America, October 1967*, New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Marcuse, H. (1964). *One-Dimensional Man*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
- Margenau, H. (1931). Causality and Modern Physics. *The Monist*, 41, 1–36.
- Maritain, J. (1936). *Integral Humanism: Temporal and Spiritual Problems of a New Christendom*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.
- Maritain, J. (1940). *Scholasticism and Politics*. New York: MacMillan.
- Maritain, J. (1941). Science, Philosophy, and Faith. In *Science, Philosophy and Religion: A Symposium* (pp. 162–183). New York: Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion.
- Maritain, J. (1943). *Education at the Crossroads*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Marrow, A. J. (1969). *The Practical Theorist: The Life and Work of Kurt Lewin*. New York: Basic Books.
- Martin, J. (2002). *The Education of John Dewey*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Martin, E. C. (2019). “The Battle Is On”: Lakatos, Feyerabend, and the Student Protests. *European Journal for Philosophy of Science*, 9, 1–33.
- Mates, B. (1992). Isabel Creed Hungerland, Philosophy: Berkeley.
<https://digicoll.lib.berkeley.edu/record/81261/files/inmemoriam1992.pdf> (accessed May 2026).
- McCumber, J. (2001). *Time in the Ditch: American Philosophy and the McCarthy Era*. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
- McCumber, J. (2016). *The Philosophy Scare: The Politics of Reason in the Early Cold War*. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
- McEvoy, J. G. (1975). A “Revolutionary” Philosophy of Science: Feyerabend and the Degeneration of Critical Rationalism into Sceptical Fallibilism. *Philosophy of Science*, 42, 49–66.
- McGeoch, J. A. (1936). The Vertical Dimensions of Mind. *Psychological Review*, 43, 107–129.
- McGill, V. J. (1936). An Evaluation of Logical Positivism. *Science and Society*, 1, 45–80.
- McGilvary, E. B. (1908). The Chicago “Idea” and Idealism. *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, 5, 589–597.

- McGilvary, E. B. (1931). Dialectical Arguments against Relative Simultaneity. *Journal of Philosophy*, 28, 421–435.
- McGuinness, B. (1979, ed.). *Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- McGuinness, B. (1980, ed.). *Hans Hahn: Philosophical Papers*. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
- McMillian, J. (2011). *Smoking Typewriters: The Sixties Underground Press and the Rise of Alternative Media in America*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- McMullin, E. (1982). Values in Science. *PSA: Proceedings of Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association*, 2, 3–28.
- McNulty, M. B. (forthcoming). “A Research Place of Our Own”: The Early Institutional History of the Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science. In Love and Verhaegh (eds.).
- Meehl, P. (1989). Autobiography. In G. Lindzey (ed.), *A History of Psychology in Autobiography*. Vol. 8 (pp. 337–389). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Mellor, D. (1974). Religious and Secular Statements. *Philosophy*, 49, 33–46.
- Menand, L. (2001). *The Metaphysical Club: The Story of Ideas in America*. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux.
- Menn, S. (2010). In Memoriam: Ian Mueller (1938–2010). *Aestimatio*, 7, 193–228.
- Mihaljevic, K. (2022). What Can Rose Rand Teach us about Modern Canon Formation? In Peijnenburg and Verhaegh (eds.), 147–164.
- Mihaljevic, K. (2023). Breaking into British Academic Life in Second World War Britain: The Story of Rose Rand. *HOPOS: Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science*, 13, 297–316.
- Milkov, N. (2013). The Berlin Group and the Vienna Circle: Affinities and Divergences. In Milkov and Peckhaus (eds.), 3–32.
- Milkov, N., and Peckhaus, V. (2013). *The Berlin Group and the Philosophy of Logical Empiricism*. Dordrecht: Springer.
- Miller, D. S. (1899). Professor James on Philosophical Method. *Philosophical Review*, 8, 166–170.
- Mills, C. W. (1961). *The Sociological Imagination*. Evergreen edition. New York: Grove Press.
- Mink, L. (1980). The Golden History of the Golden Department. *History of Education Quarterly*, 20, 189–195.
- Misak, C. (1995). *Verificationism: Its History and Prospects*. London: Routledge.
- Misak, C. (2013). *The American Pragmatists*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Misak, C. (2016). *Cambridge Pragmatism: From Peirce and James to Ramsey and Wittgenstein*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Misak, C. (2024a). Peirce’s Thwarted Career. In C. de Waal (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of C. S. Peirce* (pp. 43–58). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Misak, C. (2024b). Ryle’s Debt to Pragmatism and Margaret MacDonald. *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 6, 629–656.
- Misak, C. (2025). Lewis and the Exiled Empiricists. In Verhaegh (2025a, ed.), 31–52.
- Misak, C., and Price, H. (2017, eds.). *The Practical Turn: Pragmatism in Britain in the Long Twentieth Century*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Missner, M. (1985). Why Einstein Became Famous in America. *Social Studies of Science*, 15, 267–291.

- Mitchell, J. (2004). *Measurement in Psychology: A Critical History of a Methodological Concept*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Monk, R. (1996). *Bertrand Russell: The Spirit of Solitude 1872–1921*. New York: Free Press.
- Montague, W. P. (1902). Professor Royce's Refutation of Realism. *Philosophical Review*, 11, 43–55.
- Montague, W. P. (1907). Current Conceptions of Realism. *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, 4, 100–105.
- Montague, W. P. (1909). May a Realist Be a Pragmatist? II. The Implications of Instrumentalism. *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, 6, 485–490.
- Montague, W. P. (1912). A Realistic Theory of Truth and Error. In Holt et al. (1912, eds.), 252–302.
- Montague, W. P. (1924). The Einstein Theory and a Possible Alternative. *Philosophical Review*, 33, 143–170.
- Montague, W. P. (1925). *The Ways of Knowing*. London: George Allen & Unwin.
- Montague, W. P. (1933). Philosophy as Vision. *International Journal of Ethics*, 44, 1–22.
- Montague, W. P. (1937). The Story of American Realism. *Philosophy*, 12, 140–161.
- Moore, G. E. (1899). The Nature of Judgment. *Mind*, 8, 176–193.
- Moore, G. E. (1903a). The Refutation of Idealism. *Mind*, 12, 433–453.
- Moore, G. E. (1903b). *Principia Ethica*. Cambridge: Cambridge University press.
- Moore, G. E. (1903c). Review of *The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong* by F. Brentano. *International Journal of Ethics*, 14, 115–123.
- Moore, K. (1996). Organizing Integrity: American Science and the Creation of Public Interest Organizations, 1955–1975. *American Journal of Sociology*, 101, 1592–1627.
- Moore, K. (2008). *Disrupting Science: Social Movements, American Scientists, and the Politics of the Military, 1945–1975*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- More, L. T. (1909). Atomic Theories and Modern Physics. *Hibbert Journal*, 7, 864–881.
- More, L. T. (1910). The Metaphysical Tendencies of Modern Physics. *Hibbert Journal*, 8, 800–817.
- More, L. T. (1911). On the Recent Theories of Electricity. *London, Edinburgh, and Dublin Philosophical Magazine and Journal of Science*, 21, 196–218.
- Mormann, T. (2022). From Cautious Enthusiasm to Profound Disenchantment: Ernest Nagel and Carnapian Logical Empiricism. In Neuber and Tuboly (eds.), 89–108.
- Morris, C. W. (1933). Review of *Vers le Concret: Études d'Histoire de la Philosophie Contemporaine* by J. Wahl. *Journal of Philosophy*, 30, 714–716.
- Morris, C. W. (1934). Pragmatism and Metaphysics. *Philosophical Review*, 43, 549–564.
- Morris, C. W. (1935a). The Relation of the Formal and Empirical Sciences within Scientific Empiricism. *Erkenntnis*, 5, 6–16.
- Morris, C. W. (1935b). Philosophy of Science and Science of Philosophy. *Philosophy of Science*, 2, 271–286.
- Morris, C. W. (1935c). Some Aspects of Recent American Scientific Philosophy. *Erkenntnis*, 5, 142–151.
- Morris, C. (1939). Esthetics and the Theory of Signs. *Journal of Unified Science*, 8, 131–150.

- Morris, C. (1960). On the History of the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. *Synthese*, 12, 517–521.
- Morris, S. (2015). Quine, Russell, and Naturalism. From a Logical Point of View. *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 53, 133–155.
- Mota, E., Crawford, P., and Simões, A. (2009). Einstein in Portugal: Eddington's Expedition to Principe and the Reactions of Portuguese Astronomers (1917–25). *British Journal for the History of Science*, 42, 245–273.
- Mourelatos, A. (2015). Gregory Vlastos and the Study and Teaching of Ancient Greek Philosophy. *Philosophical Inquiry*, 39, 2–7.
- Moyer, A. (1983). *American Physics in Transition: A History of Conceptual Change in the Late Nineteenth Century*. Los Angeles, CA: Tomas.
- Moyer, A. (1991a). Bridgman's Operational Perspective on Physics. I: Origins and Developments. *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science*, 22, 237–258.
- Moyer, A. (1991b). Bridgman's Operational Perspective on Physics. II: Refinements, Publication, and Reception. *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science*, 22, 373–397.
- Muirhead, J. H. (1903). Review of *The Varieties of Religious Experience* by William James. *International Journal of Ethics* 13, 236–246.
- Mulder, H. L. (1968). Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung der Wiener Kreis. *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 6, 386–390.
- Mulder, H. L. (1985). The *Vienna Circle Archive* and the Literary Remains of Moritz Schlick and Otto Neurath. *Synthese*, 64, 375–387.
- Mulder, H. L., and van de Velde-Schlick, B. F. B. (1979a, eds.). *Moritz Schlick: Philosophical Papers*. Vol. I: 1909–1922. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
- Mulder, H. L., and van de Velde-Schlick, B. F. B. (1979b, eds.). *Moritz Schlick: Philosophical Papers*. Vol. II: 1925–1936. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
- Mulder, H. L., Kox, A. J., and Hegselmann, R. (1987, eds.). *Moritz Schlick: The Problems of Philosophy in Their Interconnection*. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
- Murphey, M. G. (2012). *The Development of Quine's Philosophy*. Dordrecht: Springer.
- Murphy, A. E. (1945). The Climate of Opinion. In Blanshard et al. (1945a, eds.), 43–65.
- Mursell, J. L. (1920). An Analysis of the Concept of Meaning. *Philosophical Review*, 29, 256–268.
- Nagel, E. (1929a). Nature and Convention. *Journal of Philosophy*, 26, 169–182.
- Nagel, E. (1929b). Intuition, Consistency, and the Excluded Middle. *Journal of Philosophy*, 26, 477–489.
- Nagel, E. (1929c). Can Logic Be Divorced from Ontology? *Journal of Philosophy*, 26, 705–712.
- Nagel, E. (1931a). *On the Logic of Measurement*. Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University.
- Nagel, E. (1931b). Measurement. *Erkenntnis*, 2, 313–335.
- Nagel, E. (1933). The Frequency Theory of Probability. *Journal of Philosophy*, 30, 533–554.
- Nagel, E. (1934a). Verifiability, Truth, and Verification. *Journal of Philosophy*, 31, 141–148.
- Nagel, E. (1934b). The Eighth International Congress of Philosophy. *Journal of Philosophy*, 32, 589–601.
- Nagel, E. (1935a). Notes toward a Naturalistic Conception of Logic. In Nagel (1956, ed.), 39–54.

- Nagel, E. (1935b). Review of *Logische Syntax der Sprache* by R. Carnap. *Journal of Philosophy*, 32, 49–52.
- Nagel, E. (1935c). The Logic of Reduction in the Sciences. *Erkenntnis*, 5, 46–52.
- Nagel, E. (1936a). Impressions and Appraisals of Analytic Philosophy in Europe. I. *Journal of Philosophy*, 33, 5–24.
- Nagel, E. (1936b). Impressions and Appraisals of Analytic Philosophy in Europe. II. *Journal of Philosophy*, 33, 29–53.
- Nagel, E. (1936c). Review of *Wahrscheinlichkeitslehre* by H. Reichenbach. *Mind*, 45, 501–514.
- Nagel, E. (1938a). Review of *Einführung in die Mathematische Logik* by A. Tarski. *Philosophy of Science*, 5, 232–233.
- Nagel, E. (1938b). Review of *Experience and Prediction* by H. Reichenbach. *Journal of Philosophy*, 35, 270–272.
- Nagel, E. (1938c). The Fight for Clarity: Logical Empiricism. *American Scholar*, 8, 45–59.
- Nagel, E. (1939). Dialectical Materialism in Science. In Nagel (1956, ed.), 331–334.
- Nagel, E. (1940). The Historian as a Moralist. In Nagel (1956, ed.), 383–388.
- Nagel, E. (1942). Review of *Introduction to Semantics* by R. Carnap. *Journal of Philosophy*, 39, 468–473.
- Nagel, E. (1944). Logic without Ontology. In Nagel (1956, ed.), 93–102.
- Nagel, E. (1948a). Review of *Meaning and Necessity* by R. Carnap. *Journal of Philosophy*, 45, 467–472.
- Nagel, E. (1948b). On the Philosophical Battlefront. In Nagel (1956, ed.), 393–400.
- Nagel, E. (1950). Dewey's Theory of Natural Science. In S. Hook (ed.), *John Dewey: Philosopher of Science and Freedom* (pp. 231–248). New York: Dial Press.
- Nagel, E. (1954). Naturalism Reconsidered. In Nagel (1956, ed.), 3–18.
- Nagel, E. (1956, ed.). *Logic without Metaphysics and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
- Nagel, E. (1957). Morris R. Cohen in Retrospect. *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 18, 548–551.
- Nagel, E. (1978). Recollections of Hans Reichenbach. In Reichenbach and Cohen (1978a, eds.), 42–45.
- Nagel, E. (1979). *Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Nasim, O. W. (2017). The Spaces of Knowledge: Bertrand Russell, Logical Construction, and the Classification of the Sciences. *British Journal for the History of Philosophy*, 20, 1163–1182.
- NDEA (1963). Report on the National Defense Education Act, Fiscal Years 1961 and 1962.
- Neuber, M. (2011). Feigl's "Scientific Realism". *Philosophy of Science*, 78, 165–183.
- Neuber, M. (2020). Two Forms of American Critical Realism: Perception and Reality in Santayana/Strong and Sellars. *HOPOS: Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science*, 10, 76–105.
- Neuber, M. (2024). Perry and the Rise of Analytic Philosophy. *Journal of the American Philosophical Association*, 10, 185–204.
- Neuber, M. (2025). Herbert Feigl on the Idea of a "Scientific Humanism". In Verhaegh (2025a, ed.), 191–210.

- Neuber, M., and Tuboly, A. T. (2022, eds.). *Ernest Nagel: Philosophy of Science and the Fight for Clarity*. Cham: Springer.
- Neurath, M., and Cohen, R. S. (1973, eds.). *Otto Neurath: Empiricism and Sociology*. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
- Neurath, O. (1921). *Anti-Spengler*. Munich: Callwey.
- Neurath, O. (1931a). *Empirische Soziologie. Der wissenschaftliche Gehalt der Geschichte und Nationalökonomie*. Vienna: Springer.
- Neurath, O. (1931b). Physicalism: The Philosophy of the Vienna Circle. *The Monist*, 41, 618–623.
- Neurath, O. (1931c). Physikalismus. *Scientia*, 50, 297–303. Transl. by R. S. Cohen and M. Neurath. Physicalism. In Cohen and Neurath (1983, eds.), 52–57.
- Neurath, O. (1932). Protokollsätze. *Erkenntnis*, 3, 204–214.
- Neurath, O. (1935). The Unity of Science as a Task. In Cohen and Neurath (1983, eds.), 115–120.
- Neurath, O. (1936a). An International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. In Cohen and Neurath (1983, eds.), 139–144.
- Neurath, O. (1936b). Encyclopedia as “Model”. In Cohen and Neurath (1983, eds.), 145–158.
- Neurath, O. (1937). The Departmentalization of Unified Science. In Cohen and Neurath (1983, eds.), 200–205.
- Newcomb, S. (1876). Abstract Science in America, 1776–1876. *North American Review*, 122, 88–123.
- Nichols, E. L. (1906). The Fundamental Concepts of Physical Science. In K. Sopka (1986, ed.), *Physics for a New Century: Papers Presented at the 1904 St. Louis Congress* (pp. 95–106). New York: Tomash.
- Northrop, F. S. C. (1925). Relativity and the Relation of Science to Philosophy. *The Monist*, 35, 1–26.
- Northrop, F. S. C. (1928a). The Theory of Relativity and the First Principles of Science. *Journal of Philosophy*, 25, 421–435.
- Northrop, F. S. C. (1928b). The Macroscopic Atomic Theory: A Physical Interpretation of the Theory of Relativity. *Journal of Philosophy*, 25, 449–467.
- Northrop, F. S. C. (1930). Concerning the Philosophical Consequences of the Theory of Relativity. *Journal of Philosophy*, 27, 192–210.
- Northrop, F. S. C. (1931). Review of *Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre* by Hans Reichenbach. *Philosophical Review*, 40, 281–285.
- Nuechterlein, J. A. (1980). The Dream of Scientific Liberalism: The “New Republic” and American Progressive Thought, 1914–1920. *Review of Politics*, 42, 167–190.
- Numbers, R. L. (1998). *Darwinism Comes to America*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Oberdan, T. (1990). Positivism and the Pragmatic Theory of Observation. In Fine et al. (eds.), 25–37.
- Olen, P. (2016). *Wilfrid Sellars and the Foundations of Normativity*. London: Macmillan.
- Ormond, A. T. (1906). *Concepts of Philosophy*. New York: Macmillan.

- Padovani, F. (2010). Statistical or Dynamical Lawfulness? Reichenbach and Schlick on the Laws of Nature. In F. O. Engler and M. Iven (eds.), *Moritz Schlick: Ursprünge und Entwicklungen seines Denkens* (pp. 225–255). Berlin: Parerga Verlag.
- Padovani, F. and Tuboly, A. T. (2026, eds.). *Routledge Handbook for the History of Philosophy of Science*. London: Routledge.
- Palmer, G. H., and Perry, R. B. (1930). Philosophy, 1870–1929. In S. E. Morison (ed.), *The Development of Harvard University since the Inauguration of President Eliot, 1869–1929* (pp. 3–32). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Parker, K. A. and Pratt, S. (2021). Josiah Royce. In E. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/royce>.
- Pap, A. (1949). *Elements of Analytic Philosophy*. New York: Macmillan.
- Parrini, P. and Salmon, W. (2003). Introduction. In P. Parrini, W. Salmon, and M. H. Salmon (eds.), *Logical Empiricism: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives* (pp. 1–12). Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Parry, W. T. (1932). Implication. Ph.D. dissertation. Harvard University.
- Passmore, J. (1957). *A Hundred Years of Philosophy*. London: Duckworth.
- Passmore, J. (1967). Logical Positivism. In P. Edwards (ed.), *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Vol. 5 (pp. 52–57). New York: Macmillan.
- Patai, D., and Koertge, N. (1995). *Professing Feminism: Cautionary Tales from the Strange World of Women's Studies*. New York: Basic Books.
- Patrick, G. T. W. (1924). *Introduction to Philosophy*. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
- Patrick, G. T. W. (1932). Founding the Psychological Laboratory at the State University of Iowa: An Historical Sketch. *Iowa Journal of History and Politics*, 30, 404–416.
- Patton, L. (2005). The Critical Philosophy Renewed. *Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities*, 10, 127–136.
- Patton, L. (2014). Introduction. In: *Philosophy, Science, and History: A Guide and Critical Reader* (pp. 1–6). New York: Routledge.
- Patton, L. (forthcoming). Scientists in the Philosophy of Science. In Love and Verhaegh (eds.).
- Paty, M. (1987). The Scientific Reception of Relativity in France. In Glick (ed.), 113–167.
- Pearce, T. (2020). *Pragmatism's Evolution: Organism and Environment in American Philosophy*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Peirce, C. S. (1878). How to Make Our Ideas Clear. CPP, 5, 388–410.
- Peirce, C. S. (1892). The Law of Mind. CPP, 6, 102–63.
- Peirce, C. S. (1902). Pragmatic and Pragmatism. CPP, 5, 1–4.
- Peirce, C. S. (1904). Review of *A Treatise of Cosmology* by H. Nichols. CPP, 8, 191–193.
- Peirce, C. S. (1905a). What Pragmatism Is. CPP, 5, 411–437.
- Peirce, C. S. (1905b). Issues of Pragmaticism. CPP, 5, 438–462.
- Peirce, C. S. (1923). *Chance, Love and Logic*. Ed. by M. R. Cohen. New York: Harcourt.
- Peijnenburg, J., and Verhaegh, S. (2022, eds.). *Women in the History of Analytic Philosophy*. Cham: Springer.
- Perry, R. B. (1902). Prof. Royce's Refutation of Realism and Pluralism. *The Monist*, 12, 446–458.
- Perry, R. B. (1904). Review of The Refutation of Idealism by G. E. Moore. *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, 1, 76–77.

- Perry, R. B. (1910). The Ego-Centric Predicament. *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, 7, 5–14.
- Perry, R. B. (1912). *Present Philosophical Tendencies: A Critical Survey of Naturalism, Idealism, Pragmatism, and Realism*. New York: Longmans, Green.
- Perry, R. B. (1916). *The Free Man and the Soldier*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.
- Perry, R. B. (1918). *The Present Conflict of Ideals: A Study of the Philosophical Background of the World War*. New York: Longmans, Green.
- Perry, R. B. (1928). Peace without Victory—in Philosophy. *Philosophy*, 3, 300–312.
- Petrovich, E. (2024). *A Quantitative Portrait of Analytic Philosophy: Looking Through the Margins*. Cham: Springer.
- Petrovich, E., Verhaegh S., Börs G., Cristalli C., Dewulf F., van Gemert T., and IJdens N. (2024). Bibliometrics Beyond Citations: Introducing Mention Extraction and Analysis. *Scientometrics*, 129, 5731–5768.
- Phelps, C. (1997). *Young Sidney Hook: Marxist and Pragmatist*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Pincock, C. (2007). Carnap, Russell, and the External World. In Friedman and Creath (eds.), 106–128.
- Pincock, C. (2017). Ernest Nagel's Naturalism: A Microhistory of the American Reception of Logical Empiricism. In Preston (ed.), 160–174.
- Plaisance, K. S., Michaud, J., and McLevey, J. (2021). Pathways of Influence: Understanding the Impact of Philosophy of Science in Scientific Domains. *Synthese*, 199, 4865–4896.
- Planck, M. (1949). *Scientific Autobiography and Other Papers*. London: William & Norgate.
- Pojman, P. (2011). The Influence of Biology and Psychology upon Physics: Ernst Mach Revisited. *Perspectives on Science* 19, 121–135.
- Popper, K. R. (1935). *Logik der Forschung*. Vienna: Springer.
- Popper, K. R. (1970a). Normal Science and its Dangers. In Lakatos and Musgrave (1970, eds.), 51–58.
- Popper, K. R. (1970b). Reason or Revolution? *European Journal of Sociology*, 11, 252–262.
- Popper, K. R. (1975). The Rationality of Scientific Revolutions. In R. Harré (ed.), *Problems of Scientific Revolution* (pp. 72–101). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Potochnik, A., and Yap, A. (2006). Revisiting Galison's "Aufbau/Bauhaus" in Light of Neurath's Philosophical Projects. *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science*, 37, 469–488.
- Potochnik, A. (2011). A Neurathian Conception of the Unity of Science. *Erkenntnis*, 34, 305–319.
- Potochnik, A. (2017). *Idealization and the Aims of Science*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Potochnik, A. (2021). Our World Isn't Organized into Levels. In D. S. Brooks, J. DiFrisco, and W. C. Wimsatt (eds.), *Levels of Organization in the Biological Sciences* (pp. 61–76). Boston, MA: MIT Press.
- Pratt, J. B. (1907). Truth and Its Verification. *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, 4, 320–324.
- Pratt, J. B. (1934). Logical Positivism and Professor Lewis. *Journal of Philosophy*, 31, 701–710.

- Preston, A. (2017, ed.). *Analytic Philosophy: An Interpretive History*. New York: Routledge.
- Putnam, H. (1958). Review of *Philosophy of Science* by P. Frank. *Science*, 127, 750–751.
- Putnam, H. (1981). *Reason, Truth, and History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Putnam, H. (2015). Intellectual Autobiography. In R. Auxier, D. R. Anderson, and L. E. Hahn (eds.), *The Philosophy of Hilary Putnam* (pp. 1–110). The Library of Living Philosophers. Vol. XXXIV. Chicago, IL: Open Court.
- Pyenson, L. (1974). The Göttingen Reception of Einstein's General Theory of Relativity. Ph.D. dissertation. Johns Hopkins University.
- Pyenson, L. (1982). Relativity in Late Wilhelmian Germany: The Appeal to a Preestablished Harmony between Mathematics and Physics. *Archive for History of Exact Sciences*, 27, 137–155.
- Quine, W. V. (1932). The Logic of Sequences. A Generalization of *Principia Mathematica*. Ph.D. dissertation. Harvard University.
- Quine, W. V. (1934). Lectures on Carnap. In Creath (1990, ed.), 45–103.
- Quine, W. V. (1940). *Mathematical Logic*. New York: Norton.
- Quine, W. V. (1951). Two Dogmas of Empiricism. In W. V. Quine (1953, ed.), *From a Logical Point of View* (pp. 20–46). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Quine, W. V. (1969). Epistemology Naturalized. In *Ontological Relativity and Other Essays* (pp. 69–90). New York: Columbia University Press.
- Quine, W. V. (1970). Homage to Rudolf Carnap. In Quine (1976), 40–43.
- Quine, W. V. (1976). *The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays*. Revised edition. New York: Random House.
- Quine, W. V. (1985). *The Time of My Life: An Autobiography*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Quine, W. V. (1986). Autobiography of W. V. Quine. In L. Hahn and P. Schilpp, P. (1998, eds.), *The Philosophy of W. V. Quine* (pp. 1–46). The Library of Living Philosophers. Vol. XVIII. Expanded edition. La Salle, IL: Open Court.
- Quine, W. V. (1987). Carnap. In D. Føllesdal and D. B. Quine (2008, eds.), *Quine in Dialogue* (pp. 142–145). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Radner, M., and Winokur, S. (1970, eds.). *Analyses of Theories and Methods of Physics and Psychology*. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Vol. IV. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Randall, Jr., J. H. (1939). Dewey's Interpretation of the History of Philosophy. In P. A. Schilpp (ed.), *The Philosophy of John Dewey* (pp. 75–102). La Salle, IL: Open Court.
- Randall, Jr., J. H. (1944). Epilogue: The Nature of Naturalism. In Y. H. Krikorian (ed.), *Naturalism and the Human Spirit* (pp. 354–382). New York: Columbia University Press.
- Randall, Jr., J. H. (1948). The Spirit of American Philosophy. In F. E. Johnson (ed.), *Wellsprings of the American Spirit* (pp. 117–133). New York: Cooper Square.
- Randall, Jr., J. H. (1953). John Dewey, 1859–1952. *Journal of Philosophy*, 50, 5–13.
- Randall, Jr., J. H., and Buchler, J. (1942). *Philosophy: An Introduction*. New York: Barnes & Noble.
- Rayman, J. (2010). Entrenched: A Genealogy of the Analytic-Continental Divide. *Radical Philosophy Review*, 13, 107–134.

- Reichenbach, H. (1918). Die Sozialisierung der Hochschule. Transl. by M. Reichenbach. Socializing the University. In Reichenbach and Cohen (1978a, eds.), 136–180.
- Reichenbach, H. (1920). *Relativitätstheorie und Erkenntnis Apriori*. Berlin: Springer.
- Reichenbach, H. (1922). The Present State of the Discussion on Relativity. In Reichenbach and Cohen (1978b, eds.), 3–47.
- Reichenbach, H. (1924). *Axiomatik der relativistischen Raum-Zeit-Lehre*. Braunschweig: Vieweg.
- Reichenbach, H. (1928). *Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre*. Berlin: De Gruyter.
- Reichenbach, H. (1930a). Zur Einführung. *Erkenntnis*, 1, 1–3.
- Reichenbach, H. (1930b). Kausalität und Wahrscheinlichkeit. *Erkenntnis*, 1, 158–188.
- Reichenbach, H. (1930c). *Atom und Kosmos: Das physikalische Weltbild der Gegenwart*. Berlin: Deutsche Buch-Gemeinschaft.
- Reichenbach, H. (1931a). The Errors of Sir Arthur Eddington: A Defence. *Philosophy*, 6, 398–399.
- Reichenbach, H. (1931b). Sir Arthur Eddington's Theories. *Philosophy*, 6, 525–526.
- Reichenbach, H. (1931c). Die Kausalproblem in der Physik. *Die Naturwissenschaften*, 19, 713–722.
- Reichenbach, H. (1933). Review of *Der logische Aufbau der Welt* by R. Carnap. *Kantstudien*, 38, 199–201.
- Reichenbach, H. (1935a). *Wahrscheinlichkeitslehre*. Leyden: Sijthoff
- Reichenbach, H. (1935b). Über Induktion und Wahrscheinlichkeit. *Erkenntnis*, 5, 267–284.
- Reichenbach, H. (1936a). Logistic Empiricism in Germany and the Present State of Its Problems. *Journal of Philosophy*, 33, 141–160.
- Reichenbach, H. (1936b). Induction and Probability. *Philosophy of Science*, 3, 124–126.
- Reichenbach, H. (1938a). *Experience and Prediction*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Reichenbach, H. (1938b). On Probability and Induction. *Philosophy of Science*, 5, 21–45.
- Reichenbach, H. (1938c). Reply to Everett J. Nelson's Criticism. *Journal of Philosophy*, 35, 127–130.
- Reichenbach, H. (1939). Dewey's Theory of Science. In Schilpp (1939, ed.), 159–192.
- Reichenbach, H. (1948). Rationalism and Empiricism: An Inquiry into the Roots of Philosophical Error. *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*, 21, 330–346.
- Reichenbach, H. (1949). *The Theory of Probability*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Reichenbach, H. (1951). *The Rise of Scientific Philosophy*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Reichenbach, H. (1952). The Syllogism Revised. *Philosophy of Science*, 19, 1–16.
- Reichenbach, H. (1965). *The Theory of Relativity and A Priori Knowledge*. Translation of Reichenbach (1920). Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Reichenbach, H. (1969). *The Axiomatization of the Theory of Relativity*. Translation of Reichenbach (1924). Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Reichenbach, M., and Cohen, R. S. (1978a, eds.). *Hans Reichenbach: Selected Writings: 1909–1953*. Vol. 1. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.

- Reichenbach, M., and Cohen, R. S. (1978b, eds.). *Hans Reichenbach: Selected Writings: 1909–1953*. Vol. 2. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
- Reinbothe, R. (2006). *Deutsch als internationale Wissenschaftssprache und der Boykott nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg*. Berlin: De Gruyter.
- Reingold, N. (1972). American Indifference to Basic Research: A Reappraisal. In G. H. Daniels (ed.), *Nineteenth-Century American Science* (pp. 38–62). Evanston, IL.: Northwestern University Press.
- Reingold, N. (1991). *Science, American Style*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
- Reisch, G. (1991). Did Kuhn Kill Logical Empiricism? *Philosophy of Science*, 58, 264–277.
- Reisch, G. (1996). A History of the “International Encyclopedia of Unified Science”. Ph.D. dissertation. University of Chicago.
- Reisch, G. (2005). *How the Cold War Transformed Philosophy of Science. To the Icy Slopes of Logic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Reisch, G. (2019). *The Politics of Paradigms: Thomas S. Kuhn, James B. Conant and the Cold War “Struggle for Men’s Minds”*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Reisch, G., and Tuboly, A. T. (2025a). Reviving the Unity of Science Movement: Philipp Frank’s Journey to Harvard. In Verhaegh (2025a, ed.), 169–190.
- Reisch, G., and Tuboly, A. T. (2025b). A Forgotten Chapter in the History of Sociology of Science: Philipp Frank’s “Good Nose”. In Schiemer (ed.), 85–108.
- Rescher, N. (1985). *The Heritage of Logical Positivism*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
- Rescher, N. (2002). *Enlightening Journey: The Autobiography of an American Scholar*. Oxford: Lexington Books.
- Richards, R. J. (2002). *The Romantic Conception of Life: Science and Philosophy in the Age of Goethe*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Richardson, A. (1990). How Not to Russell Carnap’s Aufbau. In Fine et al. (eds.), 3–14.
- Richardson, A. (1992). Logical Idealism and Carnap’s Construction of the World. *Synthese*, 93, 59–92.
- Richardson, A. (1997). Toward a History of Scientific Philosophy. *Perspectives on Science*, 5, 418–451.
- Richardson, A. (1998). *Carnap’s Construction of the World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Richardson, A. (2008). Philosophy of Science in America. In C. Misak (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of American Philosophy* (pp. 339–374). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Richardson, A. (2012). Occasions for an Empirical History of Philosophy of Science: American Philosophers of Science at Work in the 1950s and 1960s. *HOPoS: Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science*, 2, 1–20.
- Richardson, A. (2017). From Scientific to Analytic: Remarks on How Logical Positivism Became a Chapter of Analytic Philosophy. In Preston (ed.), 146–159.
- Richardson, A. (2023). *Logical Empiricism as Scientific Philosophy*. Cambridge Elements Philosophy of Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Richardson, A., and Uebel, T. (2007, eds.). *The Cambridge Companion to Logical Empiricism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Richmond, M. L. (2006). The 1909 Darwin Celebration. Reexamining Evolution in the Light of Mendel, Mutation, and Meiosis. *Isis*, 97, 447–484.
- Ricketts, T. G. (1985). Frege, the Tractatus, and the Logocentric Predicament. *Noûs*, 19, 3–15.
- Riehl, A. (1883). Über wissenschaftliche und nichtwissenschaftliche Philosophie. In *Philosophische Studien aus vier Jahrzehnten* (pp. 227–253). Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer.
- Riehl, A. (1887). *Zur Wissenschaftstheorie und Metaphysik*. Leipzig: Wilhelm Engelmann.
- Rieser, M. (1954). Remarks on the Eleventh International Congress of Philosophy, 51, 99–105.
- Ringer, F. (1969). *The Decline of the German Mandarins 1890–1933*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Ritchie, D. G. (1893). *Darwin and Hegel*. New York: Macmillan.
- Robb, A. A. (1914). *A Theory of Time and Space*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Roberts, J. H. (1988). *Darwin and the Divine in America: Protestant Intellectuals and Organic Evolution, 1859–1900*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Rockefeller Brothers Fund. (1958). *The Pursuit of Excellence: Education and the Future of America*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
- Rogers, A. K. (1906). Professor James's Theory of Knowledge. *Philosophical Review*, 15, 577–596.
- Rogers, C. T. (1980). The End-Use Problem in Engineering Ethics. *PSA: Proceedings of Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association*, 2, 464–480.
- Romizi, D. (2012). The Vienna Circle's "Scientific World-Conception": Philosophy of Science in the Political Arena. *HOPOS: Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science*, 2, 205–242.
- Romizi, D. (2024). Edgar Zilsel's Politically Engaged Philosophy of Science (1916–1932). *HOPOS: Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science*, 14, 323–360.
- Romizi, D., Wulz, M., and Nemeth, E. (2022, eds.). *Edgar Zilsel: Philosopher, Historian, Sociologist*. Cham: Springer.
- Roose, K. D., and Anderson, C. J. (1970). *A Rating of Graduate Programs*: Washington DC: American Council on Education.
- Rorty, R. (1979). *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Rorty, R. (1982). Philosophy in America Today. *American Scholar*, 51, 183–200.
- Rorty, R. (1995). Response to Richard Bernstein. In H. J. Saatkamp Jr. (ed.), *Rorty and Pragmatism* (pp. 68–71). Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press.
- Rosenfield, L. C. (1962, ed.). *Portrait of a Philosopher: Morris R. Cohen in Life and Letters*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.
- Rossiter, M. W. (1984). The History and Philosophy of Science Program at the National Science Foundation. *Isis*, 75, 95–104.
- Roszak, T. (1969). *The Making of a Counter Culture: Reflections on the Technocratic Society and Its Youthful Opposition*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
- Rowe, Mark W. (2023). *J. L. Austin: Philosopher and D-Day Intelligence Officer*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rowland, H. A. (1883). A Plea for Pure Science. *Science*, 2, 242–250.

- Royce, J. (1891). Present Ideals of American University Life. *Scribner's Magazine*, 10, 376–388.
- Royce, J. (1892). *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
- Royce, J. (1899). *The World and the Individual*. Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith.
- Royce, J. (1904). The Eternal and the Practical. *Philosophical Review*, 13, 113–142.
- Royce, J. (1908). The Problem of Truth in the Light of Recent Discussion. In D. S. Robinson (1951, ed.), *Royce's Logical Essays: Collected Logical Essays of Josiah Royce* (pp. 63–97). Dubque, IA: W. C. Brown.
- Royce, J. (1913). Introduction. In H. Poincaré, *The Foundations of Science* (pp. 9–26). Transl. by G. B. Halsted. Lancaster: Science Press.
- Royce, J. (1914). *War and Insurance*. New York: Macmillan.
- Royce, J. (1916). *The Hope of the Great Community*. New York: Macmillan.
- Royce, J., and Kernan, F. (1916). Charles Sanders Peirce. *Journal of Philosophy*, 13, 701–709.
- Rudolph, J. L. (2002). *Scientists in the Classroom: The Cold War Reconstruction of American Science Education*. New York: Palgrave.
- Russell, B. (1899). Review of *Über die Bedeutung des Weber'schen Gesetzes* by A. Meinong. *Mind*, 8, 251–256.
- Russell, B. (1903). *The Principles of Mathematics*. Cambridge: At the University Press.
- Russell, B. (1904a). Meinong's Theory of Complexes and Assumptions (I). *Mind*, 13, 204–219.
- Russell, B. (1904b). Meinong's Theory of Complexes and Assumptions (II). *Mind*, 13, 336–354.
- Russell, B. (1904c). Meinong's Theory of Complexes and Assumptions (III). *Mind*, 13, 509–524.
- Russell, B. (1905). Review of *Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie* by A. Meinong. *Mind*, 14, 530–538.
- Russell, B. (1907). On the Nature of Truth. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 7, 28–49.
- Russell, B. (1908). Transatlantic "Truth". Reprinted as William James's Conception of Truth. In *Philosophical Essays* (pp. 127–149). London: Longmans, Green.
- Russell, B. (1911a). The Basis of Realism. *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, 8, 158–161.
- Russell, B. (1911b). Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 11, 108–128.
- Russell, B. (1912). On the Relations of Universals and Particulars. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 12, 1–24.
- Russell, B. (1913a). The Nature of Sense-Data. A Reply to Dr. Dawes Hicks. *Mind*, 22, 76–81.
- Russell, B. (1913b). The Philosophical Importance of Mathematical Logic. *The Monist*, 23, 481–493.
- Russell, B. (1914a). *Our Knowledge of the External World as a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy*. Chicago, IL: Open Court.
- Russell, B. (1914b). *War: The Offspring of Fear*. London: Union of Democratic Control.

- Russell, B. (1914c). On the Nature of Acquaintance. I. Preliminary Description of Experience. *The Monist*, 24, 1–16.
- Russell, B. (1914d). On the Nature of Acquaintance. II. Neutral Monism. *The Monist*, 24, 161–187.
- Russell, B. (1914e). Mysticism and Logic. *Hibbert Journal*, 12, 780–803.
- Russell, B. (1914f). Scientific Method in Philosophy. In *Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays* (pp. 75–93). London: Allen & Unwin.
- Russell, B. (1915). Justice in War-Time. Manchester: National Labour Press.
- Russell, B. (1919a). Professor Dewey's *Essays in Experimental Logic*. *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, 16, 5–26.
- Russell, B. (1919b). *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*. London: Allen & Unwin.
- Russell, B. (1919c). On Propositions: What They Are and How They Mean. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volumes*, 2, 1–43.
- Russell, B. (1924). The American Intelligentsia. In Feinberg and Kasrils (1973, eds.), 232–235.
- Russell, B. (1926). Relativity: Philosophical Consequences. *Encyclopedia Britannica*. Thirteenth edition (pp. 331–332). London: The Encyclopædia Britannica Company.
- Russell, B. (1928). Optimistic America. In Feinberg and Kasrils (1973), 249–252.
- Russell, B. (1929). *Marriage and Morals*. London: George Allen & Unwin.
- Russell, B. (1959). *My Philosophical Development*. London: George Allen & Unwin.
- Russell, B. (1975). *Autobiography*. London: Allen & Unwin.
- Ryckman, T. (1991). *Conditio sine qua non?* Zuordnung in the early epistemologies of Cassirer and Schlick. *Erkenntnis*, 88, 57–95.
- Ryckman, T. (2018). Early Philosophical Interpretations of General Relativity. In E. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/genrel-early/>.
- Sale, K. (1973). *SDS*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Salmon, M. H. (1992). Introduction. In M. H. Salmon, J. Earman, C. Glymour, J. Lennnox, P. Machamer, J. McGuire, J. Norton, W. Salmon, and K. Schaffner (eds.), *Introduction to the Philosophy of Science* (pp. 1–5). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Salmon, W. (1953). The Uniformity of Nature. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 14, 39–48.
- Salmon, W. (1957a). The Predictive Inference. *Philosophy of Science*, 24, 180–190.
- Salmon, W. (1957b). Should We Attempt to Justify Induction. *Philosophical Studies*, 8, 33–38.
- Salmon, W. (1963). On Vindicating Induction. *Philosophy of Science*, 30, 252–261.
- Salmon, W. (1965). The Status of Prior Probabilities in Statistical Explanation. *Philosophy of Science*, 33, 137–146.
- Salmon, W. (1968). The Justification of Inductive Rules of Inference. In I. Lakatos (ed.), *The Problem of Inductive Logic* (pp. 24–43). Amsterdam: North-Holland.
- Salmon, W. (1970). Bayes's Theorem and the History of Science. In R. H. Stuewer (ed.), *Historical and Philosophical Perspectives of Science* (pp. 68–86). Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Vol. 5. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Salmon, W. (1974). Comments on "Hempel's Ambiguity" by J. Alberto Coffa. *Synthese*, 28, 165–170.

- Salmon, W. (1977a). A Third Dogma of Empiricism. In R. E. Butts and J. Hintikka (eds.), *Basic Problems in Methodology and Linguistics* (pp. 149–166). Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
- Salmon, W. (1977c). Objectively Homogeneous Reference Classes. *Synthese*, 36, 399–414.
- Salmon, W. (1978). Hans Reichenbach, A Memoir. In Reichenbach and Cohen (1978a, eds.), 69–77.
- Salmon, W. (1979a). *Hans Reichenbach: Logical Empiricist*. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
- Salmon, W. (1979b). The Philosophy of Hans Reichenbach. In Salmon (1979a), 1–84.
- Salmon, W. (1979c). Why Ask, “Why?”?—An Inquiry Concerning Scientific Explanation. In Salmon (1979a), 403–426.
- Salmon, W. (1982). Further Reflections. In R. McLaughlin (ed.), *What? Where? When? Why? Essays on Induction, Space and Time, Explanation* (pp. 231–280). Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
- Salmon, W. (1983). Carl G. Hempel on the Rationality of Science. *Journal of Philosophy*, 80, 555–562.
- Salmon, W. (1984). *Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Salmon, W. (1988). In Memoriam: J. Alberto Coffa. In Grünbaum and Salmon (1988, eds.), xxi–xxiv.
- Salmon, W. (1989). Four Decades of Scientific Explanation. In Kitcher and Salmon (eds.), 3–219.
- Salmon, W. (1990a). Rationality and Objectivity in Science, or Tom Kuhn Meets Tom Bayes. In C. Wade Savage (ed.), *Scientific Theories* (pp. 175–204). Minnesota Studies in Philosophy of Science. Vol. XIV. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Salmon, W. (1990b). The Appraisal of Theories: Kuhn Meets Bayes. *Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association*, 2, 325–332.
- Salmon, W. (1999a). The Spirit of Logical Empiricism: Carl G. Hempel's Role in Twentieth-Century Philosophy of Science. *Philosophy of Science*, 66, 333–350.
- Salmon, W. (1999b). Ornithology in a Cubical World: Reichenbach on Scientific Realism. In D. Greenberger, W. L. Reiter and A. Zeilinger (eds.), *Epistemological and Experimental Perspectives on Quantum Physics* (pp. 305–315). Dordrecht: Kluwer.
- Salmon, W. (1999c). Logical Positivism, Logical Empiricism, and Thomas Kuhn. Comment on Robert Butts. In M. C. Galavotti and A. Pagnini (eds.), *Experience, Reality, and Scientific Explanation. Essays in Honor of Merrilee and Wesley Salmon* (pp. 209–212). Dordrecht: Springer.
- Salmon, W. (2000). Logical Empiricism. In W. H. Newton-Smith (ed.), *A Companion to the Philosophy of Science* (pp. 233–242). Oxford: Blackwell.
- Salmon, W., and Wolters, G. (1994, eds.). *Logic, Language, and the Structure of Scientific Theories*. Proceedings of the Carnap-Reichenbach Centennial, University of Konstanz, May 21–24, 1991. Pittsburgh-Konstanz Series in the Philosophy and History of Science. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Salomon, J-J. (1977). Science Policy Studies and the Development of Science Policy. In Spiegel-Rösing and Price (eds.), 43–70.
- Sánchez-Ron, J. (1987). The Reception of Special Relativity in Great Britain. In Glick (ed.), 27–58.

- Sánchez-Ron, J. (1992). The Reception of General Relativity among British Physicists and Mathematicians (1915–1920). In J. Eisenstaedt and A. J. Kox (eds.), *Studies in the History of General Relativity* (pp. 57–88). Boston, MA: Birkhäuser.
- Sánchez-Ron, J. (2012). The Early Reception of Einstein’s Relativity among British Philosophers. In C. Lehner, J. Renn, and M. Schemmel (eds.), *Einstein and the Changing Worldviews of Physics* (pp. 73–116). New York: Springer.
- Sandner, G. (2022). The Winding Road to Logical Empiricism: Philosophers of Science and the Youth Movement. In Damböck et al. (2022, eds.), 15–40.
- Santayana, G. (1916). *Egotism in German Philosophy*. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons.
- Sanua, M. (1987). Stages in the Development of Jewish Life at Princeton University. *American Jewish History*, 76, 391–415.
- Sarkar, S. (1996, ed.). *Science and Philosophy in the Twentieth Century: Basic Works of Logical Empiricism*. London: Routledge
- Sarkar, S. (2024). *The Vienna Circle: The Story of Logical Empiricism*. London: Routledge.
- Scheffler, I. (1982). *Science and Subjectivity*. Second edition. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.
- Schiemer, G. (2025, ed.). *The Legacy of the Vienna Circle*. Cham: Springer.
- Schiller, F. C. S. (1902). “Useless” Knowledge: A Discourse Concerning Pragmatism. *Mind*, 11, 196–215.
- Schiller, F. C. S. (1903). Review of *The Functional versus the Representational Theory of Knowledge in Locke’s Essay* by A. W. Moore. *Mind*, 12, 114.
- Schilpp, P. A. (1930). Survey of American Philosophy. *Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 5, 270–278.
- Schilpp, P. A. (1932, ed.). *Lectures in Philosophy*. College of the Pacific Publications in Philosophy. Stockton, CA: College of the Pacific.
- Schilpp, P. A. (1935). Is “Standpoint Philosophy” Possible? *Philosophical Review*, 44, 227–253.
- Schilpp, P. A. (1939, ed.). *The Philosophy of John Dewey*. Vol I. Library of Living Philosophers. Vol. 1. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
- Schilpp, P. A. (1963, ed.). *The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap*. Vol. XI. Library of Living Philosophers. Vol. 11. La Salle, IL: Open Court.
- Schlauch, M. (1942). Semantics as Social Evasion. *Science and Society*, 6, 315–330.
- Schlick, M. (1917). *Raum und Zeit in der gegenwärtigen Physik*. Transl. by H. L. Brose (1920). *Space and Time in Contemporary Physics*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Schlick, M. (1918). *Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre*. Berlin: Springer.
- Schlick, M. (1928). Preface to: Friedrich Waismann, Logik, Sprache, Philosophie. Kritik der Philosophie. In Mulder and van de Velde-Schlick (1979b, eds.), 130–138.
- Schlick, M. (1929). Review of *The Logic of Modern Physics* by P. W. Bridgman. In J. Friedl and H. Rutte (2008, eds.), *Moritz Schlick Gesamtausgabe. Band 6: Die Wiener Zeit: Aufsätze, Beiträge, Rezensionen 1926–1936* (pp. 187–191). Vienna: Springer.
- Schlick, M. (1930a). The Turning Point in Philosophy. In Mulder and van de Velde-Schlick (1979b, eds.), 154–160.
- Schlick, M. (1930b). *Fragen der Ethik*. Vienna: Springer. Transl. by D. Rynin (1939). *Problems of Ethics*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

- Schlick, M. (1931). Die Kausalität in der gegenwärtigen Physik. *Die Naturwissenschaften*, 19, 145–162.
- Schlick, M. (1932a). Causality in Everyday Life and in Recent Science. In G. Adams, J. Loewenberg, and S. Pepper (eds.), *Causality* (pp. 99–125). Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Schlick, M. (1932b). Form and Content. An Introduction to Philosophical Thinking. In Mulder and van de Velde-Schlick (1979b, eds.), 285–369.
- Schlick, M. (1932c). The Future of Philosophy. In Schilpp (1932, ed.), 45–64.
- Schlick, M. (1932d). A New Philosophy of Experience. In Schilpp (1932, ed.), 107–123.
- Schlick, M. (1934). Über das Fundament der Erkenntnis. Transl. by P. Heath. On the Foundation of Knowledge. In Mulder and van de Velde-Schlick (1979b, eds.), 370–387.
- Schlick, M. (1935a). Facts and Propositions. In Mulder and van de Velde-Schlick (1979b, eds.), 400–404.
- Schlick, M. (1935b). Unanswerable Questions? In Mulder and van de Velde-Schlick (1979b, eds.), 414–419.
- Schlick, M. (1936). Meaning and Verification. *Philosophical Review*, 45, 339–369.
- Schliesser, E. (2022). Philosophy of Science as First Philosophy: The Liberal Polemics of Ernest Nagel. In Neuber and Tuboly (eds.), 233–255.
- Schmalzer, S., Chard, D. S., and Botelho, A. (2018). Introduction: Science for the People, the 1970s and Today. In S. Schmalzer, D. S. Chard and A. Botelho (eds.), *Science for the People: Documents from America's Movement of Radical Scientists* (pp. 1–11). Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.
- Schrecker, E. (1986). *No Ivory Tower: McCarthyism and the Universities*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Schrecker, E. (2021). *The Lost Promise: American Universities in the 1960s*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Schurman, J. G. (1892). Prefatory Note. *Philosophical Review*, 1, 1–8.
- Schwarz, S. P. (2014). *A Brief History of Analytic Philosophy: From Russell to Rawls*. Malden, MA: Wiley.
- Scriven, M. (1969). Logical Positivism and the Behavioral Sciences. In Achinstein and Barker (eds.), 195–210.
- Sellars, R. W. (1927). Current Realism in Great Britain and United States. *The Monist*, 37, 503–520.
- Sellars, R. W. (1969). *Reflections on American Philosophy from Within*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Sellars, W. F. (1956). Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. In Feigl and Scriven (eds.), 253–329.
- Sellars, W. F. (1975). Autobiographical Reflections. In H.-N. Castañeda (ed.), *Action, Knowledge, and Reality: Critical Studies in Honor of Wilfrid Sellars* (pp. 277–294). Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
- Sellars, W. F. and Hospers, J. (1952, eds.). *Readings in Ethical Theory*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
- Shaffer, R. (1987). Jews, Reds, and Violets: Anti-Semitism and Anti-Radicalism at New York University, 1916–1929. *Journal of Ethnic Studies*, 15, 47–83.

- Shan, Y. (2024, ed.). *Rethinking Thomas Kuhn's Legacy*. Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science. Vol. 345. Cham: Springer.
- Shapere, D. (1964). Review of *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* by T. Kuhn. *Philosophical Review*, 73, 383–394.
- Shapere, D. (1966). Meaning and Scientific Change. In *Reason and the Search for Knowledge* (pp. 58–101). Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
- Shapere, D. (1969). Notes toward a Post-Positivist Interpretation of Science. In Achinstein and Barker (eds.), 115–162.
- Shapere, D. (1982). *Reason and the Search for Knowledge*. Dordrecht: Reidel.
- Sheldon, W. H. (1904). Review of *Studies in Logical Theory* by John Dewey. *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods* 1, 100–105.
- Sheldon, W. H. (1922). The Dichotomy of Nature. *Journal of Philosophy*, 19, 365–381.
- Sheldon, W. H. (1945). Critique of Naturalism. *Journal of Philosophy*, 42, 253–270.
- Sheldon, W. H. (1954). *God and Polarity: A Synthesis of Philosophies*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Sheldon, W. H. (1962). *Rational Religion: The Philosophy of Christian Love*. New York: Philosophical Library.
- Shook, J. R. (1995). John Dewey's Struggle with American Realism, 1904–1910. *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society*, 31, 542–566.
- Shook, J. R. (2005, ed.). *The Dictionary of Modern American Philosophers*. Vols. 1–4. Bristol: Thoemmes Press.
- Shryock, R. H. (1948). American Indifference to Basic Science during the Nineteenth Century. *Archives Internationales d'Histoire des Sciences*, 5, 50–65.
- Sigmund, K. (2017). *Exact Thinking in Demented Times: The Vienna Circle and the Epic Quest for the Foundations of Science*. New York: Basic Books.
- Sinaceur, H. (2000). Address at the Princeton University Bicentennial Conference on Problems of Mathematics, by Alfred Tarski. *Bulletin of Symbolic*, 6, 1–44.
- Skidelsky, E. (2007). The Strange Death of British Idealism. *Philosophy and Literature*, 31, 41–51.
- Skinner, B. F. (1931). The Concept of the Reflex in the Description of Behavior. Ph.D. thesis. Harvard University.
- Smart, H. R. (1925). Review of *La Déduction Relativiste* by E. Myerson. *Philosophical Review*, 34, 511–513.
- Smith, B. (1994). *Austrian Philosophy: The Legacy of Franz Brentano*. New York: Open Court.
- Smith, J. E. (1957). The Course of American Philosophy. *Review of Metaphysics*, 11, 279–303.
- Smith, L. D. (1986). *Behaviorism and Logical Positivism: A Reassessment of the Alliance*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Smith, W. B. (1921). Relativity and Its Philosophic Interpretations. *The Monist*, 31, 481–511.
- Snow, C. P. (1959). *The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

- Soames, S. (2014). Analytic Philosophy in America. In *Analytic Philosophy in America: And Other Historical and Contemporary Essays* (pp. 3–34). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Sober, E. (2000). Quine's Two Dogmas. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes*, 74, 237–299.
- Sopka, K. (1986). *Physics for a New Century: Papers Presented at the 1904 St. Louis Congress*. New York: Tomash.
- Spaulding, E. G. (1910). The Logical Structure of Self-Refuting Systems: I. Phenomenalism. *Philosophical Review*, 19, 276–301.
- Spaulding, E. G. (1912). A Defense of Analysis. In Holt et al. (1912, eds.), pp. 155–251.
- Spence, K. W., Bergmann, G., and Lippitt, R. (1950). A Study of Simple Learning under Irrelevant Motivational-Reward Conditions. *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 40, 539–551.
- Spengler, O. (1918). *Der Untergang des Abendlandes: Umriss einer Morphologie der Weltgeschichte*. Vol. 1: Gestalt und Wirklichkeit. Munich: Beck.
- Spiegel-Rösing, I (1977). The Study of Science, Technology and Society (SSTS): Recent Trends and Future Challenges. In Spiegel-Rösing and Price (eds.), 7–42.
- Spiegel-Rösing, I., and Price, D. J. (1977, eds.). *Science, Technology and Society: A Cross-Disciplinary Perspective*. London: Sage.
- Stadler, F. (1979). Aspekte des gesellschaftlichen Hintergrunds und Standorts des Wiener Kreises am Beispiel der Universität Wien. Transl. by T. Uebel as Aspects of the Social Background and Position of the Vienna Circle at the University of Vienna. In T. Uebel (1991, ed.), *Rediscovering the Forgotten Vienna Circle* (pp. 51–77). Dordrecht: Kluwer.
- Stadler, F. (1981). Spätaufklärung und Sozialdemokratie in Wien 1918–38. In F. Kadrnoska (ed.), *Aufbruch und Untergang: Österreichische Kultur zwischen 1918 und 1938* (pp. 441–73). Vienna: Europaverlag.
- Stadler, F. (1993, ed.). *Scientific Philosophy: Origins and Development*. Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook. Vol 1. Dordrecht: Springer.
- Stadler, F. (2011). The Road to *Experience and Prediction* from Within: Hans Reichenbach's Scientific Correspondence from Berlin to Istanbul. *Erkenntnis*, 181, 137–155.
- Stadler, F. (2015). *The Vienna Circle: Studies in the Origins, Development, and Influence of Logical Empiricism*. Cham: Springer.
- Stadler, F. (2019, ed.). *Ernst Mach: Life, Work, Influence*. Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook. Cham: Springer.
- Stallo, J. B. (1882). *The Concepts and Theories of Modern Physics*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench.
- Stebbing, S. (1933). *Logical Positivism and Analysis*. London: H. Milford.
- Stern, R. and Williams, N. W. (2019). James and Hegel: Looking for a Home. In A. Klein (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of William James* (pp. 430–49). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Stevens, S. S. (1935a). The Operational Basis of Psychology. *American Journal of Psychology*, 47, 323–330.
- Stevens, S. S. (1935b). The Operational Definition of Psychological Concepts. *Psychological Review*, 42, 517–527.

- Stevenson, C. L. (1944). *Ethics and Language*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Strassfeld, J. (2020). American Divide: The Making of “Continental” Philosophy. *Modern Intellectual History*, 17, 833–866.
- Strassfeld, J. (2022). *Inventing Philosophy’s Other: Phenomenology in America*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Strong, C. A. (1921). The Meaning of “Meaning”. *Mind*, 30, 313–316.
- Strong, C. A. (1922). Mr. Russell’s Theory of the External World. *Mind*, 31, 307–320.
- Stump, D. (1991). Poincaré’s Thesis of the Translatability of Euclidean and non-Euclidean Geometries. *Noûs*, 25, 639–657.
- Sturt, H. (1902). The Logic of Pragmatism. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 3, 96–122.
- Sturt, H. (1910). Review of *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and Other Essays* by John Dewey. *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, 7, 557–579.
- Sullivan, D. (2023). Hermann Lotze. In E. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2023/entries/hermann-lotze>.
- Suppes, P. (1979). Self-Profile. In R. J. Bogdan (ed.), *Patrick Suppes* (pp. 3–56). Dordrecht: Reidel.
- Swenson, Jr., L. S. (1972). *The Ethereal Aether: A History of the Michelson-Morley-Miller Aether-Drift Experiments, 1880–1930*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Sznajder, M. (2024). Janina Hosiasson-Lindenbaum on Analogical Reasoning: New Sources. *Erkenntnis*, 89, 1349–1365.
- Talisce, R. B. (2007). *A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy*. London: Routledge.
- Talisce, R. B. (2013). Recovering American Philosophy. *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society*, 49, 424–433.
- Taylor, C. (1980). Theories of Meaning. *Continental Philosophy Review*, 13, 281–302.
- Taylor, R. (1963). Seventh Cleveland Meeting. *Science*, 140, 907–922.
- ten Hagen, S. L. (2020). The Local versus the Global in the History of Relativity: The Case of Belgium. *Science in Context*, 33, 227–250.
- Tennant, N. (1994). Carnap and Quine. In Salmon and Wolters, 305–344.
- Thayer, H. (1968). *Meaning and Action: A Critical History of Pragmatism*. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs Merrill.
- Thiel, C. (1993). Carnap und die wissenschaftliche Philosophie auf der Erlanger Tagung 1923. In R. Haller and F. Stadler (eds.), *Wien-Berlin-Prag. Der Aufstieg der wissenschaftlichen Philosophie* (pp. 175–188). Vienna: Hölde-Pichler-Tempsky.
- Thilly, F. (1914). *A History of Philosophy*. New York: Henry Holt.
- Thilly, F. (1920). Review of *The Present Conflict of Ideals* by R. Perry. *Philosophical Review*, 29, 184–191.
- Thilly, F. (1926). Contemporary American Philosophy. *Philosophical Review*, 35, 522–538.
- Thilly, F., and Wood, L. (1956). *A History of Philosophy*. Third edition. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
- Thorndike, E. L. (1909). Darwin’s Contribution to Psychology. In E. L. Thorndike (1962, ed.), *Psychology and the Science of Education* (pp. 37–47). Richmond: William Byrd.
- Tolman, E. C. (1935). Psychology versus Immediate Experience. *Philosophy of Science*, 2, 356–380.

- Toulmin, S. (1951). Review of *Relativity: A Richer Truth* by P. Frank. *Philosophical Quarterly* 1, 180–181.
- Tuboly, A. T. (2020, ed.). *The Historical and Philosophical Significance of Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Tuboly, A. T. (2021a). To the Icy Slopes in the Melting Pot: Forging Logical Empiricisms in the Context of American Pragmatism. *HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science*, 11, 27–71.
- Tuboly, A. T. (2021b). Building a New Thursday Circle. Carnap and Frank in Prague. In C. Damböck and G. Wolters (eds.), *Young Carnap in an Historical Context: 1918–1935* (pp. 243–264). Cham: Springer.
- Tuboly, A. T. (forthcoming). The Chicago Years. In Damböck and Schiemer (eds.).
- Uebel, T. (1991, ed.). *Rediscovering the Forgotten Vienna Circle: Austrian Studies on Otto Neurath and the Vienna Circle*. Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science. Vol. 133. Dordrecht: Springer.
- Uebel, T. (2004). Education, Enlightenment and Positivism: The Vienna Circle's Scientific World-Conception Revisited. *Science and Education*, 13, 41–66.
- Uebel, T. (2007). *Empiricism at the Crossroads: The Vienna Circle's Protocol-Sentence Debate*. Chicago, IL: Open Court.
- Uebel, T. (2013). “Logical Positivism”—“Logical Empiricism”: What's in a Name. *Perspectives on Science*, 21, 58–99.
- Uebel, T. (2019). Verificationism and (Some of) Its Discontents. *Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy*, 7, 1–31.
- Uebel, T. (2022). The Bipartite Metatheory Conception of Philosophy. In Uebel and Limbeck-Lilienau (eds.), 361–370.
- Uebel, T. (2024). Vienna Circle. In E. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2024/entries/vienna-circle/>.
- Uebel, T., and Limbeck-Lilienau, C. (2022, eds.). *The Routledge Handbook of Logical Empiricism*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Urban, W. (1937). Value Propositions and Verifiability. *Journal of Philosophy*, 34, 589–602.
- Urban, W. J. (2010). *More than Science and Sputnik: The National Defense Education Act of 1958*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
- Vaesen, K., and Katzav, J. (2019). The National Science Foundation and Philosophy of Science's Withdrawal from Social Concerns. *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A*, 78, 73–82.
- Van Becelaere, E. G. L. (1904). *La Philosophie en Amérique*. New York: Eclectic.
- Van de Walle, W. E. (1928). Review of *The Logic of Modern Physics* by P. W. Bridgman. *Philosophical Review*, 37, 285–290.
- Van der Schaar, M. (2013). *G. F. Stout and the Psychological Origins of Analytic Philosophy*. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Van Eck, N. J., and Waltman, L. (2009). How to Normalize Co-Occurrence Data? An Analysis of Some Well-Known Similarity Measures. *Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology*, 60, 1635–1651.
- Van Eck, N. J., and Waltman, L. (2010). Software Survey: VOSviewer, a Computer Program for Bibliometric Mapping. *Scientometrics*, 84, 523–538.

- Van Strien, M. (2024). The Challenge of Quantum Mechanics to the Rationality of Science: Philosophers of Science on Bohr. *International Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, 37, 219–241.
- Verhaegh, S. (2018). *Working from Within: The Nature and Development of Quine's Naturalism*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Verhaegh, S. (2020a). The American Reception of Logical Positivism: First Encounters (1929–1932). *HOPOS: Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science*, 10, 106–142.
- Verhaegh, S. (2020b). Coming to America: Carnap, Reichenbach, and the Great Intellectual Migration. Part I: Rudolf Carnap. *Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy*, 8, 1–23.
- Verhaegh, S. (2020c). Coming to America: Carnap, Reichenbach, and the Great Intellectual Migration. Part II: Hans Reichenbach. *Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy*, 8, 24–47.
- Verhaegh, S. (2021). Psychological Operationisms at Harvard: Skinner, Boring, and Stevens. *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences*, 57, 194–212.
- Verhaegh, S. (2022a). Nagel's Philosophical Development. In Neuber and Tuboly (2022, eds.), 43–65.
- Verhaegh, S. (2022b). Susanne Langer and the American Development of Analytic Philosophy. In Peijnenburg and Verhaegh (2022, eds.), 219–245.
- Verhaegh, S. (2023a). Carnap and Quine: First Encounters (1932–1936). In S. Morris (ed.), *The Philosophical Project of Carnap and Quine* (pp. 11–31). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Verhaegh, S. (2023b). Lewis and Quine in Context. *Asian Journal of Philosophy*, 2, 1–9.
- Verhaegh, S. (2024a). Susanne Langer and the Harvard School of Analysis. In L. Gaikis (ed.), *The Bloomsbury Handbook of Susanne K. Langer* (pp. 21–34). London: Bloomsbury.
- Verhaegh, S. (2024b). The Reception of Relativity in American Philosophy. *Philosophy of Science*, 91, 468–487.
- Verhaegh, S. (2024c). Logical Positivism: The History of a “Caricature”. *Isis*, 115, 46–64.
- Verhaegh, S. (2025a, ed.). *American Philosophy and the Intellectual Migration: Pragmatism, Logical Empiricism, Phenomenology, Critical Theory*. Berlin: De Gruyter.
- Verhaegh, S. (2025b). Introduction: American Philosophy and the Intellectual Migration. In Verhaegh (2025a), 1–28.
- Verhaegh, S. (2025c). Columbia Naturalism and the Analytic Turn: Eclipse or Synthesis? In Verhaegh (2025a), 77–99.
- Verhaegh, S. (2025d). The Analytic Turn in American Philosophy: An Institutional Perspective—Part 1: Scientific versus Humanistic Philosophy. *HOPOS: Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science*, 15, 61–98.
- Verhaegh, S. (2025e). The Analytic Turn in American Philosophy: An Institutional Perspective—Part 2: Analytic versus Continental Philosophy. *HOPOS: Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science*, 15, 354–388.
- Verhaegh, S. (2025f). Justified True Belief: The Remarkable History of Mainstream Epistemology. *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 63, 285–307.

- Verhaegh, S. (2026). Naturalism. In Padovani and Tuboly (eds.), 231–240.
- Verhaegh, S. (forthcoming-a). Carnap and Reichenbach. In Damböck and Schiemer (eds.),
- Verhaegh, S. (forthcoming-b). External Relations: Russell, New Realism, and the Harvard School of Logic. *Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy*.
- Verhaegh, S. (forthcoming-c). Golden Age/Gilded Cage: Logical Empiricism as Analytic Philosophy. In Love and Verhaegh (eds.).
- Verhaegh, S., Petrovich, E., and Bös, G. (2025). The American Reception of Logical Empiricism: A Mention-Based Bibliometric Analysis. In Schiemer (ed.), 109–130.
- Veysey, L. R. (1965). *The Emergence of the American University*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Vlastos, G. (1954). The Third Man Argument in the Parmenides. *Philosophical Review*, 63, 319–349.
- Vlastos, G. (1978). Introduction. In: *Plato: A Collection of Critical Essay*. Vol. I: Metaphysics and Epistemology (pp.1–6). Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Vogt, K. (1845). *Physiologische Briefe für Gebildete aller Stände*. Giessen: J. Ricker'sche.
- Vrahimis, A. (2020). Scientism, Social Praxis, and Overcoming Metaphysics: A Debate between Logical Empiricism and the Frankfurt School. *HOPOS: Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science*, 10, 562–597.
- Wald, A. M. (1987). *The New York Intellectuals: The Rise and Decline of the Anti-Stalinist Left from the 1930s to the 1980s*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Walkowitz, D. (2021). The Jewish Working Class in America. In J. Dailey (ed.), *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of American History*.
<https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780199329175.013.935>.
- Wall, P. (1974). How Scientific Are Political Science Models? *Political Methodology*, 1, 83–118.
- Walter, M. L. (1990). *Science and Cultural Crisis: An Intellectual Biography of Percy Williams Bridgman*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Waltman, L., Van Eck, N. J., and Noyons, E. (2010). A Unified Approach to Mapping and Clustering of Bibliometric Networks. *Journal of Informetrics*, 4, 629–635.
- Warnock, G. J. (1958). *English Philosophy since 1900*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Warren, H. C., Calkins, M. W., Dunlap, K., Gardiner, N., and Ruckmick, C. A. (1918). Definitions and Limitations of Psychological Terms. *Psychological Bulletin*, 15, 89–95
- Warren, H. C., Calkins, M. W., Dunlap, K., Gardiner, N., and Ruckmick, C. A. (1925). Definitions and Limitations of Psychological Terms, III. *Psychological Bulletin*, 22, 370–374.
- Wartofsky, M. W. (1980). The Critique of Impure Reason II: Sin, Science, and Society. *Science, Technology, and Human Values*, 6, 5–23.
- Warwick, A. (1992). Cambridge Mathematics and Cavendish Physics: Cunningham, Campbell and Einstein's Relativity 1905–1911. Part I: The Uses of Theory. *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A*, 23, 626–656.
- Watson, R. A. (1993). Shadow History in Philosophy. *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 31, 95–109.
- Weatherston, B. (2022). *A History of Philosophy Journals, Volume 1: Evidence from Topic Modeling, 1876–2013*. Ann Arbor, MI: Maize Press.

- Weinberg, J. (1936). *An Examination of Logical Positivism*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company.
- Weir, T. H. (2014). *Secularism and Religion in Nineteenth-Century Germany*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Weiss, P. (1931). Two-Valued Logic: Another Approach. *Erkenntnis*, 2, 242–261.
- Weiss, P. (1934). Metaphysics: The Domain of Ignorance. *Philosophical Review*, 43, 402–406.
- Werner, A. (2013). *The Transatlantic World of Higher Education: Americans at German Universities, 1776–1914*. New York: Berghahn.
- Wessels, L. (1975). Schrödinger's Interpretations of Wave Mechanics. Ph.D. dissertation. Indiana University.
- Wessels, L. (1991). Editor's preface. In Coffa (1991), ix–x.
- Weyl, H. (1921). *Space-Time-Matter*. London: Methuen.
- Wheatland, T. (2009). *The Frankfurt School in Exile*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- White, M. (1999). *A Philosopher's Story*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Whitehead, A. N. (1917). *The Organization of Thought: Educational and Scientific*. London: Williams & Norgate.
- Whitehead, A. N. (1920). *The Concept of Nature*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Whitehead, A. N. (1922). *The Principle of Relativity with Applications to Physical Science*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Whitehead, A. N., and Russell, B. (1910). *Principia Mathematica*. Vol. I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Second edition 1925.
- Willis, K. (1989). "This Place is Hell": Bertrand Russell at Harvard, 1914. *New England Quarterly*, 62, 3–26.
- Wilson, D. J. (1990). *Science, Community, and the Transformation of American Philosophy*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Wilson, F. (2007). Placing Bergmann. In Addis et al. (eds.), 185–274.
- Wind, E. (1925a). Contemporary German Philosophy. I. *Journal of Philosophy*, 22, 477–493.
- Wind, E. (1925b). Contemporary German Philosophy. II. *Journal of Philosophy*, 22, 516–530.
- Wind, E. (1927). Alfred C. Elsbach's Kant und Einstein. *Journal of Philosophy*, 24, 64–71.
- Winnie, J. (1977). The Causal Structure of Space-Time. In J. Earman, C. Glymour and J. Stachel (eds.), *The Foundations of Space-Time Theories* (pp. 134–205). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Wittgenstein, L. (1922). *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. Transl. by F. P. Ramsey and C. K. Ogden. London: Kegan Paul.
- Wittgenstein, L. (1953). *Philosophical Investigations*. Transl. by G. E. Anscombe. New York: Macmillan.
- Wittke, C. (1948). The German Forty-Eighters in America: A Centennial Appraisal. *American Historical Review*, 53, 711–725.
- Woessner, M. (2011). *Heidegger in America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wolenski, J. (1989). *Logic and Philosophy in the Lvov-Warsaw School*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
- Wolin, R. (2009). *Heidegger's Children: Hannah Arendt, Karl Lowith, Hans Jonas, and Herbert Marcuse*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

- Wood, L. (1941). *The Analysis of Knowledge*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Woodbridge, F. J. E. (1903). The Problem of Metaphysics. *Philosophical Review*, 12, 367–385.
- Woodbridge, F. J. E. (1905). Of What Sort Is Cognitive Experience? *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, 2, 573–576.
- Woodbridge, F. J. E. (1929). The Promise of Pragmatism. *Journal of Philosophy*, 26, 541–552.
- Woodbridge, F. J. E. (1932). The Nature of Man. *American Scholar*, 1, 81–96.
- Woodbridge, F. J. E., and Cattell, J. M. (1904). Notes and News. *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods* 1, 27–28.
- Worrall, J. (2000). Kuhn, Bayes and “Theory-Choice”: How Revolutionary Is Kuhn’s Account of Theoretical Change? In R. Nola and H. Sankey (eds.), *After Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend* (pp. 125–151). Amsterdam: Kluwer.
- Wray, K. B. (2021). *Kuhn’s Intellectual Path: Charting The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Zammito, J. H. (2004). *A Nice Derangement of Epistemes: Post-Positivism in the Study of Science from Quine to Latour*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.